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SUMMARY
This  thesis  is  concerned  with  setting  out  the  importance  of  embodied  phenomena  to  the 
experience of videogame play, and exploring the implications of those phenomena for how 
we understand the experience of videogame play.  In particular,  it  argues that  if we are to 
understand the experience of playing videogames as it is experienced by the player, we need 
to reorientate our approach to foreground the experience of the player. By taking this path it 
diverges from much, if not most, extant research on the experience of videogame play, which, 
it is argued, focuses more on theorising the likely effects or outcomes of particular formal 
qualities  or  design decisions,  rather  than how the  experience  of  videogame play in  itself 
emerges  from the interaction between the embodied player  and the videogame during the 
course of play.  This approach opens up the phenomena of videogame play to more detailed 
and grounded accounts of the player’s relation to the interface used to play, the nature of the 
experience of engagement in the course of play, and the deep involvement of the body in the 
experience of play.
The approach and theoretical framework employed in this thesis is influenced by Dourish’s 
notion of embodied interaction, which is adapted to the context of videogame play through 
further  consideration  and  employment  of  phenomenological  concepts,  such  as  Merleau-
Ponty’s work on the importance of our embodied being and of habituated bodily experience,  
and Heidegger’s  differentiation  between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand, to  the 
articulation of the experience of videogame play.  This leads to the key recurring thematic 
concern of this thesis, namely the role played by the interface in the experience of videogame 
play. Over the course of several chapters a more expansive conceptual model of the interface 
than the more technically based definitions usually employed is developed. This expanded 
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conceptualisation of the interface is applied to the nature of the interface itself, the role played 
by its physical aspects, and how it affords the player access to, and a sense of presence within, 
the game-world. 
By understanding the embodied relation between the player and the interface used to play the 
importance  of  the  phenomena  of  bodily  experience  is  made  visible,  and  opens  up  the 
phenomena  of  videogame  play  to  more  detailed  and  grounded  accounts  of  the  player’s 
relation to the interface used to play, the nature of the experience of engagement in the course 
of play, and the deep involvement of the body in the experience of play. What emerges from 
such an approach is not only an increased understanding of the nature of the experience of 
videogame play, but also of the centrality of embodiment to that experience. This centrality of 
embodiment to the experience of videogame play is demonstrated in the final chapter, which 
employs  the  work  done  over  the  course  of  the  thesis  to  examine  and  articulate  the 
phenomenological experience of movement within game-worlds. 
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INTRODUCTION
8
Too often in the study of videogames, the actual experience of videogame play is overlooked 
in  that  it  is  not  dealt  with  directly  but  rather  as  a  secondary  concern  to  other  factors. 
Videogame  play  is  commonly  reduced  to  the  concept  of  gameplay,  a  concept  generally 
regarded as a property of the videogame being played, something possessed by the videogame 
that arises out of its particular design. However, if we are to understand the experience of 
playing videogames as it is experienced by the player, we need to reorientate our approach to 
foreground the experience of the player in our minds and ask how that experience arises not 
simply from the design of the videogame in question but rather in the interaction between the 
player and the videogame effected through the interface during the course of videogame play 
itself. This thesis will argue that the notion of embodiment presents a means of reorientating 
our approach to focus on the experience of videogame play in itself,  by conceiving of the 
player  as  an  embodied  being  so  that  the  player,  their  actions,  and  their  experience  of 
videogame play is constantly fore-grounded within the researcher’s concern. This approach is 
heavily influenced by Dourish’s notion of ‘embodied interaction’, particularly his assertion 
that it is “not simply that it is a form of interaction that is embodied, but rather that it is an 
approach to the design and analysis of interaction that takes embodiment to be central to, even 
constitutive of, the whole phenomenon” (Boehner et al. 102). A focus on embodiment allows 
us to intimately examine and analyse the nature of the experience of videogame play as an 
experience through drawing us into the moment to moment experience the player has with the 
videogame during the course of play. This approach opens up the phenomena of videogame 
play to more detailed and grounded accounts of the player’s relation to the interface used to 
play,  the  nature  of  the  experience  of  engagement  in  the  course  of  play,  and  the  deep 
involvement of the body in the experience of play. What emerges from such an approach is 
not only an increased understanding of the nature of the experience of videogame play, but 
also of the centrality of embodiment to that experience.
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This thesis does not argue that the approach it takes is in some way the only ‘correct’, or even 
‘best’ way to go about studying videogames, for as Aarseth presciently noted in 2001 “When 
faced with the rich and varied world of digital  games,  it  is  hard to think of a subject  or 
discipline that could not in some way be used to study the field” (Aarseth "Computer Game 
Studies, Year One" 1, emphasis in original). Indeed, such a situation now exists, with lenses 
as  diverse  as  marketing,  physiology,  education,  politics,  and  ethnography  being  used  to 
examine an equally diverse range of questions about videogames. What is being claimed here 
is that if we wish to understand the experience of videogame play as it is experienced in and 
of itself by a particular, actual player, then it is within the actual experience of videogame 
play that our attention must dwell. As will be detailed in Chapter One, current writing on the 
experience of videogames seems to in fact be discussing the formal properties of videogames 
that tend towards affording a particular kind of experience for the player, particularly focusing 
on why a particular videogame is ‘fun’ or ‘enjoyable’ to play; rather than the way in which 
the player, an actual player rather than a theoretical one, experiences playing that videogame, 
and  how  their  active  engagement  in  the  course  of  videogame  play  gives  rise  to  that 
experience. It is for this reason that this thesis employs the phrase ‘experience of videogame 
play’ to express the sense of the experience of videogame play as it is experienced rather than 
the more common and conventional ‘gameplay’, which as noted above has connotations of 
being something the videogame in itself possesses, rather than something experienced by the 
player as a consequence of their engagement in videogame play. As we shall see repeatedly 
throughout this thesis  the experience of videogame play is fundamentally imbued with an 
embodied aspect, which is evident in that the player has a bodily relation to the videogame 
they play, through taking up the interface used to play and incorporating it as a ready-to-hand 
extension of their bodily schema, where their intentional concern moves into the game-space, 
which the player thus comes to inhabit, not simply consciously, but also in a way bodily. 
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Thesis Outline
Chapter One aims at presenting the case for the position taken by this thesis  as a whole,  
specifically that the experience of videogame play is a fundamentally embodied experience, 
and showing how this  position relates  to  the field of videogame studies more  broadly.  It 
begins by drawing upon Leino’s case for what he describes as a first-person perspective to 
establish the over-arching orientation upon which this thesis is based. This is followed by an 
exploration  of  what  actually  constitutes  videogame  play,  noting  concerns  with  the 
connotations  implicit  within  the  term  ‘play’.  Existing  research  on  the  experience  of 
videogame play is then turned to, firstly noting the shortcomings of the common or prevailing 
approaches  in  dealing  with  the  concern  of  this  thesis  of  understanding  the  experience  of 
videogame play as it is experienced. However, this is not intended as a literature review in the 
traditional sense, as it is not aimed at providing an exhaustive overview of previous findings, 
but rather presents particular examples which illustrate and articulate the more general trends 
and underlying assumptions of such research. Secondly, promising work on the experience of 
videogame play is drawn upon to demonstrate how this thesis fits into the wider context of an 
emerging trend of research into understanding the experience of videogame play concerned 
with its embodied aspect. This section also draws upon ideas and theories from outside the 
field of videogame studies which suggest new lines of enquiry that more adequately address 
the  experience  of  videogame  play  as  it  is  experienced.  Dourish’s  notion  of  embodied 
interaction, and aspects of the work of the phenomenologists Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger, 
that Dourish as well as other scholars that form part of the emerging trend mentioned above 
draw  on  extensively,  are  particularly  in  focus  within  this  section.  This  treatment  is  not 
intended as an exhaustive coverage of these theories – to do so in some cases would entail that 
this thesis change its subject matter from the experience of videogame play to philosophical 
arguments well outside the concerns addressed here. What these theories do furnish is a set of 
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conceptual  ‘tools’,  which  will  be  employed  to  articulate  and  analyse  the  experience  of 
videogame play as it is experienced throughout the course of the thesis.
Chapter Two begins our engagement with the experience of videogame play by considering 
the interactive installation  [giantJoystick] (Flanagan  [Giantjoystick]). This work features a 
vastly oversized, but still functional Atari 2600 joystick,1 and because of this change in scale 
presents a useful example of the importance of the body to the experience of videogame play 
in terms of the player’s embodied relation to the interface used to play. The increased size of 
the joystick necessitates the involvement of the player’s entire body in the act of videogame 
play,  highlighting  both  the  importance  of  the  interface  to  the  player’s  experience  of 
videogame play, and that despite functioning in the same manner as a conventional Atari 2600 
joystick,  the  increased  size  of  [giantJoystick] means  that  it  is  unfamiliar  to  the  player. 
Importantly, it is through the player’s bodily familiarity with the interface more generally that 
that sense of immediate engagement in the activity of videogame play is facilitated, for it is 
through this familiarity that the player  can take up the interface,  in Heidegger’s terms, as 
equipment  ready-to-hand,  something  in-order-to  do  something  else  rather  than  being  the 
immediate end of the player’s intentional concern. Thus, as Heidegger argues in relation to 
equipment generally,  for the interface to be genuinely ready-to-hand it must be withdrawn 
from the player’s immediate awareness and subordinated to that which it is used in-order-to 
(Heidegger 360), specifically the activity of playing the videogame.
This withdrawal of the interface in the experience of the player is addressed in Chapter Three, 
for  in  its  withdrawal  the  interface  becomes  more  complex  conceptually  in  terms  of  the 
experience of videogame play, for in being taken up as an extension of the player’s body the 
interface  goes  beyond  what  the  limited  technically  based  understanding  of  the  interface 
1 Also known as the Atari VCS (Video Computer System)
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dominant in the field of videogame studies can account for, and thus the question of what and 
where  the  interface  is  provides  the  focus  of  this  chapter.  In  this  context  the  example  of 
EyeToy:  Play  3 (Sony  Computer  Entertainment  Europe) is  employed  to  address  this 
ambiguity of the interface, in particular formulating an understanding of the interface not as a 
thing or object in the world, but rather addressing it conceptually as the site of the relation  
between player and videogame, that which puts the player and videogame into relation and 
thus affords the player the extension of their bodily schema and intentionality into the game-
space.  Whilst  EyeToy:  Play  3 presents,  similarly  to  [giantJoystick],  an  unconventional 
example of the experience of videogame play, it is argued that its overt employment of the 
player’s body as part of the interface used to play opens up a unique avenue to exploring the 
player’s  embodied  relation  to  the interface,  leading us to  two important  implications  that 
inform the remaining chapters.  These implications  concern the way in which the player’s 
embodied relation to the interface is constitutive of their experience of videogame play by 
providing the means through which the player’s intentional concern can come to dwell within 
the world of the videogame. These implications concern firstly, the importance of the physical 
interface  in  the experience  of  videogame play – despite  its  withdrawal  from the  player’s 
immediate intentional concern – and secondly, as a result of this withdrawal of the physical 
interface, the player’s embodied relation with the deeper aspects of the interface with which 
the player acts within the game-space, namely the avatars and characters they control, and 
through which they are able to experience videogame play.
Chapter Four and Chapter Five address these two implications in turn, the former considering 
the role of the physical aspect of the interface to the player’s experience of videogame play by 
drawing upon examples of videogames that should arguably foreground the physical aspect of 
their  interface  within  the  player’s  attention  –  tangible  interface  videogames.  Particularly 
focused on are The Eye of Judgement (Sony Computer Enterainment Japan) and A Game of  
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Marbles  (Devine and Mason), which are addressed in two related areas of theory adapted 
from  the  field  of  Human-Computer  Interaction  (HCI),  tangible  computing  and  tangible 
interfaces. Chapter Five considers what role is played by the deeper levels of this expanded 
conceptualisation  of  the  interface  to  the  player’s  experience  of  videogame  play,  through 
considering how the avatars or characters used to play come to be in a particular embodied 
relation to the player. A distinction between embodiment as a state of being, and embodying 
as a dynamic act, is employed to argue that the player’s locus of manipulation does not simply 
act as a passive conduit for the player’s intentionality into the game-space, but rather is a 
feedback based process of co-embodying between the player and their locus of manipulation 
that  comes  to  shape  the  implicit  understanding  the  player  has  about  what  the  locus  of 
manipulation  is  ‘in-order-to’  within  the  game-space.   This  chapter  finishes  with  a 
consideration of how the player’s experience of a sense of feeling present in the game-space, 
that  important  aspect  of  the  experience  of  videogame  play  often  simply  described  as 
immersion,  can  be  understood  as  a  consequence  of  their  incorporating  the  locus  of 
manipulation, and the interface more generally, as a ready-to-hand extension of their bodily 
schema. Such an approach moves beyond assuming that the experience of being present in the 
game-space is based upon a kind of sensory transportation based primarily upon the visual 
verisimilitude  of  the  videogame,  where  the  player  passively  enters  into  a  suspension  of 
disbelief, to argue instead that the player’s sense of presence in the game-space arises from 
their active engagement in the experience of videogame play through the projection of their 
intentional concerns into the game-space that accompanies the incorporation of the interface 
into the player’s bodily schema. 
Chapter Six seeks to integrate the implications, namely the importance of both the physical 
interface and the locus of manipulation to the experience of videogame play, that arise out of 
Chapters  Three,  Four,  and Five,  particularly  considering  how the process  of  embodiment 
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developed over those chapters,  of the simultaneous incorporation of the interface into the 
player’s body and the extension of the player’s body into the game-space, can articulate the 
phenomenological experience of play as an experiential  whole. In a sense this question is 
intended not merely to set up an activity of verifying our conclusions so far, but rather to 
bring  these  conclusions  together  to  articulate  further  the  richness  of  the  experience  of 
videogame play, not so much to identify any gaps or omissions to be addressed but to open up 
the experience of play beyond the physical and software elements of the interface we have 
previously  focused  upon.  Thus  Chapter  Six  continues  the  concern  with  the  player’s 
experience of a sense of presence in the game-space. For, if the consequence of the argument 
developed over the course of this thesis is that the player experiences a sense of presence 
within the game-space, in a way experiencing a sense of actually being there, how does this 
consequence affect the player’s experience of videogame play, or in other words what are the 
implications  of  this  experience  of  being-in-the-game-space  for  the  player’s  experience  of 
videogame play as a whole? Drawing upon existing work in the field that employs Merleau-
Ponty’s  understanding  of  the  experience  of  spatiality,  in  particular  the  importance  of 
intentionally directed movement to the experience of space  (Flynn 55), the phenomenon of 
experiencing a sense of actual movement within the game-space is taken up and considered in 
terms of the implications developed over the course of the thesis to conclude that embodied 
phenomena and particularly the player’s embodied relation to the interface are central to the 
experience of videogame play.
A Note on Methodology and the Structure of the Thesis
Given  that  this  thesis  doesn't  contain  a  conventional  'methodology'  chapter,  a  short  note 
regarding the methodological approach taken, and in particular how the slight variations in the 
overall  approach from chapter  to  chapter  are  informed by the overall  structure and inter-
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relation  between  the  individual  chapters,  is  felt  to  be  appropriate.  In  broad  terms,  while 
Chapter One is inherently theoretical in nature, the remaining chapters in general employ a 
mixture of theoretical exposition and phenomenological investigation of particular aspects of 
the experience of videogame play. However the composure of this mixture and the nature of 
the phenomenological investigation vary according to the purposes served by the individual 
chapters within the overall structure of the thesis. For instance, Chapters Two is something of 
a bridging chapter between Chapter One and Chapters Three to Six, in that it introduces the 
general approach of the application of phenomenological concepts to specific examples, while 
the analysis remains at a theoretical rather than experiential level. As such, it is not intended 
as an articulation of the experience of playing [giantJoystick] in itself, but rather makes use of 
the installation as a way of developing the overall argument of the thesis through identifying 
and  articulating  the  importance  of  the  player's  embodied  relation  to  the  interface  in  the 
experience  of  videogame  play  which  is  further  addressed  through  phenomenological 
investigation in the later chapters.
Chapters Three to Six seek to open up the problem space of the experience of videogame 
play,  grounded  in  the  role  played  by  the  player's  embodied  relation  to  the  interface,  to 
exploration and articulation,  and as such it was felt that as broad an understanding of the 
variety of the experience of videogame play that could be included was thus advantageous. 
For  this  reason  my  own  experience  of  videogame  play  is  integrated  with  the  reported 
experiences of others, both first-hand and observed, as well as the speculative setting forth of 
the experience of what is described, following Kücklich, as model players in Chapter Five. 
However,  within  this  sequence  of  chapters  there  is  a  movement  from  the  sustained 
investigation of my personal experience of playing  Eyetoy:  Play 3  in Chapter Three,  to a 
wider number of examples, and sources of the experience of playing them, in Chapters Four 
and Five to address the insights and conclusions that arise from Chapter Three in greater 
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detail.  Chapter Six focuses on bringing together the various moments of the experience of 
videogame  play  addressed  in  the  earlier  chapters  and  employing  them  to  consider  the 
experience of videogame play as an experiential whole. As such it returns to the sustained 
consideration on my own experience of videogame play in seeking a deeper articulation of the 
experience  of  videogame play through grounding that  articulation  in  my own experience. 
Rather than attempting to account for the wider variety in the experience of videogame play 
addressed in Chapters Four and Five, we are left free to consider how the arguments made in 
those  chapters  help  us  to  articulate  and  address  the  experience  of  videogame  play  of  a 
particular player, with whose experience I am most familiar. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
THE EXPERIENCE OF VIDEOGAME PLAY
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This  chapter  argues  that  the  experience  of  videogame play  is  a  fundamentally  embodied 
experience,  setting  out  the  central  concepts,  theoretical  framework,  and  the  approach  to 
understanding the phenomena of videogame play that informs this thesis. The first section sets 
out the general theoretical approach to the experience of videogame play, a phenomenological 
or first-person orientation, and demonstrates how this diverges from other approaches to the 
study of the experience of videogame play within the field of videogames studies, noting 
important  previous  contributions  in  this  direction  from  the  field.  This  is  followed  by  a 
consideration of the notion of play more generally to attend to assumptions implicit within the 
term ‘play’ which permeate much study of the experience of videogame play, particularly the 
tendency to set play and in consequence videogames apart from everyday life. 
After having outlined the general approach and key notion of play we turn to existing research 
into  the  player’s  experience  of  videogame  play  in  more  detail.  Firstly,  what  could  be 
characterised broadly, following Leino, as objective or distanced approaches to the study of 
players’ experience of videogame play (Leino "Understanding Games as Played: Sketch for a 
First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 3-5), are addressed to highlight the 
weaknesses  which  this  thesis  addresses.  This  is  not  meant  as  a  literature  review  in  the 
traditional sense, as it is not aimed at providing an exhaustive overview of the field, but rather 
presents  particular  examples  which  illustrate  and  articulate  the  more  general  trends  and 
assumptions that permeate much of the study of players’ experience of videogame play. This 
demonstrate  how the experience  of  videogame play as  it  is  experienced has been largely 
overlooked by the field of videogame studies and the implications of this to our understanding 
of videogame play. This is followed by a section discussing countervailing research emerging 
within the field of videogame studies as well as relevant research from outside of the field, 
such as HCI and phenomenology, to identify and discuss the more specific elements of the 
approach that is taken in this thesis, and in particular to demonstrate the importance of the 
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notion of embodiment in understanding the experience of videogame play as it is experienced.
From Third to First Person
Researchers interested in player’s experience would assumedly, across 
disciplines,  agree  that  the  goal  behind  enquiries  into  player’s 
experience is to understand how games’ features end up affecting the 
player’s  experience.  Much  of  the  contemporary  interdisciplinary 
research  into  player’s  experience  leans  towards  the  empirical-
scientific,  in  the  forms  [of]  (neuro)psychology,  sociology  and 
cognitive  science,  to name a few. In such approaches,  for example 
demonstrating correlation between physiological symptoms and an in-
game event may amount to ‘understanding’.
However, the experience of computer game play is a viable topic also 
for computer game studies within the general tradition of humanities. 
In such context, the idea of ‘understanding an experience’ invites an 
approach  focusing  on  the  experienced  significance of  events  and 
objects  within  computer  game  play.  This  focus,  in  turn,  suggest 
turning  to  the  principles  associated  with  (broadly  speaking) 
phenomenology, among which is the idea of describing things as they 
appear, or as they are  given, in the experience, from the first-person 
perspective.  (Leino "Understanding Games  as  Played:  Sketch  for  a 
First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 1, emphasis in 
original)
As Leino notes, much current study of players’ experiences of playing videogames focuses 
not so much on those experiences in themselves, but rather as a marker or indicator of the 
effects of various features of particular videogames.2 In a sense, the players themselves and 
their  experience  of  videogame  play  serve  as  a  sort  of  testing  ground  to  enable  the 
establishment or evaluation of theoretical frameworks that suggest what kind of features will 
likely  lead  to  fun,  interesting,  compelling,  moving,  or  whatever  other  type  of  desired 
experience for the player. The complex nature of the player’s experience itself is left largely 
unexplored, reduced into general categories which can be ranked or measured in some other 
2 It is due to this general use of 'player experience' within the field of videogame studies that this thesis 
employs the somewhat rhetorically intended phrase 'the experience of videogame play as it is 
experienced'. Though, given the phenomenological approach taken within this thesis, this construction 
is arguably tautological, it is intended to foreground or emphasise this distinction between the 
experience of videogame play in itself, and as a indicator of the effects of particular features of 
videogame design that Leino identfies. 
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way, or theorised as abstracted cognitive processes. 
Importantly,  Leino shows that  this  tendency is  shared not  only by the  type  of empirical-
scientific  cause and effect orientated approaches he mentions in the first paragraph in the 
quote above, but can also be found in much of the work within the field of videogame studies  
that  would  largely  fall  within  the  humanities.  This  tendency is  “implied  by  the  de  facto 
methodological paradigm of humanities-inclined game studies [. . .] according to which the 
computer game researcher distances him/herself as the playing subject from the object under 
study”  (Leino "Understanding Games as Played:  Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for 
Computer  Game  Analysis"  3,  emphasis  in  original).  Noting  this  tendency  across  several 
influential  methodologies  for  the analysis  of  videogames  including formalist,  critical,  and 
ethnographic orientated approaches Leino concludes that “the lived gameplay carried out by 
the  researcher  is  not  material  in  itself,  but  one  means  among  others  by  which  to  gather 
material to support claims about ‘the game’” (Leino "Understanding Games as Played: Sketch 
for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 4). Whilst such approaches rely 
to some extent on the researcher’s own experience of playing the videogame, that experience 
itself is often pushed to the side, and as Leino notes “there is a difference between studying a 
game by playing it and studying a game as played” (Leino "Understanding Games as Played: 
Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 3, emphasis in original). 
A way of understanding the difference Leino identifies  between the third and first person 
perspectives is found in Lanigan’s contrast between the order of analysis and the order of 
experience. Lanigan describes the “order of analysis [as] moving from the experienced to the 
experiencing to  the  experiencer”  (Lanigan  1,  emphasis  in  original).  The  reverse  of  this 
movement is “the order of experience [where it] is the experiencer who is experiencing the 
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experienced”  (Lanigan 2, emphasis in original).3 The order of analysis is clearly present in 
much of the work Leino identifies as adopting a third-person perspective, as they begin with 
the experienced (the videogame), continue to the experiencing (via mechanisms or models of 
the experience of play appropriate to the researcher’s particular discipline) and ending with 
the experiencer (player’s response to various features of the videogame). By reversing this 
order, that is, by following Lanigan’s order of experience, and starting with the experiencer, 
rather than deriving them from the experiencing of the experienced, we can avoid the problem 
of abstracting first person experience to third person processes to fit the particular approach 
taken  towards  the  experienced,  and  of  claiming  to  be  talking  about  the  experience  of 
videogame play as it is experienced when we are in fact talking about the thing which is  
experienced – the videogame. Consequently, we would then have a focus on the experiencer 
(the  player)  experiencing  (through  playing)  the  videogame  (the  experienced)  with  the 
important consequence that rather than establishing abstracted models as explanations for the 
experience  of  videogame  play  at  a  general  level  we  instead  open  up  the  richness  and 
heterogeneity of the experience of videogame play as it is experienced, in Lanigan’s terms as 
a  “phenomenological  human  becoming”  (Lanigan  2),  to  description,  consideration,  and 
understanding.
This is not to invalidate the results or arguments of research which Leino describes as being 
orientated from a third person perspective, but simply to point to both the focus and limits of 
their understanding of the experience of videogame play. As Leino notes, “the experienced 
significance of gameplay is not, from the third-person perspective, really a lack at all” (Leino 
"Understanding Games as Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game 
Analysis"  5),  for  “The objects  of  study are different  from the  two perspectives:  it  is  not 
3 It should be noted that these two orders aren’t oppositional in nature, but rather are based in Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of reversibility. Richard L. Lanigan, "Embodiment: Signs of Life in the Self," 
Twentieth Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America: Musement to Meaning: Body and 
Mind (San Antonio, Texas, USA: Semiotic Society of America, 1995), 2. 
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necessarily the ‘same game’ one is studying from two angles.” (Leino "Understanding Games 
as Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 6). Through 
maintaining a concern with an objective distance from the object of study the third person 
perspective when employed by both “‘those who study players’ and ‘those whose [sic] study 
games’ [. . .] inhibits both from accessing the experiential qualities of computer game play” 
(Leino "Understanding Games as Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer 
Game Analysis" 2). It is those experiential qualities of videogame play with which this thesis 
is concerned, and as such it is a first person perspective or phenomenological approach that 
will be employed. 
In a  general  sense,  we will  follow Leino’s  advice  where “Instead of  trying  to  define  the 
borders of the player’s experience from outside, we should seek to accept the experience as it 
is” (Leino "Feeling So Real - a Phenomenological Exploration into the Realities of Emotions 
in Play" 7). As implied in its name, taking a first-person perspective towards the experience of 
videogame play inherently draws upon the first-person experience of the researcher, or, as 
Leino  terms  it  requires  the  researcher  to  occupy  a  ‘player’s  perspective’  (Leino 
"Understanding Games as Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game 
Analysis"  5-6).  However,  the  experience  of  videogame play  which  is  drawn upon is  not 
simply described in evaluative terms, for as Leino notes: 
Phenomenology is not interested in the idiosyncratic experience, but 
in the experience’s ‘invariant structures.’ Thus the phenomenological 
questions are not about how a particular person experiences the world 
(or how a particular player experiences the game), but about how is it 
possible  for  anyone  to  experience  a  world  (or  for  any  player  to 
experience  the  game).  (Leino  "Understanding  Games  as  Played: 
Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 
6) 
Thus it is not a question of whether the researcher liked or disliked the videogame, that they 
found it confusing or familiar,  boring or engaging, but rather a deeper question about the 
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nature of their experience of videogame play – those invariant structures of the experience 
that make the videogame available to the player as an experience of videogame play.  For 
Leino,  the  invariant  structures  of  the  experience  of  videogame  play  can  be  approached 
through an understanding of the conditions of the player’s experience, themselves “sought 
from the materiality of the game artefact”  (Leino "Understanding Games as Played: Sketch 
for  a  First-Person Perspective  for  Computer  Game Analysis"  1),  by which he means  “all 
aspects of the single-player computer game being played which do not originate in the player 
wand which are shared by all players and playings of the same game” (Leino "Understanding 
Games as Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 7). The 
explicit  reference  to  single  player  videogames  informs  the  choice  of  examples  used 
throughout this thesis, which are predominantly single player videogames, as the inclusion of 
other  players  opens  up  the  experience  of  videogame  play  to  the  interpersonal  (Leino 
"Understanding Games as Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game 
Analysis" 8), complicating the task of the researcher who wishes to study the experience of 
videogame play as it is experienced in itself by introducing another level of complexity into 
that experience which is not directly pursuant to the invariable structures of the videogame 
being studied.
Though  Leino  acknowledges  Juul’s  argument  that  there  “is  not  necessarily  any common 
‘material support’ or ‘medium’ to all games”, whilst maintaining the relevance of the material 
support of individual  games  (Leino "Understanding Games as Played:  Sketch for a  First-
Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 9, emphasis in original), this thesis will 
argue that, in the case of videogames specifically, there is at least one common element of 
material support common to all videogames, specifically that all have some kind of interface 
between  the  player  and  videogame.  This  commonality  of  the  presence  of  the  interface 
amongst videogames derives in part from its necessity to the experience of videogame play, 
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for  as  Wirman  and  Leino  argue  “The  interface  is  a  surface  allowing  two  parties  of 
fundamentally different kind, the simulation and the human player, to communicate with each 
other” (Wirman and Leino 461). The notion of the interface, particularly the player’s relation 
to it,  seems on the face of it  to be one of those invariant  structures of the experience of 
videogame play which  the phenomenological  or first  person approach to  be taken in  this 
thesis is tasked with exploring, and while the exploration of the notion of the interface forms a 
significant part of this thesis at this point we will limit ourselves to observing that the relation 
between  player  and  interface  is  a  bodily  one  where  “The  interface  is  an  umbilical  cord 
through which,  in  the gaming situation,  new senses are enabled rather  than existing ones 
limited” (Wirman and Leino 462). An important consequence of the player's bodily relation to 
the interface relates to the position of the interface in the player's experience of videogame 
play,  in  that  it  is  not  necessarily experienced by the player  as a separate  entity  from the 
videogame itself during the course of play. Rather, the player's bodily relation to the interface 
leads to the interface being subsumed or incorporated into the player's bodily being and thus 
withdrawn from the player's immediate concious attention. The interface, while central to the 
player's experience of videogame play, is also potentially at the same time curiously absent 
from that experience. This withdrawal of the interface, and its consequence for the player's 
experience of videogame play, is addressed in detail in Chapter Three.
This  a  well  known  phenomena  within  the  field  of  videogame  studies  though  one  not 
necessarily discussed in terms of the body – Calleja, for example, notes “when the movement 
controls are learned, the player devotes less attention to figuring out how to perform an action 
and simply does it” (Calleja 254). The phenomena of the bodily incorporation of the interface 
into the player’s body and the subsequent extension of the player’s body through the interface 
into the world of the videogame is an important and recurrent theme throughout this thesis. 
Furthermore, its importance to the experience of videogame play requires an articulation of 
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the nature of the interface that goes beyond the commonplace or everyday meaning of the 
term to recognise and describe the complex of bodily relations between player, the interface, 
and the videogame.  For now, having now briefly outlined the approach that will be taken to 
articulate and understand the experience of videogame play in this thesis let us turn towards 
the key concepts of play and games.  
Play and Games
The  concepts  of  play  and  games,  central  to  the  field  of  game  studies,  are  fraught  with 
difficulties due to the breadth of the field, incorporating as it does theories and approaches as 
diverse as marketing, physiology, education, politics, and ethnography, addressing an equally 
diverse range of questions about videogames. However, a side effect of this breadth is an 
associated  lack  of  depth,  arising  from  an  uncritical  acceptance  of  the  concept  of  what 
videogames are and their function in our lives. Malaby negotiates these issues through paring 
back our understanding of games, and by inclusion videogames, to the essential features of 
their  being based on contingency and that  they generate  meaning,  captured in  his  simple 
definition  that  “A  game  is  a  semi-bounded  and  socially  legitimate  domain  of  contrived 
contingency that generates interpretable outcomes”  (Malaby 106). Malaby’s argument also 
provides a useful position on the concept of play, given that he reappraises the importance and 
position given to the concept of play by the field of game studies, through reducing games to 
what he argues are their essential qualities. In doing so, he seeks to break what he considers to 
be a normative bias that pervades the academic and popular discourse on games, namely that 
they are essentially about entertainment – they are supposed to be fun (Malaby 96). He argues 
that  this  bias extends from what  is  connotated  by ‘play’,  namely that  it  is  separate  from 
everyday life,  safe,  and pleasurable,  features which he argues are not intrinsically part  of 
games but  are  rather  “cultural  accomplishments specific  to  a  given context”  (Malaby 96, 
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emphasis in original).
In part, Malaby’s argument is a criticism of the widely held ‘magic-circle’ thesis, whereby 
games are seen as being, or belonging to, a different order of reality than the everyday world, 
thus separated from everyday life. Malaby sees this argument as a logical extension of an 
exceptionalist view of games which takes the perspective:
that games are play and therefore set apart.  This perspective allows 
some to hold games at arm’s length from what matters, from where 
“real”  things happen, whereas others cast  them as potential  utopias 
promising new transformative possibilities for society but ultimately 
just as removed from everyday experience. (Malaby 97)
This situation is even more serious for videogames, whose digital basis brings into operation 
“another  form of  exceptionalism,  one that  sees the ‘virtual’  as  separable  from the ‘real’” 
(Malaby  97).  Malaby  uses  the  example  of  traditional  gambling  practices  in  Greek  rural 
communities  to point  out the fundamental  inseparability of games from the real  world in 
which  they  take  place  (Malaby 98),  further  noting  that  anthropological  studies  have  also 
found that the distinction between work and play does not exist in all cultures (Malaby 97). 
While  Malaby speaks about  games generally,  it  is  simple to  find examples  of this  innate 
connectedness of games with the real world in the context of videogames, such as when a 
player’s individual identity is seen as relevant to the videogame being played. For example, in 
Linderoth’s  observation  of  children’s  disapproving  reaction  to  a  boy  choosing  a  female 
character in a fighting game, and the boy’s response of couching his choice in terms of the 
avatar simply being equipment used to play, claiming that “Zelda is awesome” (Linderoth 8), 
there is clearly an importance placed on gender distinctions by the other children.
 
However, in Malaby’s criticism of what he sees as game studies’ current focus on “the limited 
purview suggested by the play concept” (Malaby 96), he perhaps errs in attempting to set his 
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account of games too wide by treating games as a single category. This focus on games as a 
general category has similar drawbacks to what Leino describes as the ‘transmedial argument’ 
where games can be implemented across any number of mediums, such that chess “is the 
same Chess regardless if it is played on a wooden board with ivory pieces (or with pieces that  
represent characters from Star Wars, for example), or on a computer” (Leino "Understanding 
Games as Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 8). 
Noting similarly the many variations of Tetris Leino argues that “The transmedial Tetris is not 
accessible from the first-person perspective, because the player’s experience always involves 
a  particular  Tetris game with its  distinctive materiality”  (Leino "Understanding Games as 
Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 10). Like the 
transmedial argument, Malaby’s approach of establishing an all encompassing definition of 
games as a category tells us little about the experience of videogame play as it is experienced, 
illustrating Leino’s distinction "between studying a game by playing it and studying a game 
as played” (Leino "Understanding Games as Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for 
Computer  Game Analysis"  10,  emphasis  in original). This is  not meant  to undermine the 
quality of Malaby’s conclusions regarding the pervasive normative bias around the concept of 
play,  but simply to recognise their inherent limits, namely that the general focus taken by 
Malaby  of  addressing  games  in  all  their  forms  necessarily  doesn’t  let  us  address  the 
specificity  of  actual  human  experiences  of  play  that  relate  to  games  beyond  his  central 
example of gambling practices in Greece. If we are interested in the experience of videogame 
play as  it  is  experienced,  holding to  all  encompassing definitions  of games as  a  singular 
category runs the risk of losing the granularity and richness of the experience of videogame 
play in itself. 
By excising the concept of play from his treatment of games for its normative connotations 
Malaby loses perhaps the central  quality that characterises particular games as an activity 
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taken  up  by  particular  individuals,  as  Leino  notes  at  a  conceptual  level  “to  conceive  of 
something  as  a  game  necessarily  implies  filling  the  position(s)  of  the  player(s)  with 
something,  that  is,  conceiving  something  as  being  the  player  of  the  game”  (Leino 
"Understanding Games as Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game 
Analysis" 2). More practically, games only move from abstract entities of rule structures to 
actual things in the world when they are taken up and played, where their contingency comes 
into  action,  and the  outcomes  that  are  generated  become meaningful,  not  to  an  idealised 
player, but as realised by an actual player. This sense of games as actual things in the world, 
rather than as abstract categories, can be lost in all encompassing definitions such as Malaby’s 
or transmedial approaches, as “Calling a chess board and pieces (or a binary executable file, 
for that matter) a ‘game’ without reference, through the activity of play, to those who make 
the decisions to move the pieces on the board would be an arbitrary reference to the purpose 
of  the  artefacts”  (Leino  "Understanding  Games  as  Played:  Sketch  for  a  First-Person 
Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 2). What we are talking about here are games not 
as an abstracted theoretical category but as a lived experience. Games exist to be played, and 
it is through this play that we come to experience them, and that they come to be things in the 
world.
Malaby is perhaps aware of this as he does not reject the concept of play completely, arguing 
that “it is clear that the term may continue to have some usefulness as a label for a mode of  
experience, a way of engaging the world” (Malaby 102, emphasis in original), as opposed to 
“a label for a  kind or  form of distinct human activity”  (Malaby 100, emphasis in original). 
While maintaining that  the connotations latent  in the concept  of play must  be dealt  with, 
suggesting that “More work in this vein must be done to recuperate the concept of play” 
(Malaby 102), Malaby turns away from play to concentrate on the ontology of games without 
further mention of this work to be done. This thesis aims at taking up the task of returning the 
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concept of play to a meaningful significance,  beyond the normative connotations which it 
often  invokes,  and towards  a  consideration  of  the  experience  of  videogame  play  as  it  is 
experienced. We have already noted that Malaby approaches games as a general category, and 
his  conception  of  ‘play’  is  similarly  broad,  extending  beyond  the  playing  of  games  to  a 
broader attitude of dealing with the world, a mode of experience. To reconcile this broader 
conception of the play concept, let us consider Malaby’s claim that play refers to a mode of 
experience rather than a form of activity within the more specific context of videogame play.
By restricting  the  concept  of  play  to  being  a  mode  of  experience,  a  generalised  attitude 
towards or way of engaging with the world, Malaby seeks to avoid the normative use of the 
word as a “label for a  kind or  form of distinct human activity (something that allows us to 
differentiate  between  activities  that  ‘are  play’  and  those  that  ‘are  not’)”  (Malaby  100, 
emphasis in original). Whilst at a general level the usefulness of this is clear, in terms of the 
first-person approach taken in this thesis its utility is far from self evident. If ‘play’ is only a  
mode of experience as Malaby argues, what status then does actually ‘playing’ a videogame 
hold when we are concerned with the experience of videogame play as it is experienced if, as 
Malaby argues, it is the game itself which is the activity (Malaby 102)? Given the common 
usage of the terms ‘play’ and ‘game’ Malaby’s position is both understandable yet confusing, 
for ‘game’ is a noun and not a verb, the name given to the activity but not the doing of the 
activity itself.4 This leads to the question of what the term in common usage for engaging in 
the activity associated with videogames is, of which the answer of course is that one plays a  
videogame. Is it possible to engage with a videogame in a manner that still constitutes this 
activity as a game without playing it? It would seem that while ‘play’ as a general concept can 
indeed be characterised as a mode of experience, in the case of a specific instance of play, 
such as that of playing a particular videogame, it can also be regarded as a distinct kind or 
4 Of course ‘game’ as a verb has entered into informal usage, such as in the phrase ‘gaming the 
system’, or to denote the pastime of playing videogames as ‘gaming’.
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form of human activity. Here we are following Leino, who argues that “one could postulate a 
narrower category by speaking of computer game play: the activity that takes place upon or 
involves the artefacts we take as ‘computer games’ could be referred to as computer game 
play”  (Leino "Understanding  Games  as  Played:  Sketch  for  a  First-Person Perspective  for 
Computer Game Analysis" 10).
The possibility of describing play as a distinct form of human activity comes about because of 
the cultural work that Malaby identifies behind the particular conventions commonly ascribed 
to games  (Malaby 96), a particular videogame is not an abstract intellectual category but a 
particular instance of a product that is designed to fulfil a particular purpose or purposes in 
our everyday life, most directly that it is made for the activity of play. This purpose does not  
necessarily have to  be the entertainment  principle  that  Malaby seeks to demystify,  for as 
Leino  notes  “computer  game artefacts  can  be  used  for  a  number  of  activities  other  than 
playing the game,” such as the difference “between playing the game and playing  with the 
game”  (Leino "Understanding Games as Played:  Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for 
Computer  Game  Analysis"  10).5 As  the  serious  videogames  movement  demonstrates 
videogames can be about education outcomes or political activism, whilst ‘art’ videogames 
show that their motive can be self expression, or even a meta-analytical investigation of the 
form’s own conventions and the associated expectations of player’s,  for example  Second-
Person Shooter (Oliver Second Person Shooter), which as the name suggests places the player 
in a second-person perspective, rather than the more usual first- or third-person perspective 
found in more conventional commercially orientated videogames.
So we are left with two related yet differentiated meanings for our concept of play. Firstly, 
that highlighted by Malaby of play as a mode of experience, or to put it another way as a 
5 This distinction between playing the game and playing with the game Leino mentions is taken up in 
reference to the player’s relation to their in-game avatar in more detail in Chapter 5.
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particular way of opening to the world, a meaning captured in the common phrase ‘a playful  
spirit’.  For  this  wider  meaning  of  the  play  concept  Malaby  finds  weighty  support, 
acknowledging Huizinga’s argument that “play should be understood as an always potentially 
present mode of human experience, rather than as a distinct activity”  (Malaby 101). Indeed, 
Huizinga goes further to argue that the play concept is constitutive of much human activity, 
from laws, to war, to philosophy, and even culture itself, as “The great archetypal activities of 
human society are all  permeated with play from the start”  (Huizinga 22). However, if we 
follow Huizinga  too  closely we seemingly  fall  straight  into the  same normative  trap that 
Malaby rightly criticises, for Huizinga also argues that “Play is distinct from ‘ordinary’ life 
both as to locality and duration” (Huizinga 28). At first this seems incongruous, that he can 
assert that play permeates culture, yet that “for the adult and responsible human being play is 
a function which he could equally well leave alone. Play is superfluous” (Huizinga 26). This 
apparent  contradiction  becomes  non-problematic  if  we understand  that  Huizinga’s  central 
theme is “the relation of play to culture” (Huizinga 25), which becomes clear when we look at 
the spheres of human activity with which Huizinga address; ritual, art, philosophy, law, and 
even warfare. In each of these domains we find evidence for Huizinga’s argument that “The 
function of play in the higher forms which concern us here can largely be derived from the 
two basic aspects under which we meet it: as a contest  for something or a representation  of 
something” (Huizinga 32, emphasis in original).
Thus we encounter again the same problem that we raised with Malaby’s conception of play, 
that in a broad sense it is a mode of experience rather than a particular activity, yet at the same 
time it is embedded within and permeates through particular activities, even some that we 
would not normally regard as ‘playful’ activities.  It is for this reason that I have articulated a 
more  specific  sense  of  ‘play’,  that  of  a  particular  instance  of  activity  on  the  part  of  an 
individual engaging the world in a playful manner – for the purpose of this thesis through 
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playing a videogame. Here though we would be still be wise to take Malaby’s council on the 
normative assumptions associated with the play concept, for even if our engagement in the 
activity of play does not result in an enjoyable or fun experience, that experience might still 
be described as an instance of play. For example, if we are loosing badly in a game of pool 
our actual experience may be one of frustration, anger, boredom, or even grim determination, 
yet we would still describe our activity and the experience that activity as one of playing pool. 
Clearly then,  though the  play  concept  carries  a  much  wider  meaning  than  the  normative 
associations that Malaby identifies, we are still left with the question of how to understand the 
experience of someone who is engaged with the world in this playful mode of experience 
through the particular activity of playing a videogame, that is, of addressing the experience of 
videogame play in itself.
The Experience of Videogame Play 
The experience of playing videogames has received increasing attention within the field of 
videogame  studies  as  the  field  matures  and moves  on  from the  definitional  debates  that 
characterised  its  early  stages  towards  a  more  holistic  approach.  For  example,  this 
development is characterised by the theme of the 2007 Digital Games Research Association 
(DiGRA)  conference,  ‘Situated  Play’.  However,  despite  this  apparent  advance  we  soon 
encounter the problem of the normative assumptions raised by Malaby within the field, for 
instance  one  quantitative  study of  player  experience  aimed  to  “design and test  a  reliable 
measurement of the overall enjoyment derived from the gaming experience” (Tychsen et al. 
51).  The measure  developed was named  the FUN construct,  and consists  of  several  sub-
constructs  that  “target  specific  aspects  of  the  gaming  experience”  such  as  temporal 
dissociation, immersion, and enjoyment (Tychsen et al. 51). Implicit in these measures are the 
normative assumptions of enjoyment and separability that Malaby identifies, and the focus of 
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the study informing the FUN construct seems, in line with the tendency Leino recognises 
more generally, to be not so much the experience of playing videogames in themselves, but 
rather  the  underlying  reasons  why  playing  one  particular  videogame  may  be  fun  whilst 
another may not. These criticisms can be applied more widely, for instance Ermi and Mäyrä, 
whilst acknowledging that “Playing games does not always feel fun: on the contrary, it quite 
often appears to be stressful and frustrating”  (Ermi and Mäyrä 3), develop a model of the 
experience of videogame play based largely on the concept of immersion, yet the same type 
of normative assumptions again arise, as they argue that “‘fun’ is the ultimate emotional state 
that they [the player] expect to experience as a consequence of playing” (Ermi and Mäyrä 3). 
Again, what is addressed is not so much the experience of videogame play in itself but rather 
the  factors  and  features  of  videogames  that  contribute  to  creating  a  particular  type  of 
experience for the player, in this case that experience being enjoyable and somehow separated 
or distinct from everyday life.
This is not to undervalue the results of these studies or others like them, but merely to point  
out that neither addresses the experience of videogame play as it is experienced. Each study is 
indirectly asking the question of what makes  videogames enjoyable,  as Leino notes,  they 
ultimately attempt to theorise the effects that different formal properties of videogames will 
have on players from the point of view of game design  (Leino "Understanding Games as 
Played:  Sketch  for  a  First-Person  Perspective  for  Computer  Game  Analysis"  1).  This  is 
evident  even  in  the  methodology  of  Ermi  and  Mäyrä  who,  by  basing  their  model  on 
interviewing  children  to  discover  “the  different  holding  powers  they  had  recognized  in 
games” (Ermi and Mäyrä 6), implicitly exclude frustrating, boring, or confusing experiences 
of  videogame play,  and resultantly  derived a  three  part  model  of  immersion  based on a 
videogame’s audiovisual qualities, level of challenge, and fictional content (Ermi and Mäyrä 
7-8). This is not to discount these elements of the videogame form, for quite clearly, they are 
34
present to our experience when we play videogames, but they cannot by themselves account 
for the actual experience of videogame play, that moment to moment unfolding of experience 
that arises during the course of videogame play. The way in which individual players may 
experience the features identified in such studies, as well  as others not identified,  are not 
broken down into separate formal elements in the course of our actual playing, but rather exist 
as a holistic totality in the experience of videogame play. 
Another  common approach to  understanding the experience  of videogame play is  to turn 
towards cognitive based theories, that is, to step back from the immediacy of videogames as 
they are experienced to consider the mental processes inherent in the player’s experience of 
them. Grodal presents one such approach and, like Malaby, criticises narrative approaches to 
the studying of videogames not simply because of an assumption of the primacy of ludic 
features over narrative features, but rather “because phenomena such as ‘story’ or ‘narrative’ 
are then only defined in relation to their media realization, not by their relation to unmediated 
real-life experiences and those mental structures that support such experiences” (Grodal 129). 
According to Grodal, cognitive mechanisms can be used to explain much of the experience of 
videogame  play,  for  “The  experience  of  stories  is  based  on  central  embodied  mental 
mechanisms”  (Grodal  130),  specifically  a  flow from perception,  to  emotion,  to  cognitive 
processes, and finally a motor response  (Grodal 131), and it is videogames’ engagement of 
this flow that accounts for the particular experience of playing videogames as “they allow ‘the 
full  experiential  flow’  by  linking  perceptions,  cognitions,  and  emotions  with  first  person 
actions”  (Grodal  132).  It  is  these  first  person  actions  that  underlie  the  characteristic 
interactivity of videogames for Grodal, introducing an “interactive motor dimension to story 
experience”  that  differentiates  them from  other  media  forms  (Grodal  138).  Furthermore, 
Grodal’s approach highlights the sense of videogame play as an activity for as he notes “The 
interactive capability also raises a series of new problems that [. . .] are similar to those raised 
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by interacting with real-life phenomena on a first-person basis” (Grodal 139), and as such “the 
player needs to possess a series of specific skills to ‘develop’ the story, from concrete motor  
skills and routines to a series of planning skills” (Grodal 139). 
However, while Grodal argues for an understanding of the experience of playing videogames 
based upon its basis in cognitive structures common to real world experiences, he still adheres 
to the common normative assumptions concerning play, stating that “a central element in the 
concept of ‘play’ is linked to what kind of reality status is manifested in a given play activity” 
(Grodal 140). Though this statement in itself is non-committal, Grodal finds that the reality 
status of videogames tends towards the pleasurable and separable, as “A central element in 
those playful  activities  that we call  games is [.  .  .]  their repetitiveness,  because somehow 
repetitive (reversible) activities are far less serious, less ‘real’ than activities like tragic stories 
that represent irreversible processes” (Grodal 140). Once again, we seem to have come full 
circle,  and  it  seems  that  play,  considered  as  a  mode  of  experience  from  a  cognitive 
perspective, is still overtaken by normative assumptions of its value or consequence. 
Yet,  what  really  undermines  Grodal’s  theory  of  experiential  flow,  and  cognitively  based 
theories more generally for elucidating the experience of videogame play,  is that while he 
attempts  to  address  the  experience  of  playing  videogames,  that  experience  is  implicitly 
abstracted, or turned into ‘third-person processes’, as Merleau-Ponty would put it  (Merleau-
Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 92). Whilst Grodal orientates his approach towards the 
first person experience of videogame play his understanding of it is based in what Lanigan 
calls the order of analysis as it is not the experience in itself with which Grodal is concerned, 
how it  is  experienced in  the first-person in  the order  of experience,  but  rather  abstracted 
cognitive processes which have little direct relevance to the experience of videogame play as 
it is experienced. Whilst for the purposes of systematic analysis of the cognitive processes 
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involved in the experience of videogame play an approach such as Grodal’s has it uses, in the 
first-person experience of playing videogames such experience simply does not proceed in an 
orderly step by step fashion between the discrete stages identified by Grodal. The progression 
from perception, to emotion (or motivation), to cognitive activity, and finally to motor action, 
are not discrete stages in the experience of videogame play as it is experienced but rather 
these categories blend and blur into each other – not consciously separated in the experience 
of  the  player  but  again  part  of  the  greater  experiential  whole  that  is  the  experience  of 
videogame play. And whilst the examples given so far are hardly exhaustive of research into 
the experience of videogame play within the field we can see the trend Leino identifies, that in 
general “the goal behind enquiries into player’s  experience is to understand the [sic] how 
games’ features end up affecting the player’s experience”  (Leino "Understanding Games as 
Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 1), rather than 
the experience of videogame play as it is experienced.
The Experience of Videogame Play and Interactivity
We can see this tendency to overlook the experience of videogame play as it is experienced 
more clearly if we take up in more detail the question of interactivity, a concept both reviled 
and central to much theoretical work on videogames. As an influential example let us consider 
Salen and Zimmerman’s  typological  model  of interaction,  which identifies  four modes of 
interactivity:  cognitive/interpretive,  functional/utilitarian,  explicit/participatory,  and cultural 
participation. What is meant by the cognitive/interpretive mode is simply “the psychological, 
emotional,  and  intellectual  participation  between  a  person  and  a  system”  (Salen  and 
Zimmerman "Game Design and Meaningful Play" 70), whilst the functional/utilitarian mode 
involves the player’s interaction with the “material components of the system (whether real or 
virtual)”  (Salen and Zimmerman "Game Design and Meaningful Play" 70),6 essentially the 
6 It should be noted that Salen and Zimmerman’s use of ‘material’ is in some regards similar to 
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interface  both  physical  and  on  screen  at  the  most  basic  or  mechanical  level. 
Explicit/participatory interaction refers to the everyday use of the term, “overt participation 
like clicking the non-linear links of a hypertext novel, following the rules of a board game, [. . 
.] using the joystick to manoeuvre Ms. Pac-Man” (Salen and Zimmerman "Game Design and 
Meaningful  Play"  70).   Finally,  the  mode  of  cultural  participation  refers  to  the  player’s 
interaction with the game outside of the game itself  “The clearest examples come from fan 
culture, in which participants co-construct communal realities, using designed systems as the 
raw material” (Salen and Zimmerman "Game Design and Meaningful Play" 70). 
Whilst obviously Salen and Zimmerman’s fourth mode of interaction, cultural participation, 
lies outside of our interest here dealing specifically as it does with the player’s experience 
beyond their immediate experience of videogame play, with the other three modes we can 
raise a similar criticism to what we made of Grodal’s stages of experiential flow concerning 
the abstraction of the experience of play into discrete modes or types for the purposes of third 
person  analysis.  While  there  is  no  doubt  that  there  is  value  in  breaking  down the  often 
nebulous and ill  defined concept of interaction and giving it  a rigorous and multi-faceted 
standing for certain approaches to understanding videogames and the experience of playing 
them, particularly for those concerned primarily with questions of effective videogame design 
such as Salen and Zimmerman, its utility for understanding the experience of videogame play 
as  it  is  experienced  is  less  evident.  Though  each  of  Salen  and  Zimmerman’s  modes  of 
interaction articulate  a facet  of the experience of videogame play they tell  us little  about 
videogame play as it is experienced in the first person apart from that it involves various 
levels or modes of interaction between the player and the videogame. Like Grodal’s stages of 
experiential  flow these modes  of  interactions  are  not experienced as  discrete  moments  or 
kinds  of  experience  but  rather  as  varying  aspects  without  clear  delineation  or  distinction 
Leino’s use of the term, but perhaps does not go as far.
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within the wider experience of videogame play as it is experienced.
Yet a more serious problem with Salen and Zimmerman’s conception of interactivity, if we 
are  concerned  with  the  experience  of  videogame  play  as  it  is  experienced,  is  in  their 
assumption that interactivity consists of a series of meaningful choices by the player  (Salen 
and Zimmerman "Game Design and Meaningful Play" 60). While such a view of interactivity 
may be appropriate for a slowly paced strategy game such as chess, where the focus is on 
carefully considered moves, it seems less apt for faster paced games that demand a speedy 
response from the player. For Salen and Zimmerman ‘choice’ seems to stand in for a much 
more complex process involving intentionality, skill, and physical limitations such as reaction 
time, which are all involved in taking action when playing a videogame. This broad notion is 
taken to somewhat  counter-intuitive  degrees,  such that “intuitive physical  action” and the 
“random throw of a die” both constitute a form of ‘choice’ for Salen and Zimmerman (Salen 
and Zimmerman Rules of Play 61). Their choice of “choice” as the basis of interactivity, even 
over the perhaps more  appropriate  “relationship between action and outcome”  (Salen and 
Zimmerman Rules of Play 354) they describe, is a surprising one, and possibly a legacy of the 
influence of hypertext theories of interactivity, or of overly cognitivist assumptions about the 
experience of videogame play. 
In general terms a ‘choice’ implies a decision made between options, and as Heaton notes, “A 
decision in a sense is nothing [. . .] It is a change in the state of the overall intent of the  
player”  (Heaton 4). Heaton moves from the abstract notion of choice to the more concrete 
idea of skills that we have already encountered in Grodal’s approach, differentiating between 
analytical and implementation skills (Heaton 5).7 Heaton’s model is a cyclical one where “The 
7 These different types identified by Heaton are similar to the evaluation and execution stages of 
Norman’s model of the human action cycle, which the circular model of videogame play developed by 
Heaton also resembles. Donald A. Norman, The Design of Everyday Things, 2002 ed. (New York: 
Basic Books, 2002) 47.
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player’s analysis of the current and potential future states of the game inform the decision. 
[. . .] After the decision has been made, the player uses another set of skills to implement the 
decision”  (Heaton 5). The example given by Heaton of his cycle at work in a hypothetical  
situation of videogame play in Burnout 3 (Criterion Studios) is telling – given the fast pace of 
the videogame the player’s “assessment of the risk and reward will be incomplete”  (Heaton 
6). The player would simply not have the time to make what we would generally refer to as a 
‘choice’ between their options during the course of play, but would instead have to rely on the 
skills  they  have  developed,  constantly  correcting  and  adapting  their  moment  to  moment 
actions rather than a definite decision at any one point. In such a case it is arguably the aporia-
epiphany structure identified and articulated by Aarseth (Aarseth Cybertext), which would be 
more  central  to  the experience  of playing  Burnout 3 than the ability to make meaningful 
choices. 
Of course both of these elements,  as well  as a  gamut  of others such as aesthetic  appeal, 
narrative  content,  and  intensity,  all  contribute  to  the  emergence  of  the  experience  of 
videogame play in differing degrees depending on the particular videogame and the particular 
player.  However what is  particularly useful about Heaton’s analyse-implement  skill  based 
approach for our purposes is that it foregrounds the active role of the player who employs 
their implementation skills through taking action. Consider a game of chess for instance – that 
a player’s choice about which move to play next will be altered if they perceive, rightly or  
wrongly, that their opponent is attempting to set up a trap would be an uninteresting point to 
make. Yet the manner in which the player takes action to implement their choices inherently 
folds  back into the  experience  of playing.  For  example,  does the player  make quick,  but 
confident moves in an attempt to intimidate their opponent, or do they indifferently move 
their pieces because they are bored with the game? What of the role of what Leino describes 
as the particular material implementation of a game of chess (Leino "Understanding Games as 
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Played: Sketch for a First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 8), is it played in 
a face to face setting or against a computer coded opponent? Is the game being played on such 
a  large  board  that  moving  pieces  requires  a  significant  physical  investment?  Perhaps the 
player  even  ‘accidentally’  knocks  the  board  over,  so  as  to  prevent  the  inevitable  defeat 
towards  which  they are  headed?  Such factors,  which  may be  considered  extra-ludic  in  a 
strictly formal sense, are none-the-less an integral part of the experience of playing games. 
Thus any examination of the experience of videogame play requires that attention be paid to 
the ways in which the player is able to take action and perceive its outcome – the interface 
from which interaction emerges. Again, it must be emphasised that ‘interface’ is used here 
more broadly then in its usual sense as a property of the technical game-system, such as the 
controllers, television screens, or on screen menus. These elements are all integral parts of the 
interface,  but  without  a  player  interfacing  with them they aren’t  much more  than plastic, 
circuitry, and software. Rather the ‘interface’ is used here to describe the sites or spaces of 
relation between the player and the videogame, extending beyond the formal characteristics 
towards a consideration of the different potential  uses that a videogame, via the interface, 
presents to the player.
The Experience of Videogame Play as it is Experienced
Clearly then, we need to move away from approaching the experience of videogame play as 
abstracted cognitive processes and ask again what constitutes the nature of the experience. 
Shinkle  offers  one  solution,  arguing  that  a  “visually  based,  structural  semiotic  angle  has 
tended  to  dominate  game  studies”  (Shinkle  "Corporealis  Ergo  Sum"  21),  such  that 
“interactivity still  tends to be understood as a predominately visual and semiotic activity” 
(Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 22). For Shinkle, the experience of videogame play is much 
more  than  simply  perceiving  and  interpreting  the  action  presented  onscreen,  for  it  also 
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involves  “phenomenological  or  affective dimensions  which  cannot  be  programmed into  a 
game, but are nonetheless vital for videogame play”  (Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 22, 
emphasis in original). By affect,  Shinkle is referring to “a way of describing the ‘feel’ or 
intensity of a game” rather than simple emotional reactions (Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 
22).  In  making  this  distinction  Shinkle  is  drawing  upon  Massumi's  articulation  of  the 
difference between affect and emotion, whereby “emotion and affect—if affect is intensity—
follow different logics and pertain to different orders” (Massumi “The Autonomy of Affect” 
88). This is not to say that there is no relation between the affective and the emotional, but 
rather that emotion is affect captured from the immediacy of experience and abstracted, for 
“Emotion is qualified intensity,  the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity 
into  semantically  and semiotically  formed  progressions,  into  narrativizable  action-reaction 
circuits, into function and meaning” (Massumi “The Autonomy of Affect” 88). In this way the 
distinction between affect and emotion resembles and resonates with both the distinctions 
referred to earlier in this chapter between approaching the experience of videogame play from 
a first person perspective versus a third person perspective identified by Leino, and the order 
of experience as opposed to the order of analysis identified by Lanigan.  
In the context of videogame studies this distinction between affect and emotion is particularly 
important due to the baggage associated with emotions in videogames,  for as Leino notes 
“More  emotional  games  are  often  dubbed  as  the  next  milestone  in  the  development  of 
computer  games”  (Leino  "Emotions  About  the  Deniable/Undeniable:  Sketch  for  a 
Classification  of  Game  Content  as  Experienced"  113).  Importantly,  this  desire  for  more 
‘emotional’ videogames has the tendency to frame its objectives in extreme terms, “such as 
sadness  so  overwhelming  that  it  makes  a  player  cry”  (Leino  "Emotions  About  the 
Deniable/Undeniable:  Sketch  for a  Classification  of  Game Content  as  Experienced"  113). 
While this tendency does not always fall  into the normative trap identified by Malaby,  in 
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many cases this is because such desires for more emotive videogames are a reaction to the 
conception  of  videogames  as  fun  and  insignificant,  thus  informed  instead  by  a  wider 
normative  bias  concerning  ‘worthwhile’  media  forms,  and  the  importance  of  eliciting 
particular emotional responses from the player. 
It is also important to note that affect is inherently embodied, as the phenomena is more than 
simply  a  mental  state  but  is  rather  characterised  by  what  Massumi  characterises  as  “the 
irreducibly bodily and autonomic nature of affect” (Massumi “The Autonomy of Affect” 89). 
Anecdotally, many game players have had the experience of shuddering when their race car 
slams into a barrier at high speed, of ducking and weaving as bullets whiz by, or even more 
simply of experiencing autonomic responses such as increased heart rate or muscle tension as 
a result of playing videogames. Such experiences demonstrate the inherently embodied nature 
of affective experience, an experience that is often described with reference to proprioception, 
which  refers  to  our  sense  of  “the  location  of  my  arms  and  legs  without  any  conscious 
reflection”  (Leino  Emotions  in  Play 191),  and the  related  concept  of  kinaesthesia,  which 
similarly describes the preconscious experience of movement of the body (Merleau-Ponty 
Phenomenology  of  Perception 107-8),  a  sensory  experience  aptly  demonstrated  by  the 
examples  of  player's  bodily  involvement  in  the  experience  of  play  mentioned  above. 
Furthermore,  such  bodily  experiences  in  the  course  of  videogame  play  demonstrate  the 
important  role  played  by  embodied  affective  experience  in  providing  a  basis  for  the 
meaningfullness of experience more generally, as it is the affective dimensions that give the 
player's movement's their meaning, as Massumi notes, “the primacy of the affective is marked 
by a  gap  between  content and  effect”  (Massumi  “Autonomy of  Affect”  84,  emphasis  in 
original).  It  is  the  affective  dimensions  which  bridge  this  gap  between  the  audio-visual 
content presented to the player and their bodily movement and autonomic responses to make 
sense of those bodily experiences and to give them their meaning in the player's experience of 
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videogame play.  
This ability of videogames to elicit such affective and motor responses from their players is a 
widely known aspect of their appeal, suggesting Caillois’ ilinx, or vertigo, category of games 
“which consist of an attempt to momentarily destroy the stability of perception and inflict a 
kind of voluptuous panic upon an otherwise lucid mind” (Caillois 138) – a statement which, 
through the use of the phrase ‘voluptuous panic’, clearly evokes the involvement of bodily 
experience into the experience of videogame play. Yet Shinkle’s articulation of the experience 
of videogame play, what she terms the ‘affective dimension’ still does not quite capture the 
entirety of the phenomenological experience of videogame play, despite the valuable move 
away from the privileging of vision towards a more synaesthetic sense of perception (Shinkle 
"Corporealis Ergo Sum" 25), a tendency towards the perceptual aspects of the experience of 
videogame play remains. For instance, despite a brief description of how the  EyeToy series 
embodies the player’s real-time, real-world movements into the world of the game, her focus 
is on the embodiment of perception, rather than of action. Indeed, she focuses more on the 
experience  of watching someone else playing  EyeToy rather  than that  of playing in itself 
(Shinkle  "Corporealis  Ergo  Sum"  25).  What  then  is  the  significance  of  this  sense  of 
immediate and bodily engagement in the experience of videogame play?
The affective experiences of videogame play noted by Shinkle are sometimes treated by the 
field of videogame studies in terms of an experience of immersion within the videogame 
being played, in the sense that the player in some way feels present within the world of the 
game they are playing, often drawing upon the idea of the suspension of disbelief. However, 
as Ermi and Mäyrä note, the term is “widely used in discussing digital games and gameplay 
experiences. [. . .] but often in an unspecified and vague way without clearly stating to [sic] 
what kind of experiences or phenomena it actually refers to” (Ermi and Mäyrä 4). While this 
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lack of specificity is perhaps the more egregious issue with the concept of immersion, another 
more nuanced problem is reflected by the reason Ermi and Mäyrä employ the term rather than 
others  that  are  often  used  synonymously,  “because  it  more  clearly  connotes  the  mental 
processes involved in gameplay” (Ermi and Mäyrä 4). Whilst mental processes are no doubt 
involved in the particular experience of immersion or presence within the videogame during 
the  course  of  play  and indeed  the  experience  of  videogame  play  more  widely,  a  similar 
objection to that raised in regards to cognitive based approaches earlier can also be applied in 
this case. The experience of videogame play becomes implicitly abstracted into third-party 
processes which are not explicitly present to the player’s experience of videogame play in 
itself. Furthermore, even if such mental processes can be reconciled as being implicitly part of 
the experience of videogame play this still overlooks important aspects of the experience of 
videogame play which are difficult to characterise as mental processes, such as the affective 
and  phenomenological  dimensions  identified  by  Shinkle.  The  particular  aspect  of  the 
experience of videogame play whereby a player feels present within or connected the world of 
the  videogame  is  often  held  out  to  be  an  important  part  of  the  overall  experience  of 
videogame play, and a limited understanding of this particular experience of engagement in 
the experience of videogame play is engendered by understanding it in terms of ‘immersion’ 
as simply being present within the game-space due to ‘mental processes’. 
In  contrast  with  naive  accounts  of  immersion  flow  theory,  arguably  one  of  the  more 
predominant theories of the player’s experience of videogame play, flow theory comes closer 
to  articulating  the  player’s  experience  of  videogame  play  as  it  is  experienced.  Unlike 
immersion based approaches, which as Salen and Zimmerman point out are all too apt to fall 
into what they term the ‘immersive fallacy’ based upon “the idea that the pleasure of a media 
experience lies in its ability to sensually transport the participant into a illusory, stimulated 
reality”  (Salen and Zimmerman  Rules of Play 450),  the flow experience  is  instead better 
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understood as a type of active engagement, specifically an effortless type of investment of 
attention to the activity of playing, which as Järvinen, Heliö, and Mäyrä point out, engages all 
aspects of the interface (Järvinen, Heliö and Mäyrä 20-21). While one of the key elements of 
the flow experience is  a  loss of self  consciousness,  an aspect shared with the concept  of 
immersion,  there are important qualitative differences that should be underlined.  Primarily 
important is that in the flow experience, the player’s sense of self is not so much lost as it is 
expanded, such that the player can have a feeling of union or involvement with the game, 
whilst remaining aware of the contextual situation in which they are engaged (Järvinen, Heliö 
and Mäyrä 26). This is hardly the ‘suspension of disbelief’ found in immersion, which evokes 
a sense of passive surrender and transportation, but something that requires the explicit and 
active engagement of the player. 
Another way of understanding the difference in perspective on the experience of videogame 
play between the concepts of immersion and the flow experience is by drawing upon the 
distinction raised by Dourish between the ‘virtual reality’ and ‘augmented reality’ approaches 
within HCI. The assumptions implicit in the concept of immersion in game studies could be 
understood  as  part  the  greater  prevailing  world  view regarding  computational  media  that 
Dourish  describes  as  the  ‘virtual  reality’  approach,  where  “interaction  takes  place  in  a 
fictional world, either through immersion or, more commonly these days, through a window 
onto the world on a computer screen. The world of interaction is the world of the computer” 
(Dourish 38). In contrast, the flow experience is more closely attuned with Dourish’s concept 
of augmented reality, where “The site of interaction is the world of the user [. . .] the world  
may be imbued with computation, but the computer itself takes a back seat”  (Dourish 38). 
Thus, under the flow model, rather than the player being transported into the world of the 
videogame, the videogame itself  is instead is drawn out into the player’s because of their 
more engaged role, though we should say rather that both player  and videogame come to 
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experience a shared space of being. Though Dourish’s conceptualisation of the augmented 
reality approach stems in part from his work on emergent trends within the field of HCI, 
which he categorises broadly as ubiquitous computing, as a way of refiguring the relationship 
between the user and computer, it is useful for approaching the experience of videogame play 
as it is experienced. For, as Shinkle observes, “From a phenomenological standpoint, [. . .] 
virtual space is irreducibly part of the real world, and interactivity, rather than a transaction 
between eye and mind, is framed as a feedback loop between eye, mind, and body” (Shinkle 
"Corporealis Ergo Sum" 23). This also recalls the argument drawn earlier from Malaby, that 
alongside the normative assumptions implicit in play “there is another form of exceptionalism 
at work, one that sees the ‘virtual’ as separable from the ‘real’ (Malaby 37).  
For our purposes,  the important  implication  of what  Dourish terms the augmented reality 
approach is that it  places the player and their experience of videogame play firmly as the 
focus of our analysis. A similar benefit is presented by the flow model, where the player’s 
action and awareness merge, specifically that the player experiencing the flow state becomes 
so caught up in the activity of videogame play that it is no longer experienced as something 
separate or distinct  (Järvinen, Heliö and Mäyrä 22). As such, while augmented reality and 
pervasive games, roughly the videogame equivalents of Dourish’s ubiquitous computing, may 
be in their early days the augmented reality approach remains relevant to our concerns in this 
thesis, as the world around the player of more conventional videogames is no less filled with 
computation during videogame play due to the narrowing of their focus and involvement with 
the action  that  is  unfolding.  However,  whilst  flow theory presents  a  potential  avenue for 
addressing the experience of videogame play as it is experienced, we still find relevance for 
Malaby’s admonition regarding the normative bias surrounding the concept of play,  for as 
Järvinen, Heliö and Mäyrä openly attest “Obviously, flow and optimal experience have to do 
with enjoyment”  (Järvinen,  Heliö and Mäyrä 20), and thus they focus on how “to design 
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products  that  make  the  focusing  of  invested  attention  flow  smoothly  and  in  the  most 
rewarding way”  (Järvinen, Heliö and Mäyrä 21). As this focus on producing one particular 
aspect of the experience of videogame play, its fun or pleasurable aspect, diverges from the 
more inclusive sense of the experience of videogame play we are addressing, we will instead 
turn towards adapting Dourish’s concept of embodied interaction, of which his augmented 
reality approach is but one part.
The Experience of Videogame Play and Embodiment
Dourish’s  articulation  of  the  embodied  aspects  of  interacting  with  computers  provides  an 
approach  with  which  to  consider  the  experience  of  videogame  play  as  an  embodied 
experience. Though Dourish’s notion of embodied interaction arises out of his work within 
the field of HCI with a design orientated perspective, his articulation of the fundamentally 
embodied  nature  of  our  interaction  with  computers  provides  an  avenue  for  bringing  the 
player’s body into our understanding of the experience of videogame play by foregrounding 
the importance of our status as embodied beings in our experience of the world. Importantly, 
by ‘embodied interaction’ he means that “not simply that it is a form of interaction that is 
embodied, but rather that it is an approach to the design and analysis of interaction that takes 
embodiment to be central to, even constitutive of, the whole phenomenon" (Dourish 102). In 
following Dourish’s notion of embodied interaction we can aim towards an understanding of 
the experience of videogame play as embodied which implies that it is not a particular form of 
videogame play that is explicitly bodily, but rather that it is an approach to videogame play 
that sees embodiment as a central and essential part of the phenomenon of the experience of 
videogame play. 
This is not to say that the body generally, and the notion of embodiment we are developing 
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here, are entirely absent from the field of videogame studies, as we have already encountered 
them obliquely through Shinkle, whilst other researchers in the field of game studies have 
addressed  the  issue  of  embodiment  directly.  For  example,  Rambusch  draws  upon  the 
framework of embodied and situated cognition, noting that videogame play “is largely shaped 
by the player’s bodily experience and her interactions with and use of the game environment” 
(Rambusch 1), and importantly that the bodily relation between the player and the interface 
involves the interface becoming an extension of the player’s body (Rambusch 4). Wirman and 
Leino make a similar point, describing the interface as forming “an umbilical cord through 
which new senses are enabled”  (Wirman and Leino 461), noting also the importance of the 
player’s “operational intentionality or the basic ‘intentionality of the body-subject’” to the 
experience  of  videogame  play  (Wirman  and  Leino  461).  Within  the  context  of 
phenomenology intentionality is important in understand the relation between people and the 
world  as  “Rather  than  separating  humans  and world,  the  concept  of  intentionality  makes 
visible the inextricable connections between them” (Verbeek 388). The consequence of this 
conceptualisation of intentionality is that it grounds or embeds human experience as always 
being in the world, such that action, perception, and cognition, are always directed towards 
something in the world (Verbeek 388). This is something that the abstracted or third-person 
perspective approaches discussed earlier often lack, and is one of the key advantages of the 
phenomenological,  first-person  perspective  approach.  Indeed  the  notion  of  operational 
intentionality,  which Wirman and Leino take from Merleau-Ponty,  can further  clarify our 
criticism of Salen and Zimmerman’s use of ‘choice’ to characterise interaction, as Merleau-
Ponty distinguishes operational intentionality from intentionality of act, “which is that of our 
judgements and of those occasions where we voluntarily take up a position” (Merleau-Ponty 
Phenomenology of Perception xx). 
Sjöblom  employs  the  notion  of  embodiment,  including  Dourish’s  notion  of  embodied 
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interaction,  to  study  collaborative  videogame  play  in  an  internet  café,  noting  that  “The 
specific situatedness of each and every gaming session greatly influences the ways in which 
participants interact with each other, and thereby structures the activity of gaming and gaming 
cultures more generally” (Sjöblom 13). However, while a perspective that takes the notion of 
embodiment into account when addressing the experience of videogame play is beginning to 
emerge, such approaches remain greatly outnumbered by those that approach the experience 
of videogame play as abstracted and simply cognitively based, as Rambusch contends “little 
attention, [. . .] has so far been paid to the actual activity of playing computer games with the 
player and her actions in focus” (Rambusch 1). This thesis aims to build upon this early work 
done in bringing the notion of embodiment into the debate of the nature of the experience of 
videogame play as it is experienced, and will employ it in more detail over the course of 
various chapters where relevant.
Videogame play of course has always consisted of embodied action, it's just that previously 
the player’s actions were generally minute,  small  movements of the hands and fingers on 
buttons, d-pads and analogue sticks, though as was noted earlier in relation to the concept of 
affect videogame play is of course quite capable of eliciting the involvement of the player's 
entire body. Compared to the visual action, narrative development, and strategic depth to the 
videogame experience, these barely noticed actions of the player have unsurprisingly been 
low on the agenda of videogame research. It is an oversight limited not just to theorists and 
other  observers though, for videogames actively attempt  to draw attention  away from the 
hands towards the screen. 
Here is but one area where Dourish’s concept of embodied interaction is useful, for while a 
player’s attention might initially be focused on the controls whilst learning to play a particular 
videogame,  after  a  certain  competency is  reached this  attention  shifts  away – action  and 
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awareness merge, or as Dourish describes it, the controls move from being present-at-hand to 
being ready-to-hand (Dourish 109). These concepts, taken from Heidegger, suggest a closer 
relationship  between  the  player  and  the  control  surface  than  flow  theory,  that  for  the 
sufficiently  competent  player  the  control  surface  becomes  an  extension  of  the  hand,  as 
Dourish puts it (Dourish 109). For Heidegger, in our everyday experience our intentionality is 
directed not towards objects or tools used but rather towards the activity we are using those 
tools to accomplish - “That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the 
tools  themselves.  On  the  contrary,  that  which  we  concern  ourselves  primarily  is  the 
work―that which is to be produced at the time” (Heidegger 358). Heidegger’s distinction 
between  the  ready-to-hand  and  the  present-at-hand  is  much  more  significant  than  the 
orientation  we  might  take  towards  an  object  for  it  actually  captures  the  nature  of  the 
relationship with have with that  object.  For example,  when using a computer  mouse “the 
mouse exists for us as an entity only because of the way in which it can become present-at-
hand, and becomes equipment only through the way in which it can be ready-to-hand. And in 
being ready-to-hand,  it  disappears  from view—or ‘withdraws’—as an independent  entity” 
(Dourish 109, emphasis in original). Thus the relation we have to objects that have become 
equipment to us, that is have become ready-to-hand, is one where they become attached to our 
body such that they have become part of our preontological world in that “it is outside of and 
prior to our focused attention” (Dourish 110). 
Merleau-Ponty,  who  Dourish  also  draws  upon,  offers  an  in-depth  account  of  the  same 
phenomenon, couching it in terms of habits, and using the example of a blind man’s stick.  
Merleau-Ponty argues that for the blind man his walking stick “has ceased to be an object for 
him,  and  is  no  longer  perceived  for  itself;  its  point  has  become  an  area  of  sensitivity, 
extending  the  scope  and  active  radius  of  touch”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of 
Perception 165).  Importantly,  this  extended  sensitivity  is  not  experienced  conciously,  but 
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instead the stick has become an extension of the body through being incorporated as part of 
the body, for: 
habit does not consist in interpreting the pressures of the stick on the 
hand as indications of certain positions of the stick, and these as signs 
of an external object, since it relieves us of the necessity of doing so. 
The pressures on the hand and the stick are no longer given; the stick 
is no longer an object perceived by the blind man, but an instrument 
with which he perceives. It is a bodily auxiliary, an extension of the 
bodily synthesis. (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology of Perception 176, 
emphasis in original) 
  
This thesis will argue that applying conceptualisations of embodiment such as these to the 
experience  of  videogame play  can  achieve  our  aim of  recuperating  the  play  concept,  by 
addressing the experience of videogame play as it is experienced, rather than as a normative 
category.
We are using embodiment in a very strong sense here, not merely its meaning of giving a 
material  form to an intangible  concept,  but  again following Dourish providing it  with an 
explicitly phenomenological sense where, “By embodiment, I do not mean simply physical 
reality, although that is often one way in which it appears. Embodiment, instead, denotes a 
form of participative status. Embodiment is about the fact that things are embedded in the 
world, and the ways in which their reality depends on being embedded” (Dourish 18). That is, 
people are not objects who find themselves in a world but are as bodies which participate in 
creating  that  world.  Here  embodiment  takes  on  a  literal  meaning  since  “Physically,  our 
experiences  cannot  be  separated  from  the  reality  of  our  bodily  presence  in  the  world” 
(Dourish 18), and “because our experience of the world is intimately tied to the ways in which 
we act in it” (Dourish 18). Hirose notes that “There are two basic meanings of the word given 
in dictionaries: the state of being embodied and the act of embodying”  (Hirose 290). Both 
senses are important to understanding the experience of videogame play, as each sense helps 
us to unpack and articulate the complexity of the experience. When thinking of the player it is 
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important to foreground their state as an embodied being that not only has a physical body but 
is  also  embedded  within  a  certain  world  that  underlies  their  position  as  a  player  of  a 
videogame. This is the basis of the concept of embodied interaction, which takes the notion of 
embodiment, or the direct rather than abstract experience of phenomena as Dourish puts it, as 
central  to  the  experience  of  interaction  (Dourish  100-03).  The  other  sense  that  Hirose 
identifies, the act of embodying, aids in understanding the moment to moment unfolding of 
the experience of videogame play, such as the way in which the interface has been described 
as being taken up and incorporated by the player as a ready-to-hand extension of their body. 
This  distinction  between  the  static  and  the  dynamic  aspects  of  embodiment  is  raised  to 
articulate  the  relation  between  the  player,  the  interface,  and  videogame,  for  this  is  an 
embodied relationship that calls upon not only the inherent embodied nature of the player, but 
also their ability to actively alter their potential to act within the game-world by taking up the 
interface in an act of embodying. This ability to change their range of potential actions should 
not be seen simply as an addition of new potentials, for the player’s ability to act within the 
game-space is necessarily limited by the abilities and limitations provided by the interface 
within the game-space. It should be emphasised that the distinction between the state of being 
embodied and the act of embodying is not meant to suggest two mutually incompatible ways 
of being, but rather to note the variation between the static and the dynamic aspects of the 
phenomena of embodiment. As Dourish notes, our experience of the world builds upon our 
fundamentally embodied nature, for: 
the  source  of  meaning  (and meaningfulness)  is  not  a  collection  of 
abstract, idealized entities; instead, it is to be found in the world in 
which we act, and which acts upon us. The world is already filled with 
meaning. Its meaning is to be found in the way in which it reveals 
itself to us as being available for our actions. It is only through those 
actions, and the possibility for actions that the world affords us, that 
we  can  come  to  find  the  world,  in  both  its  physical  and  social 
manifestations, meaningful. (Dourish 116)
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Beyond the most elementary sense of embodiment as our being-in-the-world, the notion of 
embodiment as simply a static state seems absurd, for as the quote above points out the body 
is dynamic, reaching out to act in the world and extending its potential to act in the world. Yet 
embodiment as state is taken up as a useful concept here as it allows us to set a sort of base-
line  from which to  consider  this  dynamic  nature of the body as  it  relates  to  the player’s 
experience  of  videogame play,  and opens up the  moment  of  transition  from one state  of 
embodiment to another during the course of the act of embodying where the player takes up 
the videogame interface as an extension of their bodily schema as a way to understand the 
unfolding of the experience of videogame play during the course of play. 
This move towards a phenomenological notion of embodiment achieves three outcomes in 
support  of  addressing  the  experience  of  videogame  play  as  it  is  experienced.  Firstly,  it 
recognises the importance of our actions, and our perceptions with which they are intrinsically 
tied,  that  constitutes  our experience  of the world and our relationship to it.  Secondly,  by 
bringing us closer to our experience of the world as it is experienced we can hopefully avoid, 
or at least reduce significantly,8 the need to draw on the analysis of abstracted processes and 
theoretical  structures  to  describe  those  experiences.  And  finally,  returning  to  our  initial 
problem of play as a mode of experience, it affords us the context with which to consider 
those cultural accomplishments (as Malaby describes them) that characterise our normative 
views of play, as well as a level of focus for a consideration of the interaction between play as 
a mode of experience and videogame play as an activity via the concept of the embodied 
player.
The significance of the implications of adapting Dourish’s notion of embodied interaction to 
build  a  new understanding  of  embodied  videogame  play  can  be  demonstrated  through  a 
8 Of course, fixing experience into language through description and articulation necessarily leads to a 
degree of abstraction.
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comparison of the approaches already addressed. For instance, let us again consider Grodal’s 
psychological  model,  which  he  describes  as  “An  embodied  brain-approach  to  story 
experience” (Grodal 132), the nucleus of which “is the first-person experience, because third-
person perspectives are—from an evolutionary point of view—expansions of a first-person 
point of view even down to the level of motor activation” (Grodal 133). Whilst the notion of 
the body is a central part of Grodal’s model, there is then the question of our relationship to 
our body and of our  bodily experience,  which  is  where Grodal’s  approach diverges  with 
Dourish’s notion of embodied interaction. While Grodal’s focus on first-person experience, or 
experience as it is experienced, is largely in keeping with the perspective we are developing 
here,  we previously described his account of these experiences  as abstracted,  third-person 
processes, and we can now identify how Grodal arrives at this transition from first-person 
experience  to  third-person  processes.  Whilst  the  body  is  implicit  in  Grodal’s  approach, 
characterised as eyes, ears, and muscles, it is not a body experienced but a mechanistic object 
of  cause  and effect,  which  we can  see in  his  explanation  of  how the  interrelation  of  its  
separate parts distinguishes videogames from other media forms – “eye and ear will not only 
be linked to an activation of the premotor cortex (as in previous media) but also to a full 
motor cortex and muscle activation” (Grodal 139). What is in dispute here is not the accuracy 
of  the  neurological  processes  he  describes,  but  rather  the  effectiveness  of  using  these 
processes as a basis for addressing the experience of playing videogames as an experience, 
one  which  has  little  self  awareness  of  motor  cortices  and  muscle  activation.  Grodal  has 
successfully located the experience of play as an embodied one, but applies an understanding 
of  embodiment,  the  body  as  function,  which  keeps  the  experience  of  this  embodiment 
fundamentally a cognitively based account which allows him to conclude that “Videogames 
are furthermore mainly based on sympathetic, aversive emotions, due to their output-driven 
setup” (Grodal 153). This does not resonate as an articulation of the experience of videogame 
play as it is experienced, but rather as an explanation of how the experience of videogame 
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play operates in terms of cognitive or psychological structures and processes, that is “central 
embodied mental mechanisms” (Grodal 130). 
To understand the particular nature of our bodily experience for the experience of the playing 
of a videogame we need to consider the body as it is experienced, namely, as an inherent and 
largely preconscious embodiment and existence in the world. What we need to address is the 
tendency towards the assumption of body-mind dualism, which Lanigan identifies as an issue 
extending back to Plato, but most commonly arising in the context of the Cartesian separation 
(Lanigan  1),  that  sees  mind  and  body  as  fundamentally  separate.  While  this  separation 
between  body  and  mind,  between  the  objectivity  of  the  body  and  the  subjectivity  of 
consciousness, is no longer an uncontested perspective within academic debates, having been 
disputed  by  various  scholars  across  various  fields  of  study,  including  Merleau-Ponty’s 
approach to embodiment which this thesis draws upon, the absence of attention paid to the 
position and role of the body in the experience of playing videogames is indicative of its 
continuing influence.  This is not merely a question about how we account for our bodily 
experience, for as Merleau-Ponty argues the conception of a conscious mind separated from 
the  objective  body  constitutes  “a  crucial  moment  in  the  genesis  of  the  objective  world” 
(Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 83), whereas in contrast we are concerned with 
the phenomenological world in which we are embedded through our embodied being. In other 
words, given that it is through our body that we have a world as Merleau-Ponty argues: “The 
body  is  our  general  medium  for  having  a  world”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of 
Perception 169), the relationship we have with that world is derived from an understanding 
that  must  proceed  via  our  bodily  experience.  Thus  we  must  challenge  the  notion  of  an 
objectified body separated from our conscious experience posited by the Cartesian separation, 
and instead ask how an appreciation and understanding of the involvement of our body in our 
experience  and  of  our  experience  through  our  body  changes  our  perspectives  on,  and 
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understanding of, videogame play. This is in keeping with the arguments raised by Leino and 
Malaby, though extending them further to consider the basis of our first-person experience of 
playing  videogames,  where  play,  as  a  particular  mode  of  experience,  is  a  fundamentally 
embodied one.
The conception of embodiment we are developing here refers not only to immediate bodily 
experience,  such as  sensation,  but  more  broadly  to  the  embeddedness  of  the  body in  all 
aspects  of  our  experience.  The concept  of  learned  habits  that  Merleau-Ponty  develops  is 
essential in this regard, for he rejects the idea of an innate or ‘natural’ state of being for a 
more nuanced position where “Everything is  both manufactured and natural in man,  as it 
were, in the sense that there is not a word, not a form of behaviour which does not owe 
something  to  purely  biological  being—and  which  at  the  same  time  does  not  elude  the 
simplicity of animal life, and cause forms of vital behaviour to deviate from their pre-ordained 
direction”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of  Perception 220).  The  type  of  embodied 
experience we are discussing here is not an essentialist account based on a linear cause and 
effect description of our body apparatus, but instead refers to our lived experience of being-in-
the-world, recognising that we are not simply controlled by the processes of our body, for 
such  a  view reintroduces  the  separation  between  a  mechanistic  body  and  a  transcendent 
subjective consciousness. Rather than a stimulus-response model of our bodily experience, the 
phenomenological  approach we are  employing  here  posits  a  more  complex  and nebulous 
situation where “there is not a perception followed by a movement, for both form a system 
which varies as a whole”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology of Perception 127), and it is this 
‘whole’  with which  we are concerned,  rather  than  the  breaking down of  that  whole into 
particular mechanisms and processes of the body addressed objectively. 
This  immediate  sense  of  embodiment  remains  the  underwriter  for  our  more  complex 
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involvement  with the  world,  for  “Bodily experience  which  runs  through me,  yet  does  so 
independently of me, is only the barest raw material of a genuine presence in the world. Yet at 
least it provides the possibility of such presence, and establishes our first consonance with the 
world”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology of Perception 192). Our status as embodied beings 
places us in a phenomenological world, which as Merleau-Ponty notes “is not pure being, but 
the sense which is revealed where the paths of my various experiences intersect,  and also 
where  my own and other  people’s  intersect  and engage  each other  like  gears.  It  is  thus 
inseparable  from  subjectivity  and  inter  subjectivity”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of 
Perception xxii). This is to say that the world in which we are embedded is also a human 
world, that is, one of intersubjective relationships, communication and shared meaning. Yet 
crucially,  our experience of this world is based on our pre-existing familiarity with it,  for 
example when we converse with others “In order that I may understand the words of another 
person, it is clear that his vocabulary and his syntax must be ‘already known’ to me. [. . .] We 
live in a world where speech is  an  institution.  For all  these commonplace utterances,  we 
possess  within  ourselves  ready-made  meanings”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of 
Perception 213, emphasis in original). In this sense, the cultural conventions by which we 
organise  and  understand  our  conduct  can  be  considered  as  a  kind  of  collective  habit, 
developed, learned, adapted, and learned again, what we would call instinctual apart from that 
term’s association with innate processes, but which we experience as something akin to such a 
natural response which we can call on largely without conscious effort during the conduct of 
our everyday lives. We can see then why the normative assumptions surrounding play that 
Malaby identifies are so pervasive within the Western cultural tradition, it is not merely a case 
of a consciously adopted attitude, nor simply a mistaken understanding of the world, but a 
particular habituated lived orientation towards and existence in the world based on a cultural 
convention  of  temporal  and  spatial  differentiation  that  demarcates  productive  and  non-
productive activities.
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The point of course is not so much whether such a distinction between work and play is or is 
not preferable to Malaby’s insistence on its demise, only its normalisation as an essential and 
‘natural’ difference, rather than a ‘cultural accomplishment’ in Malaby’s phrase. But, having 
noted  the  inadequacy  of  cognitive  and  psychological  approaches  to  play  as  a  mode  of 
experience, and keeping in mind Shinkle’s objection to what she sees as a bias towards the 
visual  and the  semiotic  in  discourses  surrounding videogame play,  we must  consider  the 
effect  of  moving  towards  a  consideration  of  play  that  grounds  it  in  our  wider  everyday 
experience as an embodied experience. How then does an orientation that focuses on the body 
affect how we understand videogames and more importantly the experience of videogame 
play? More specifically, what frameworks and concepts are sensitive to this orientation and 
can effectively account for an understanding of videogame play as an embodied experience? 
Furthermore, what opportunities arise from such an understanding, not only from a theoretical 
point of view, but also in regards to videogame design? Videogames seem to be becoming 
more physically performative, a process that perhaps started with  Dance Dance Revolution 
(Konami), and continuing on with the EyeToy series, before becoming the basis of an entire 
gaming platform in the shape of the Nintendo Wii – perhaps future cases of “Nintendo-itis” 
will affect the wrists and shoulders more often than the thumbs! Videogames such as Wii Fit 
(Nintendo  Wii  Fit),  which  specifically  aim  at  integrating  a  videogame  experience  into 
everyday fitness regimes, further highlight this tendency of increasing bodily involvement in 
the  experience  of  videogame  play.  Beyond  this  explicit  involvement,  the  more  general 
implicit involvement of the body in the experience of videogame play remains an important 
aspect in videogame play.
Conclusion
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In this chapter we have articulated a position for addressing the experience of videogame play 
as it  is  experienced,  rather  than as the abstracted  processes or theoretical  structures more 
commonly found within the field of videogame studies. We have taken up Leino’s argument 
that to understand the experience of videogame play as it is experienced it must be addressed 
from a first-person perspective, which we have followed through adapting Dourish’s notion of 
embodied action and the phenomenological concepts upon which it is based for use as our 
conceptual tool set to explore the experience of videogame play. The following chapters aim 
to  employ  this  position,  that  of  the  fundamentally  embodied  nature  of  the  experience  of 
videogame play, to describe, articulate and consider the experience of videogame play as an 
experience in itself. The next chapter begins this process by considering what it is that the 
embodied player actually does in the course of videogame play, not in the sense of the ludic  
events represented onscreen, but rather how their embodied being is engaged in videogame 
play, and how understanding this engagement expands our understanding of the experience of 
videogame play.
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CHAPTER 2:
 VIDEOGAME PLAY AND
 THE BODY: [giantJoystick]
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What exactly are we doing when we say we are playing a videogame? In everyday situations 
it seems that we are referring to what is happening on screen, after all,  that is where our 
attention is directed, and it is where we are able to express the agency and control that is often 
offered up as the particular attraction of playing videogames. When we describe our own play 
activity we are likely to refer to the on-screen action, recounting how we shot the monster,  
won the race, or cleared the level. We are unlikely to discuss our bodily movements that arose 
out  of  and  directed  our  play  activities,  such  as  that  we  pushed  a  certain  button  at  the 
appropriate time or that we moved the mouse in a certain direction, but rather recall what 
these physical  actions  were translated  to on screen.  This  in itself  is  not  unsurprising,  for 
button  pressing  and  mouse  moving  are  not  in  themselves  particularly  interesting  or 
memorable, being at first glance simply instrumental actions that have no context or meaning 
without the on-screen action to which they are related.9 However, as was argued in Chapter 
One, such oversight of the role of embodied action limits our understanding of the experience 
of videogame play as it is experienced. This chapter will demonstrate the importance of the 
player’s embodied engagement in their experience of videogame play through focusing their 
bodily relation with the interface used to play. While the usage is not as common as it used to 
be, interface devices such as joysticks and game pads were once referred to as peripherals, as 
technically  they  were  separate  devices  attached  to  the  main  computer  unit.  The  related 
inference suggests a particular attitude towards these devices which sees them as of secondary 
importance, when they are arguably as central to the experience of playing videogames as the 
screen or the CPU.
In  this  chapter  we  will  take  as  an  example  the  art  installation  [giantJoystick] by  Mary 
9 It is instructive that one of the few instances where a particular sequence of physical actions by the 
player onto the controller becomes noteworthy and worth the effort of remembering is related to 
special moves, such as those in fighting games, and even in this case the particular sequence is 
retained in memory only for as long as required for the player to learn the special move, that is, be able 
to perform the required sequence without having to consciously recall it.
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Flanagan  (Flanagan  [Giantjoystick]) to  demonstrate  and  explore  the  importance  of  the 
interface to the player’s experience of videogame play. It should be noted that this analysis is 
not intended to articulate the experience of [giantJoystick] in its totality, but rather takes an 
important aspect of the work, its bigness, as the basis for developing and demonstrating a 
wider theoretical argument concerning the importance of the player's bodily relation to the 
interface in their experience of videogame play. As is sign-posted by the work’s title, a very 
large joystick is used to play videogames, the joystick in question being a recreation of the 
classic Atari 2600 joystick. However, apart from the marked increase in size of the now ten 
foot tall joystick, the games themselves are simply original Atari games such as  Breakout 
(Atari  Breakout) and  Asteroids (Atari  Asteroids).  Though  nostalgia  for  such  classic 
videogames  in  itself  is  an  important  part  of  this  work,  what  is  more  important  for  our 
purposes is the associated familiarity that many participants will have with both the system 
itself and the games which it runs, as it could be expected that a large proportion of likely 
players of [giantJoystick] have some previous experience of playing Atari 2600 videogames. 
As a result of this familiarity we are able to focus on the most significant aspect of the work 
for the purposes of this chapter, simply put, its size and the implications of that size on the 
experience of the installation. 
Bigness
What then is the effect in this change of scale of the input device? Clearly the artist felt there 
must be some effect to warrant making the work in the first place, and indeed Flanagan’s own 
website states that “[giantJoystick] explores group collaboration in play. … [it] is situated in 
the gallery or in public space in order to produce a childlike scale, to generate discussion and 
group play”  (Flanagan "[Giantjoystick]").  Unsurprisingly,  the accompanying essay for  the 
installation in the catalogue for the exhibition in which  [giantJoystick] was first shown is 
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supportive of Flanagan’s intentions, stating that “Mary Flanagan highlights the spatial and 
social  role of the interface.  The joystick itself  becomes a social  structure and territory for 
inter-personal communication”  (Paul 29). Interestingly, this statement by Paul was taken as 
the basis for online criticism of [giantJoystick] by some, while the installation itself has also 
drawn criticism from other anonymous online commentators.  Of course such criticisms are 
from  unknown  individuals,  and  it  is  impossible  to  know  whether  or  not  they  actually 
experienced the work,  or if  they have any experience of videogame play more  generally. 
However, what we can glean from such criticisms is a general sense of ‘so what, it’s a big 
joystick,’ suggesting that such commentators have either overlooked the significance of that 
bigness or are responding to it negatively. In fact, in these negative reactions the very essence 
of the work itself, its bigness, seems to be the point of contention. It makes it ‘cool’ but not  
significant, just a novel bit of meaningless fun, or ‘juvenile’, relying on the novelty of bigness 
to cover for a lack of imagination, which is in a way amusing given Flanagan’s own stated 
intention of invoking a sense a childlike scale.  
Whilst  the  premise  of  [giantJoystick] may  seem  simple,  making  an  everyday  object  in 
massive scale,10 it does present an opportunity to rethink our experience of videogame play by 
deftly bringing back into our awareness the physicality of these systems, of interactivity, and 
of our experience of playing them. And while there is much more to the experience of the 
exhibition than the physical size of its interface in itself, for our purposes in this chapter it is 
its inherent bigness and the visibility of the player's embodied relation to the interface that 
that entails which is our focus. Let us consider then the bigness of [giantJoystick], particularly 
in reference to the Atari 2600 it is based upon. In the first case there is the essential size of the 
installation, a player usually does not have to climb onto an Atari 2600 joystick to operate it. 
10 It should be noted that enlargement of everyday items or consumer products is common artistic 
practice, such as Damien Hirsch’s Hymn, a 20ft tall reproduction of a 14 inch anatomical model, or 
Claes Oldenburg’s 45ft tall Clothespin. In fact another artist, Jason Torchinsky, has also produced a 
working large scale Atari 2600 joystick.
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Rather  the  joystick  usually  sits  in  the  player’s  hand,  it  is  graspable,  enclosed  within  the 
player’s grip, giving the player a sense of control over the joystick.  [giantJoystick] is much 
too large for the player’s hand to surround, rather they must grip the joystick with both hands,  
one on each side, almost as if they were embracing, or perhaps more aptly, wrestling with it, 
pushing and pulling it using not just the wrist and forearm but the entire body, bracing legs 
and shifting body weight. In fact the player has to position themselves such that the joystick 
itself does not occlude their vision of the game action projected on the wall, something the 
player  using  the  normal  sized  joystick  does  not  have  to  worry  about.  The  scale  of 
[giantJoystick] also necessitates collaboration, as a single player would have a difficult time 
both moving the joystick and pressing the button at the same time. Whilst the button on the 
original Atari 2600 joystick is designed to be pushed with the thumb of the non-preferred 
hand,  with  the  rest  of  that  hand supporting  the  joystick  from underneath,  in  the  case  of 
[giantJoystick] many options are possible. Some players may stand beside the unit so that the 
button is at about waist height, so that they can push down on the button, other players could 
use their hands to push the button, but kneel or crouch on top of the controller next to the  
button so that their hands can actually reach the button. Still other players might opt to use 
their feet to press the button, either standing next to the button and depressing it with one foot 
as shown in Figure One, or standing with both feet on the button, so that its default state 
becomes ‘pressed’, and jumping ever so slightly to repeatedly trigger the button.
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Figure  One:  [giantJoystick] in  use.  (Image  copyright  Mary  Flanagan,  reproduced  with 
permission.)
By  altering  the  size  of  the  joystick  Flanagan  makes  visible  the  nature  of  our  bodily 
relationships with videogame controllers, indeed even the essentially embodied nature of our 
interaction with videogames. These physical interfaces are commonly naturalised parts of our 
experience of playing videogames, at least in the case of experienced players, in that they 
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have become so familiar with the controllers which they use to play that a situation arises not 
unlike that of Merleau-Ponty’s example of the blind man’s walking stick which we drew upon 
in  Chapter  One  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of  Perception 165),  specifically  that  the 
joystick in itself is no longer in the immediate awareness of the players but rather extends the 
‘reach’ of the players. In the case of the videogame controller, it has not so much become an 
area of sensitivity, though the inclusion of tactile feedback in most contemporary controllers 
certainly gives the players a sense of the ‘feel’ of the videogame, so much as it extends the 
player’s scope and radius of touch in the sense that it  extends their  ability to act into the 
game-space. The familiarity that underpins this phenomena in turn feeds into, and is fed by, 
the way in which videogame controllers are largely conventionalised, so much so in fact that 
many gamepads designed for use with personal computers mimic the design of Sony's Dual 
Shock controller, even if many omit the more complicated and hence more expensive features 
such as the actual  analog sticks.  Furthermore,  generally there is a certain homogeneity to 
videogame controllers – even Nintendo's motion sensing based WiiMote is designed to be 
grasped comfortably in the hands and with a mass that doesn't require a substantial physical 
effort on the part of the player to lift it off the coffee table. The buttons, directional pads, and 
analog sticks on these controllers are themselves responsive, with only a minimal amount of 
mechanical resistance to give them the right amount of feedback and feel to the player – a 
joystick that requires significant physical effort to move is likely to be broken unless it is one 
designed to provide force feedback, for instance for use with high end flight simulators. This 
is not to say that the player's body isn't involved in the experience of play more generally, as  
noted  in  Chapter  One,  the  affective  dimensions  of  videogame  play  often  results  in  the 
involvement of the player's entire body in their experience of play. Rather, the point here is 
that [giantJoystick] explicitly requires this total involvement of the player's body in the course 
of their experience of  videogame play.
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Figure Two: Using the entire body to move the joystick. (Image copyright Mary Flanagan, 
reproduced with permission.)
[giantJoystick] however introduces this aspect of physical effort as the joystick is not merely 
moved but must be forcefully pushed using the entirety of the player’s body as can be seen in 
Figure Two, and similarly the button now presents significant resistance,  requiring one or 
both arms, or even the player’s entire body weight to trigger it. How might this added element 
of physicality affect the experience of play? Most obviously the experience of play would be 
more  physically  demanding,  and resultantly  more  difficult  for  the  player  to  achieve  their 
intentions  within the videogame being played.  At a basic level,  it  would be interesting to 
compare  the  scores  of  experienced  players  between  play  sessions  using  standard  Atari 
hardware and Flanagan’s  [giantJoystick], as I would argue that the gap between these two 
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scores, even accounting for the additional co-operative elements of the latter, would show a 
significant decrease in performance for the larger joystick. We would expect that the added 
physical  element  would  have  played  a  significant  role  in  this  degradation,  as  the  effort 
required to use [giantJoystick] would be considerably higher than that of the standard sized 
joystick, so issues such as fatigue become an issue. Even so, if it were possible to remove the 
effect  of the physical  effort  required on the part  of  [giantJoystick] I  am confident  that  a 
performance degradation  would still  exist,  or to  put  it  another  way,  that  it  isn’t  only the 
physical effort required that would affect the experience but rather that there is a fundamental 
difference in the nature of the experience. Once the two variables of co-operative play and 
physical exertion are removed from this hypothetical experiment being described there would 
still  exist  one  variable  that  would  affect  the  player’s  performance  –  the  players’  bodily 
unfamiliarity with the joystick. What such a comparison between scores would tell us it not 
simply that [giantJoystick]  is more difficult to play, but that the basic compentency player's 
might  have  with  more  conventional  interfaces  would  not  transfer  across,  and  that  more 
generally  the  player's  intentional  orientation  would  be  profoundly  altered  –  despite  their 
familiarity with the videogames they are playing via the installation,  it  is  likely that they 
would be unable to play them as 'games' as such.
Competency in playing videogames is much more involved than simply knowing the right 
time to perform the right action, but also includes a factor that is usually implicit and largely 
invisible  in our experience of playing videogames.  The actual  performance of that  action 
through the manipulation and use of the controller, what we as players actually do as we ‘play 
games’,  is a particular skill that we must develop through our familiarity with videogame 
controllers – how they feel and how they move to our touch. Furthermore, the experience 
itself of this performance has a certain fluidity to it, a sense of ease and of relatively direct 
control not of the controller itself but over what the controller relates to in the game – the 
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experienced player does not consciously think to themselves to push a button at a certain time 
but simply presses it as if it were second nature. It would seem that for experienced players 
their level of experience with the controller is such that it has become almost transparent to 
them,  simply  a  ready-to-hand  conduit  through  which  their  intentions  flow  into  the 
environment  of  the  videogame.  [giantJoystick] however,  so  drastically  changes  the 
relationship of its players to the control interface that the built up skill of the experienced 
player cannot simply be transferred across. The player may still know the optimal time to 
perform the relevant  actions  within the game,  but they would still  find their  performance 
unsatisfactory as the manner in which these actions are performed calls on them to make use 
of their body in a very different way to what they are used to. 
Merleau-Ponty describes  how an experienced typist  relates  to their  keyboard,  not through 
positing the keys required at a particular instance as objective points in space, arguing rather 
“that the subject who learns to type incorporates the key-bank space into his bodily space” 
(Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 167). A similar scenario could be put forward 
for experienced players, that the familiarity they have with videogame controllers arises from 
the incorporation of the button and joystick space into the bodily space of the player and 
[giantJoystick]  arguably demonstrates  this.  [giantJoystick] disrupts  the  comfortable 
familiarity we have with videogame controllers, as it requires the player to use their entire 
body, as opposed to just the hands alone, and this necessitates the player not merely learning a 
new way of moving the joystick but an entirely new way of playing to incorporate the joystick 
into their bodily space. This new ‘style’ has kinetic considerations wholly absent from the 
experience of using a regular sized joystick,  for instance if  the player  suddenly wishes to 
change the direction of the joystick a mere flick of the wrist will no longer be sufficient, as 
apart from simply having a longer ‘travel’, the inertia of the joystick would be considerably 
higher, and as such the player will require some small amount of time to properly position 
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themselves to move the joystick in the direction desired -  we could expect that this would 
require a change in the player’s approach towards the game, as they may need to plan their 
movements  more  carefully  to  take  into  account  these  new conditions.  The  nature  of  the 
experience of play becomes less about ‘shooting down the aliens’ but rather ‘learning how to 
make use of the joystick in order to shoot down the aliens’. 
This ‘learning to play again’ aspect of [giantJoystick] is illuminating, as for many of us that 
have grown up with videogames the various joysticks, control pads, and other conventional 
interface devices have become such a naturalised part of our everyday experience that we tend 
not to think about them, we simply use them as we would use any other part of our nominal  
body. As a result they have become somewhat invisible to us as has the mediating role played 
by  these  interfaces  in  our  experience  of  playing  videogames.  The  inherent  bigness  of 
[giantJoystick] highlights  this  mediating  role  and  the  importance  of  familiarity  with  the 
interface  to  what  we  usually  consider  as  the  experience  of  playing  videogames  –  that 
generally when we play videogames our attention is focused on the screen and we expect the 
controller  to  transmit  our  intentions  with as  little  trouble  as possible.  However,  Flanagan 
reverses this situation so that rather than acting through the joystick as we usually would the 
focus instead becomes one of acting  upon the joystick.  This is  why even an experienced 
player  would  find  their  experience  does  not  necessarily  accord  with  their  experience  of 
videogame play in more conventional settings, as whilst for them using a conventionally sized 
controller has become such a second nature experience that they need not even think about it 
while  playing,  this  familiarity  does  not  transpose  to  [giantJoystick],  simply  because  this 
familiarity was based on a bodily relationship with the control interface that was taken for 
granted and which is no longer applicable. 
Here Dourish's use of Heidegger’s distinction between the ready-to-hand and the present-at-
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hand is helpful in understanding how merely changing the size of an object could have such 
an impact.  According to Dourish, [replace moved text]   In effect,  through its  bigness the 
joystick of  [giantJoystick] makes the joystick present to our awareness again, something to 
pay attention to in its own right, rather than something peripheral to the experience of playing 
videogames, moving it out of our preontological world by making it present-to-hand, thus 
becoming more than simply equipment used to play videogames but rather an entity in its own 
right. Importantly, it is not simply that the players become aware of its existence, but also that 
their intentional concern comes to rest upon the physical interface itself rather than through 
the joystick and into the game-space.
Collaboration
As noted earlier the scale of  [giantJoystick] requires two players to co-operate in using the 
installation, and this collaborative aspect is an important part of the installation, as what were 
once  single  player  games  suddenly  become  multiplayer  ones,  further  demonstrating  the 
importance of the player’s bodily relation with the interface to their experience of videogame 
play. Furthermore, it is informative to consider how the interface alters the experience of play 
through requiring this collaboration,  both in regards to a more conventional interface,  and 
through  considering  how  the  interface  mediates  that  collaboration  by  considering  how 
changes  to  the  interface  might  affect  the  player's  experience  of  collaboration  and  of  the 
videogame play more generally. A player using a normal Atari 2600 joystick does not need to 
verbally communicate between their two hands to co-ordinate their activity,  their hands do 
this automatically through the sensory-motor proprioceptive systems with which we perceive 
and act  within  the  world.  However,  the  players  of  [giantJoystick] must  co-ordinate  their 
individual actions in some manner, whether this involves communication during the course of 
play or some establishment of particular strategies preceding play, though of course there are 
72
also other options depending on the sort of game being played. For instance, in a shooting 
game such as Centipede (Atari  Centipede), the player operating the button could simply fire 
continuously, leaving it to the player operating the joystick to make use of this steady stream 
of  fire  through appropriately  aiming  it.  On the  other  hand there  are  technical  limitations 
inherent in the Atari platform that restrict the number of moving objects on screen (Wolf 55), 
and in some games such as Space Invaders (Tatio), where the rate of fire is slow because of 
this limitation the player operating the button may be better served by carefully watching the 
on-screen movements of the other player and attempting to push the button at the appropriate 
time. In any case this communication between the two players is a completely new layer of 
interaction  over  the  original  versions  of  these  games  played  with  a  conventional  sized 
controller, and as a result an entirely new layer of the experience of play is added to the mix. 
The bigness of Flanagan’s  [giantJoystick] changes what would have been the co-ordinated 
action of a single body to a process requiring inter-personal  communication  between two 
bodies, and the joystick as the site of this communication becomes a focus of attention, thus 
the experience of play is centred not only onscreen, as is the case with a conventional Atari 
2600 joystick, but rather also literally on the joystick.
The ability for the players to co-operate is itself  based on the proximity between the two 
players and their location within the same space required to make use of the installation, they 
are co-located in that they “are within range of each other’s naked sense perceptions and can 
see, hear and even touch each other without physically re-positioning themselves” (Zhao and 
Elesh 569). This is important not only for the act of communication, as there is no apparatus 
provided that  would  allow either  player  to  act  at  a  distance,  but  also  for  a  sense  of  co-
ordination, as both players would be able at some, if not at all, times to see their co-player at 
the periphery of their vision, providing some awareness of the other player’s movements and 
demeanour. Indeed, it would be possible to set up some type of remote control for the button, 
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such that the player operating the button could be unseen to the player using the joystick, 
perhaps being located somewhere behind the joystick and able to view both the projected 
image, the joystick, and the other player somewhat detachedly. This remote player would still  
be able to push the button, but would also have a much clearer view of what the joystick 
player is doing, and as a result would be better able to anticipate when the correct time to fire 
would be. Would this change in the interface, and thus the player’s embodied relation to the 
interface, affect their experience of videogame play?
The co-location of the players is more than just a practical requirement of the installation's 
physical design, for the players are not only present together within the same space but also 
present to each other – they are not merely co-located but also co-present, which could be 
thought of as a relation of being-with, as opposed to simply being-in-the-same-space.11 To see 
this distinction more clearly, let us imagine a scenario where I am playing games at a net café, 
and the patron sitting next to me is checking their email and browsing the internet. We are 
both in the same space, we are co-located, we are even aware of each others presence given 
our close proximity, but could it be said that we are in a relation of co-presence, where we are 
experiencing that space together? Whilst  we may be physically in the same space we are 
engaged in different activities, whereas if we were co-players of  [giantJoystick] we would 
both be attending to the same activity, and it is this sense of collaboration that is the essential 
ingredient in the creation of the sense of co-presence, “copresent [sic] individuals are not only 
located in each other’s close proximity but also play close attention to each other, ready to 
engage and be engaged” (Zhao and Elesh 570). Co-presence captures the phenomenological 
sense  of  ‘withness’  we  experience  when  another  person  becomes  closely  part  of  the 
immediate world we perceive, such as, for instance, when we are collaborating on the same 
11 It should be noted that Zhao and Elesh draw comparisons between their sense of co-presence and 
Heidegger's sense of 'being with', and whilst the sense of being-with used here has roughly the same 
meaning, it is not intended as a reference to Heidegger's concept.
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task and thus share an intentional concern, as opposed to the sense of being-in-the-same-space 
I may experience “in public places like malls, streets and parks, where people are next to each 
other, minding their own businesses” (Zhao and Elesh 570). 
Intrinsically, co-presence requires co-location, for if each individual is outside of the other's 
perceptual range they would not be able to “pay close attention to each other, ready to engage 
and be engaged” (Zhao and Elesh 570). In the hypothetical situation of the remote button, the 
co-players would be unable to establish any sense of co-presence, as the preceding condition 
of being co-located cannot not be met, for whilst the player operating the button would have 
within their perceptual range the player operating the joystick,  this situation would not be 
reciprocated. This again underlines the central role of the player's embodiment as the basis for 
their experience of playing [giantJoystick], for the co-location upon which co-presence rests 
derives from being “within range of each other’s naked sense perceptions and can see, hear 
and even touch each other without physically re-positioning themselves”  (Zhao and Elesh 
569), it is a physical, bodily closeness that allows for the possibility of collaboration during 
the course of play.  Yet, while the importance of physical bodily closeness in the experience 
of playing [giantJoystick] specifically would seem to indicate that co-presence depends upon 
a condition of physical proximity,  as Zhao and Elesh argue more generally in the case of 
physical  separation,  a  sense  of  co-location  “can  be  partially  restored  through  sensory 
extensions  via  electronic  mediation.  A  multimedia  communication  device,  such  as  a 
videophone, allows distant individuals to see and hear each other as if they were co-located in 
the same physical  place”  (Zhao and Elesh 569).  Would it  be possible  then to establish a 
mediated  sense  of  co-presence  in  the  experience  of  playing  our  modified  version  of 
[giantJoystick] through electronically mediated communication between the players?
As we have seen, more than just proximity is required for an experience of co-presence, so let  
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us  consider  if  a  mediated  form  of  co-location  in  itself  is  sufficient,  by  extending  our 
hypothetical version of [giantJoystick], this time with the co-players unable to observe each 
other directly due to being placed in discrete locations, but with each being able to view the 
game  action  onscreen.  Already we  lose  one  of  the  most  important  aspects  of  the  actual 
[giantJoystick] experience, namely that the joystick as both the physical location, and more 
importantly  as  the  locus  of  the  co-player  interaction  with  each  other  and  hence  of  the 
experience of the installation, is no longer present. The only means each co-player has of 
communicating with each other is through the game itself via the dynamic image projected 
onscreen – the joystick  player  knows when their  co-player  has pressed the button by the 
results of the button push on-screen, whilst similarly the button player can see the actions of 
their co-player through the movement of the co-players’ avatar on screen. No longer is the co-
players’ attention focused primarily on the physicality of the joystick as it no longer serves as 
the basis for the co-players interaction,  but rather their  attention turns towards the screen, 
which now provides the only means with which the co-players can attempt to co-ordinate 
their actions. The experience of the installation would change markedly as well – though there 
would still be the bigness of the joystick the co-player’s experience would no longer be based 
around the joystick itself but the on-screen action, and it is likely that [giantJoystick] would 
lose some if not all of its wistful and childlike appeal and instead become an instrumental aid 
to the more teleological experience of ‘playing the game’. 
However, though physically distant, the co-players are engaged with the same activity so we 
can ask if they experience a sense of co-location within the game environment and as such a 
sense of co-presence within that environment. This would, in the first instance, rely on the co-
players  experiencing  a  sense  of  being  located  within  the  mediated  environment  of  the 
videogame world, and as Susi and Rambusch argue, players are not only situated in their 
immediate  physical  and cultural  environments  but  also  “they are  simultaneously  situated  
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within the game’s virtual world;  the activity of controlling a game’s characters places the 
player  in  the  virtual  game  world”  (Susi  and  Rambusch  733-34,  emphasis  in  orginal).12 
According to this perspective the players of [giantJoystick] are co-located in another sense in 
that they are present in both real and virtual spaces, a situation which must be “handled by 
players if the game is to be played successfully”  (Susi and Rambusch 734). Would the co-
players experience then a sense of co-presence within the videogame environment, that is, 
would their  shared activity  be sufficient  to impart  a sense of being present  to each other 
within their mediated environment, or would the lack of communicative facilities outside of 
the actions that each can perform undermine the very sense of collaborating towards the same 
end? After all, the player with the button has little recourse but to push the button as they feel 
appropriate, whilst the joystick player can only position the avatar in regards as to where they 
think is  an appropriate  place to  push the button.  This  disconnection between the two co-
players means that for any sense of co-presence to be experienced the co-players would need 
to be ‘in-sync’ – the individual actions of each player would need to be fairly close to the 
expectations that the other player had of the appropriate action to take at that time. In other 
words,  the  sense  of  a  shared  task  between  the  two  players  would  rest  on  a  mutual  
understanding of  the requirements  of the task between the two players,  an understanding 
limited by the communicative options on offer. 
This is not to rule out the possibility of communication between the co-players through the 
limited channels on offer, for as Sjöblom notes, “the actions that constitute the gaming, both 
on- and off-  screen are the very same actions  by which gaming gets understood, and the 
situation  (context)  in  which  this  is  done  is  constructed  out  of  those  very  same  actions” 
(Sjöblom 4). The context of playing videogames implicit in the installation assists with the 
12 It should be noted that Susi and Rambusch characterise this sense of being situated within the game-
space through their control over the character not in the sense of a narrative immersion within the 
videogame’s fictional setting, but rather in a sense of habitual tool use not dissimilar to that mentioned 
in regard to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.
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co-players  understanding the actions they view on-screen of their  collaborators.  However, 
unlike the actual version of [giantJoystick], it is only this onscreen aspect that can be directly 
viewed, their co-player’s off screen actions are only indirectly available through inference 
from their onscreen actions, resulting in the re-centring away from the joystick as the focal 
point  of  attention  towards  the  on-screen  game.  This  transformation  in  the  experience  of 
[giantJoystick] could be alleviated to some extent through the addition to the hypothetical 
remote locations of each co-player of some means of communication, for instance a video 
camera aimed towards the co-player that displays their actions and transmits their voice to a 
screen with speakers at their co-player’s physical location. Once again the co-player’s can see 
and  hear  each  other,  and  their  focus  of  attention  would  turn  away  from the  videogame 
projected onscreen. However, the co-players would not be focused back onto the joystick, but 
instead their attention would be turned towards the audio-visual screens which display their 
co-player and thus provide the opportunity of collaborating on the operation of the joystick. 
The experience of co-presence would likely be much stronger for the co-players than that of 
the  previous  hypothetical  set  up,  as  the  co-players  can  now communicate  directly,  albeit 
through the mediating screens, rather than relying on inferences based on the onscreen action.
Even so, would there be qualitative differences between the experience co-presence offered 
by this modified version of  [giantJoystick] and the experience of co-presence which is so 
central to the actual installation? In both cases the co-players are able to communicate both 
through spoken language, as well as through body language; and in both cases the co-players 
are engaged with a common activity. At face value there seems to be little, if any difference at 
all, a viewpoint backed up by Sjöblom’s analysis of videogame play at a internet cafe which 
highlights  “the  participants  simultaneous  orientation  to  on-screen  and  off-screen  space, 
making an analytical distinction counter-productive when studying situated gaming,” which 
leads him to argue that “the participants do not orient to these two resources as if they were of 
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qualitatively different orders,” for instance through a combination of on-screen and off-screen 
pointing to nominate a feature of interest  (Sjöblom 13). However, in the case studies that 
Sjöblom provides, his participants are located within the one contiguous area, the room of the 
internet cafe, and are thus physically present to each other, as opposed to being only visually 
present. Even in one of Sjöblom’s excerpts, a player who is located about 5 metres from the 
other  players  must  ensure that  his  own avatar  is  safe  from harm before “he can turn his 
attention away from the on-screen action of his own screen and orient to activities that other 
people playing the game are part of” (Sjöblom 7-8). 
A similar  situation  would  exist  in  the  modified  version  of  [giantJoystick] where  the  co-
players would have two screens to attend to, the screen showing the game environment, and 
the screen displaying their co-player, and they would not experience the same degree of co-
presence with their co-player as they would in the actual version of [giantJoystick]. Though 
they would still be able to communicate verbally it would be the small details that would be 
lost, things such as vibrations felt through the joystick and its base that arise out of the co-
players’ movement and actions, or the possibility of touch whether intentional or accidental – 
these  and  other  such  familiarities  of  immediate  physical  proximity  can  simply  not  be 
perceived  via  a  screen  nor  speaker,  much  like  many  of  the  nuances  of  face  to  face 
conversation, such as body language, that are omitted from telephone conversations  (Steuer 
78ff).  The  hypothetical  modification  of  [giantJoystick] would  still  largely  be  about 
collaboration, but would also introduce to the experience of the participants the challenge of 
dealing with the multiple  demands  on their  attention  that  arises  from their  negotiation  of 
multiple in-between spaces, as opposed to the focus on the joystick itself as the space of both 
play  and  co-operation,  a  focus  which  emphasises  the  essentially  embodied  nature  of 
interaction during the course of videogame play.
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have seen how the physical size of the art game installation [giantJoystick]  
makes  visible  the  player’s  embodied  relation  to  the  interface  during  the  course  of  play, 
highlighting that the player’s entire body is phenomenologically involved in the experience of 
videogame  play  through  de-familiarising  the  joystick  such that  the  player’s  relation  to  it  
changes from a ready-to-hand extension of their motility and intentionality to a present-at-
hand object. This indicates that the interface plays a much more important role in the player’s  
experience of videogame play than is generally acknowledged within the field of videogame 
studies, where it is addressed largely in a narrow and technical manner. While the Atari 2600 
joystick and other  conventional  interface controllers  lack the physical  size that  makes  the 
embodied relation of the player to the joystick of  [giantJoystick] so apparent, the player’s 
embodied relation to the interface more generally is no less important in their experience of 
videogame play.  However, it  should be emphasised that  [giantJoystick] is something of a 
unique case. For instance, whilst the games played using [giantJoystick] are the same games 
playable on the Atari 2600, the domestic context in which the later is played is quite different  
from the gallery context in which the players experience  [giantJoystick]. The most obvious 
difference  is  that  the  gallery  location  introduces  a  public  context,  whereas  the  domestic 
location is one of private space. As such, there is a sense of performance on the part of the 
players of [giantJoystick], as it is likely that other gallery patrons might stop to watch their 
interactions with the installation, possibly introducing a sense of self awareness that might 
interfere with the players’ experience of the work. This possibility of the intrusion of self 
awareness into the players' experience raises another aspect of bodily being, the awareness of 
being observable by others. As Merleau-Ponty argues, “in so far as I have a body, I may be 
reduced to the status of an object beneath the gaze of another person, and no longer count as a 
person  for  him”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of  Perception 193).  This  aspect  of 
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[giantJoystick], the potential for being regarded as part of the spectacle by others, suggests a 
very different kind of experience than that encountered with videogame play more generally.
It could be argued that one of the aspects of the gallery context in which  [giantJoystick] is 
shown is in a way necessary for its very being. The presence of  [giantJoystick] within this 
context already marks it with certain expectations – it is an artwork, it aims to communicate 
something about itself, about its very bigness, it aims to get its audience to see things in a 
different way. Conversely, the humble Atari 2600 joystick is simply an object that is part of a 
consumer electronics  product,  its  purpose is  not to communicate  with its  user but  simply 
function in the manner it was designed for. As such, the two joysticks are differentiated not 
only in terms of scale, but also significantly in their context of use, and as a result both the 
expectations of their users and the meaning those users will take away from their experience 
with either will be different. Is it relevant then to take [giantJoystick] as a particular case that 
has  more  far  reaching  implications  for  the  field  of  videogames  due  to  its  status  as  a 
videogame of sorts, or does its other aspect as an artwork mitigate the applicability of the 
analysis  above  due  to  it  being  a  special,  or  particular  case,  with  limited  relevance  to 
videogames more generally? We have already mentioned the public aspect of [giantJoystick] 
which is not part of the context of use for the original Atari 2600 joystick, however a public 
setting for videogame play more generally is not uncommon, most obviously in the case of 
videogame arcades, where the issues of public performance, scrutiny by other patrons of that 
performance, and questions of etiquette around turn taking and other issues of appropriate 
conduct are relevant. Though these wider similarities are not of primary interest here they do 
suggest that the significant divergences between [giantJoystick], and the Atari 2600 joystick it 
is based on, do not necessarily entail  that the key implication arising from the analysis of 
[giantJoystick], the role played by the player’s embodied relation to the interface, cannot be 
applied more widely.
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Even so, given the difference in the expectations towards, and purpose of, [giantJoystick] and 
the  Atari  2600 joystick  on which it  is  based,  we would do well  to  be  cautious  with  the 
comparisons being drawn. Yet it is instructive that we were able to discuss both joysticks 
within  the  same general  frame of  reference,  namely how each relates  to  us  as  embodied 
beings, how each engages us in a different kind of bodily comportment or style, and different 
kinds of phenomenological space. That is to say, that the significance of [giantJoystick]  for 
this  thesis  lies  in  how it  makes  visible the role  played by our body in the experience of 
playing games, and that our bodies are no less present and essential  when we are playing 
using a conventional controller. Let us consider Sjöblom’s statement that “there is nothing 
about gaming that is ‘virtual’. Gameplaying is not something that goes on only on-screen” 
(Sjöblom 13). Indeed, even in the sometimes idealised genre of massively multiplayer online 
role playing games the realness of the offline world is never far from the elves and orcs that  
populate  the  environment,  such  as  in  the  familial  relationships  or  geographical  common 
ground  underpinning  playing  groups  that  Jakobsson  and  Taylor  describe  (Jakobsson  and 
Taylor  98-99).  [giantJoystick] is  instructive  in  that  through  its  sheer  size  it  moves  the 
attention  of its  players  away from the  screen on which so much of what  is  described as 
videogame play is assumed to take place towards the physicality of the controls. By simply 
upscaling the familiar Atari 2600 joystick Flanagan achieves with [giantJoystick] that which 
every console manufacturer and games designer is trying to avoid, making the equipment with 
which we play games  unfamiliar  and present-to-hand,  that  is,  making them objects  again 
which require us to use them, and think about them, in new ways.
[giantJoystick] is thus relevant to wider questions about the role of our body in videogame 
play as it explicitly disrupts our conventional and expected relationships with the physical 
interfaces  used to play videogames.  Through increasing the size of  a  joystick  to  such an 
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impressive scale Flanagan amplifies the moment of our use of joysticks to such a degree that 
it  distorts  our conventional  body schema as it  relates to videogames.  What  this  distortion 
highlights is the importance of this bodily relation between player and videogame through the 
interface to the experience of videogame play – an interface device may occasionally still be 
described as  a  peripheral,  but  as  we have seen it  is  central  to  the player’s  experience  of 
videogame play even if they are not consciously aware of it due to having become ready-to-
hand  and  thus  withdrawn.  The  next  chapter  extends  the  investigation  begun  within  this 
chapter  by focusing  on the  interface,  specifically  through developing  a  deeper  and  more 
nuanced  understanding  of  the  concept  of  the  interface,  extending  beyond  the  technical 
definition normally applied to it.  
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CHAPTER 3:
WHAT IS AN INTERFACE?
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In the last chapter we saw how the physical size of the art game installation [giantJoystick] 
made  visible  the  role  played  by  an  important  part  of  the  equipment  we  use  to  play 
videogames, the physical interface. We also saw how a particular interface addresses us as 
players  through  a  particular  embodied  relation,  in  the  case  of  [giantJoystick] one  that 
highlights  how  our  entire  body  is  phenomenologically  involved  in  the  act  of  playing 
videogames through de-familiarising the joystick such that the player’s relation to it changes 
from a ready-to-hand extension of their motility and intentionality to a present-at-hand object. 
In examining  [giantJoystick] though, a particular question was left unasked, or at least its 
answer  was  assumed  –  what  is  an  interface?  Like  the  Atari  2600  joysticks  upon  which 
[giantJoystick] was modelled, the interfaces between us and the videogames we play more 
generally  have  become  so  ubiquitous  that  we  have  become  inured  to  their  presence,  as 
[giantJoystick] underlined they have become ready-to-hand, things we act through rather than 
upon, things that exist not as objects in themselves for us but as instrumental means to an end. 
This chapter seeks to examine more closely what is meant by the concept of an interface in 
videogame play,  and aims at providing a deeper, more nuanced understanding of what an 
interface is by moving beyond the often technical basis in which they are discussed towards a 
view grounded in the player’s embodied experience of using interfaces, and subsequently the 
nature  of  their  relation  with  this  broadened  conceptualisation  of  what  interfaces  are.  To 
achieve this outcome, this chapter will first expand the notion of the interface by adopting 
Dourish’s historical model which understands interfaces through the ways in which they make 
use of different sets of human skills, and Shinkle’s notion of the interface as the portal or 
junction between player and game. This expanded concept of the interface will then be used 
to explore the question of what an interface is by applying it to an example of a videogame 
with an unconventional interface design, Sony’s EyeToy: Play 3. The insights gathered from 
this analysis will demonstrate an understanding of the videogame interface that considers how 
the player’s interaction with the videogame they are playing involves a number of layered 
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relations that suggests that the concept of interface extends beyond the physical devices and 
screens with which is usually associated.13
The Game Interface
The digital  game interface is the portal between the player  and the 
game form – a junction point between input and output, hardware and 
software. Designed to draw together eye, body, and gameworld, the 
game interface  is  a complex system comprising both graphical  and 
physical elements  such as screens, keyboards,  joysticks,  controllers, 
and other peripherals. This complexity has yet to be unpacked in any 
great detail by the field of digital game studies, however, where the 
graphic interface often stands in for a more thorough rendering of the 
game interface as an embodied instrument.  (Shinkle "Digital Games 
and the Anamorphic" 1)
In the above quote Shinkle identifies many of the elements we often associate with interfaces,  
for instance that they involve various paired elements such as input and output, hardware and 
software, and graphical and physical factors. What is particularly important about the quote 
though is the theoretical shortcomings it identifies, namely how the graphic interface often 
comes to subsume the other elements of the game interface more generally, and as a result the 
fuller  complexity  of  the  interface  as  a  thing  used  to  play  is  overlooked.  Certainly,  this 
tendency is not limited to the study of videogames alone but can quite commonly be found in 
the literature dealing with HCI and interaction design. For instance, a section on user interface 
design in one particularly tome-like ‘handbook’ of HCI features chapters on the graphical 
design of user interfaces, the design of on-screen features such as menus, the role of interface 
metaphors,  and the effects  of colour on interaction – yet  physical  input devices are listed 
separately in another section  dealing with the design of workstations,  whilst  a chapter  on 
voice based input  is  included in a  section that deals  mainly with multimedia applications 
13 This is not to deny that more nuanced approaches towards the concept of the interface exist within 
relevant fields such as interaction design, but only that within the field of videogame studies and more 
generally in treatments of the interface that the concept is often treated simply as the devices that form 
the surface of the interface.
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(Helander, Landauer and Prabhu xvi-xvii). This suggests that not all elements of the interface 
are considered as part of the user interface. Similarly, Preece, Rogers, and Sharp’s text book 
on interaction design features a chapter that addresses the affective impact of interfaces on 
users, which deals almost exclusively with how the representations on-screen can produce 
positive emotions on those who view it  (Preece, Rogers and Sharp 141-64), yet makes no 
mention of how the other elements of the interface might  have affective impacts.  This is 
possibly due to the limited meaning often attributed to the word affect, for as Shinkle notes: 
affect is not the same things as emotion. Affect is a way of describing 
the  ‘feel’  or  intensity  of  a  game,  [.  .  .] Affect  refers  to  the 
unquantifiable features of a game – those phenomenological aspects 
of interactivity that are difficult to describe and to model theoretically, 
but which nonetheless make a game come alive. (Shinkle "Corporealis 
Ergo Sum" 22-23,emphasis in original) 
Furthermore, this affective aspect is something that should not be conceived of in terms of 
content,  which  Shinkle  describes  as  “the  sociocultural  capture  or  qualification  of  this 
intensity” (Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 22), but rather “in terms of the embodied nature 
of image perception and the player’s material relationship to digital technologies”  (Shinkle 
"Corporealis Ergo Sum" 23). That is, the affective aspect of the experience of videogame play 
should be approached with regards to its essentially situated and embodied nature, grounded 
in the concrete experience of the player that arises from the act of play. The omission of these 
material and affective relationships is underscored in an earlier section of Preece, Rogers and 
Sharps’ text purportedly dealing with physical design – the design of the physical elements 
that Shinkle notes in the quote at the start of this section – which characterises such physical 
design decisions largely in terms of information visualisation, with the actual physical design 
treated as only an influencing factor on decisions concerning “The way the information will 
be structured, the kinds of graphical representations that will be appropriate, and the layout of 
the graphics on the screens” (Preece, Rogers and Sharp 65).
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In these HCI texts the important point raised by Shinkle can be clearly seen, that when we talk 
about interfaces we are often referring to the graphical user interface alone to the exclusion of 
the  other aspects she notes,14 and this should not surprise us for three reasons. Firstly,  as 
Dourish has noted “the key feature of interaction with computation is how we act through it 
to achieve effects in the world” (Dourish 137, emphasis in original?), which holds also for the 
interface we use to interact with videogames. In our everyday life we are more concerned 
with the ‘doing of’ rather than the ‘of doing’, and the screen, which presents back to us what 
we  are  doing,  expectedly  becomes  our  main  focus.  Secondly,  our  familiarity  with  the 
interfaces we use to play aids this first point, as they have often become ready-to-hand and 
incorporated into our bodily space and as such we act through them not only teleologically but 
also ontologically, in that “our relationship with the technology [. . .] was not about using an 
instrument,  but  being an  instrument”  (Shinkle  "Corporealis  Ergo  Sum"  29,  emphasis  in 
original). Lastly, there is the simple pragmatism that the videogame systems, both console and 
personal computer based, that we use are mass produced standardised products with a largely 
conventionalised model of simultaneous controller input  with audio-visual output. Very few 
of us are lucky enough to work at Xerox Parc or MIT’s Media Lab and have the opportunity 
to design both the physical interface and the underlying software that utilises it, but instead 
have to fit our needs as best we can to the physical interfaces that are already in wide spread 
use. 
As  Shinkle  points  out,  “most  commercially  available  interfaces  require  the  user  to  adapt 
his/her  movements  to  suit  the  manufacturer’s  specifications,  replacing  individual  gestures 
with [. . .] the homogenization of gesture and response” (Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 31). 
This homogenisation of gesture acts in concert with our familiarity of conventional interfaces 
14 Of course it should be noted that at least at a simple level the graphic interface is physical in the 
sense that it is the photons of which it is comprised that makes it possible for us to see them in the first 
place.
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such that  we develop enduring habits  in our use of those interfaces,  what  Merleau-Ponty 
describes  as  ‘praktognosia”,  or  practical  knowledge  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of 
Perception 162), a “knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is 
made, [. . .] a knowledge bred of familiarity” (Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 
166). For  the experienced  player,  which  anecdotally  many within  the  field  of  videogame 
studies  are,  there  is  a  powerful  habit  based  familiarity  with  the  largely  conventionalised 
prevailing  design  of  physical  interfaces,  such  that  they  have  become  ready-to-hand  and 
incorporated into our bodily schema, not something we act upon but rather act through. The 
result  of  all  this  is  that  videogame  interfaces  are  often  considered  as  simply  part  of  the 
technical  system used to play,  rather than as a central  and vital  part  of the experience of 
videogame play in itself.
Stages of Interface Development
If we step outside of this everyday view of our use of interfaces and approach the topic more 
historically though it becomes clear that this on-screen bias was not always the situation in 
our  experience  of  interfaces.  Dourish  puts  forward  such  a  historical  narrative  of  the 
development of the interaction between humans and computers that does not focus primarily 
on the technical aspects but rather on “the development of user interfaces in terms of the 
different  sets  of  human  skills  they  are  designed  to  exploit”  (Dourish  5),  describing the 
electrical, symbolic, textual, and graphical as successive stages (Dourish 7-11). What is useful 
here about the approach Dourish develops is that “it draws attention to the human experience 
of computation”  (Dourish 5),  rather than focusing only on the technical developments and 
advances or conceptual models that underpin these different paradigms of our interaction with 
computers. It describes how we relate to computers through the nature of our interaction with 
them, particularly how the interfaces that enable this interaction entail different experiences of 
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interaction, such as the different experience between using a command line based interface as 
opposed to a contemporary graphical desktop interface. 
Given that Dourish’s model is historical, it begins with our interaction with computers when 
electronic computers were first emerging from research laboratories where “Every machine 
was a prototype;  every program, uniquely designed for a specific  computer”  (Dourish 6). 
Though  Dourish  chronologically  situates  this  stage  at  the  transition  “from  hardware 
configuration to digitally stored programs, [. . .] The boundary that we now take for granted 
[between  hardware  and  software]  was  fuzzier  then;  interacting  with  the  system,  and 
developing  new  programs,  relied  on  a  thorough  understanding  of  the  electronic  design” 
(Dourish  7).  Hence, the  interface  used  to  interact  with  computers  at  this  stage  was  the 
conceptual knowledge of how the computer, as an electronic machine, actually functioned in 
the  physical  world  and  the  physical  circuitry  itself  as  “What  we  currently  refer  to  as 
‘instruction sets’ [. . .] were, at that stage in the history of computation, intimately tied to the 
individual  details  of  the  circuitry of  any particular  computer”  (Dourish 6-7).  As a  result, 
“Entering a new program, even if that program was to be stored digitally in the memory of the 
computer, could still bear a remarkable resemblance to electronic reconfiguration, involving 
plugboards and patch cables” (Dourish 7). Screwdrivers, soldering irons, and cabling, rather 
than  the  keyboard  and  mouse  with  which  we  are  familiar  with  today,  were  the  primary 
interface device at this stage. Importantly, this physical reconfiguration ensued that interaction 
with  computers  was  asynchronous,  in  that  there  were  discrete  stages  of  configuring  the 
computer, and then running the program.
A more complex level of abstraction for this interaction with computers through the interface 
of the physical circuitry developed during the transition to the symbolic stage of interaction 
where  “programming  computers  came  to  require  less  understanding  of  the  detailed 
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construction  of  each particular  machine,  and relied  increasingly  on regularized  and well-
understood capacities that would be available across a wide range of machines—register files, 
index registers, accumulators, and so forth” (Dourish 7). The programmer no longer interacted 
with the  physical  machinery  but  rather  with the  conceptual  machinery of  computation  as 
standards and conventions began to emerge. At the same time the way in which programs 
were encoded moved away from machine native forms “to other symbolic forms that were 
more readily understandable to human beings” (Dourish 7). Firstly assembly languages, still 
tied to a particular type of computer system, but later programming languages such as LISP 
and FORTRAN were developed which affected a type of interaction with computers that “was 
now lifted to a more abstract level that was simultaneously a more natural form of expression 
and  independent  of  the  precise  details  of  any  specific  computer,  its  implementation  and 
configuration”  (Dourish  7-8).  Whilst  users  unfamiliar  with  protocols  of  programming 
languages would still find this type of interaction almost as foreign as the earlier electrical 
stage,  importantly  “It  introduced  a  set  of  symbolic representations of  computer  system 
operation as the primary modality by which interaction was conducted” (Dourish 8, emphasis 
added).  Interestingly,  Dourish  argues  that  the  physical  interface  mirrored  the  conceptual 
development of symbolic interaction – “Punched cards, for example,  can be regarded as a 
primitive form of symbolic  interaction” (Dourish 8),  a development  best  seen in the later 
adoption of the alphanumeric keyboard as the key interface device for symbolic interaction 
with computers.
This development of the interface employed in interaction from the machinery of the circuitry 
to symbolic representations of that circuitry is a vital point in Dourish’s historical model, as it  
underpins the development of his next stage, textual interaction. Dourish characterises this 
stage as an extension of the symbolic phase, for as he notes many programming languages are 
themselves textual in nature, yet given the concerns of his model with the human experience 
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of using computers “a distinction can be made between symbolic and textual interaction by 
looking  at  the  actual  interaction with  the  computer”  (Dourish  9,  emphasis  in  original). 
Primarily,  this  distinction  lies  in  the  temporal  relationships  the user  would have with the 
computer – rather than the asynchronous, batch processing style of the symbolic stage the user 
now received co-temporous feedback which “brought the idea of ‘interaction’  to the fore. 
[. . .] replacing configuration, programming, or other ideas that had largely characterized the 
interplay between users and systems in the past” (Dourish 10-11).15 Underlying this increased 
sense  of  interaction  was  the  dialogical  nature  of  textual  interaction  based  on  a  habitual 
“‘grammar’ of interaction, one that broke input text into commands, parameters, arguments, 
and options” (Dourish 10), to which the computer would respond if not immediately then as 
quickly as a response could be processed, and as such “it was natural to look on the result as a 
‘conversation’ or ‘dialogue.’” (Dourish 10).  
Graphical interfaces built upon this sense of interacting with the computer and added, quite 
literally,  another  dimension “by turning interaction  into  something that  happened in  two-
dimensional space rather than a one-dimensional stream of characters” (Dourish 11). Dourish 
outlines various ways in which the spatial nature of graphical interfaces opened up new ways 
in which to make use of our everyday abilities in our interaction with computers, but what is 
of  particular  interest  to  us  here  is  how these  various  factors  came  together  in  the  direct 
manipulation model of interface design which “represent[s] explicitly the objects that users 
will deal with and to allow users to operate on these objects directly” (Dourish 13). Frohlich 
expands further  on the  direct  manipulation  model,  noting  that  the  sense of  direct  control 
“seemed to  change the  entire  paradigm for  human-computer  interaction  from  dialogue to 
manipulation by utilizing what the programmers knew was a visual language in a way users 
15 An interesting case which fits in between these two stages and helps elucidate the difference are 
programming languages such as python which features both command line mode (i.e. textual 
interaction) as well as a more conventional compile mode (i.e. symbolic interaction). Despite the 
difference in the temporal relation to the user, both modes follow the same protocols and syntax.
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believed  to  be  an  entire  interactive  world”  (Frohlich  464,  emphasis  in  original).  This 
‘worldness’ of graphical interfaces is based on the experience of  ‘directness’ they provided 
for  their  user,  an  experience  Frohlich  argues  is  based  both  on  engagement and distance. 
Engagement, which “refers to the perceived locus of control of action within the system. [. . .] 
whether users feel themselves to be the principle actors within the system or not” (Frohlich 
465),  is  high  in  systems  utilising  graphical  interfaces,  as  the  experience  of  directly 
manipulating the objects of experience “is like reaching into the world yourself to carry out 
the  action.  Users  act  on  the  world  in  ‘first-person’  and  are  therefore  said  to  be  directly 
engaged with the system”  (Frohlich 466).  The concept  of distance draws upon Norman’s 
concepts of the gulf of evaluation and the gulf of execution (Norman 49) to describe the ease 
with  which  users  can  “translate  their  goals  into  actions”  (Frohlich  466).  This  is a  task 
graphical interfaces can make easier by employing a system of metaphors based on real world 
objects  and  actions such  as  writing  documents which  invoke  “a  set  of  ready-made 
expectations in users about what kinds of things could be done  with documents”  (Frohlich 
466). For  example,  the  development  of  graphical  interfaces  made  our  interactions  with 
computers more pragmatic, more concerned with the  tasks to which we were directed than 
with dealing with the technical tasks and procedures required to perform those tasks.
What is interesting about Dourish’s historical model is that it tracks how our interaction with 
computers  gradually  becomes  more  and  more  like  an  everyday  activity,  “more  easily 
integrated into our daily lives by reducing the complexity of those interactions” (Dourish 14), 
through drawing upon our skills and familiarity with the world in ways that developed an 
increasingly phenomenologically natural interface, for instance where the screen becomes a 
‘desktop’, and a text file becomes a ‘document’. At the same time the physical aspects of the 
interface, the real world devices such as the keyboard and mouse, seem to disappear into the 
background  somewhere  around  the  textual  stage  as  the  interfaces  used  become  more 
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accessible  and immediate  and thus  the user’s attention  increasingly focuses  upon what  is 
onscreen. Whilst Shinkle quite rightly disputes what she sees as the inherent occularism in the 
academic treatment of videogames, noting that “Within the field of game studies, interactivity 
still  tends  to  be  understood  as  a  predominately  visual  and  semiotic  activity”  (Shinkle 
"Corporealis  Ergo  Sum"  22),  it  perhaps  should  not  be  posited  so  much  as  an  erroneous 
orientation limited  to  videogame  studies but  rather  as  a  reflection  of  wider  cultural 
understandings of and experiences with interfaces. For the many of us who possess extensive 
experience with computer interfaces those interfaces have largely become ready-to-hand and 
withdrawn from our immediate concern,16 and what is primarily important to the user is what 
they  can  do  with  those  interface  devices  onscreen.  In  regards  to  videogames, more 
specifically, these conventional ways of thinking about interfaces carry over, and as such the 
subsumption of the complexity of the game interface into the singular aspect of the graphic 
interface is similarly a reflection of our everyday habitual experience of our interaction with 
videogames. 
Ironically,  if  not perversely,  the dominant  visualist  approach which characterises both the 
popular and the academic discussion of videogames is in actuality an embodied understanding 
of videogames, in the broader sense of the term, to the extent that it reflects our experience of 
our life-world, that is of our own experience of playing videogames. At least for experienced 
players, during the course of play our relation to videogames usually focuses on the graphic 
interface onscreen rather than the controller in the hands, as the controller has become ready-
to-hand and withdrawn from our immediate conscious experience, part of the equipment used 
to play. Here we are employing Heidegger’s notion of ‘equipment’, which does not deal with 
the features of tools as things but rather as something that is for something else – “Equipment 
16 It should be noted that two of the key physical devices that comprise the computer interface, the 
keyboard and the screen, predate the personal computer in the form of the typewriter and the television 
respectively.
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is essentially ‘something in-order-to’  [.  .  .] In the ‘in-order-to’ as a structure there lies an 
assignment or  reference of something to something”  (Heidegger 356, emphasis in original). 
For  the  sufficiently  competent  player,  the  interface is  something  in-order-to  play  the 
videogame rather than a thing in itself, and as such it is unsurprising that it is on the screen, 
where the course of our play is visible,  that our attention naturally dwells, as the physical 
interface itself refers towards what is represented onscreen. This is not to dismiss the need for 
the  unpacking  of  the  complexity  of  the  game interface  that  Shinkle  calls  for  in  order  to 
uncover and better understand the approach commonly taken towards it, as Shinkle herself 
traces  influences  on the way that  we understand videogame interfaces  as  far back as  the 
codification of linear perspective in the fifteenth century, what she describes as “the historical 
and epistemological baggage amassed by the perspective paradigm” (Shinkle "Digital Games 
and the Anamorphic" 1). The point is that the prevailing focus on the graphical interface is not 
a ‘mistaken’ view of our use of videogame interfaces but merely a limited one that does not 
account for how the other aspects of the game interface contribute to or indeed contradict the 
appeal of the screen. 
The Interface as Site of Relation
If we are to take into account the other aspects of the interface and ‘unpack the complexity’ of 
the videogame interface as Shinkle puts it we first need to specify what those aspects are, and 
here we turn again to Shinkle, who as we noted earlier identified the paired elements of input 
and output, hardware and software, and the physical and graphical. The first step to unpacking 
the complexity of the videogame interface is acknowledging that these aspects overlap in 
complex  ways,  for  instance  how input  and output  are  often  associated  with  the  physical 
aspect,  in particular  to refer to the physical devices which accept  input into the computer 
system  and  provide  output  in  the  form  of  audiovisual  and  tactile  feedback.  In  a  sense, 
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focusing on the different aspects of the interface identified by Shinkle, namely hardware and 
software, input and output, and graphical and physical, leads us down the wrong path, not 
because they don’t  exist  or aren’t  important,  but rather  because the interface  is  not these 
aspects in themselves but rather the relation between them, a relation Shinkle characterises as 
the portal or junction point between these aspects, and indeed between the player  and the 
videogame as well. Thus, we will take the aspects Shinkle identifies and employ them as pairs 
of terms in relation – input and output, hardware and software, and physical and graphical,  
rather then as fixed oppositions.
This sense of the videogame interface as a type of intermediary that facilitates a particular 
relation  also  arises  when  the  implications  of  the  portmanteau  term  ‘interface’  itself  are 
considered.  The prefix ‘inter’  captures  the essential  betweeness  of the interface,  that  it  is 
something between two other  things, and even that it  suggests  a sense of movement and 
process. Thus it can be seen that the contention that interfaces should be understood in terms 
of the relations  they establish is implicit within the term.17 Indeed, of the several meanings 
given in the Oxford English Dictionary for both the noun and verb forms of interface, this 
meaning of betweeness is present,  whether in the sense of an inter-lying surface between 
things, the space of interaction between things, the means of connection between things, or 
simply the act of coming into connection or interaction with something (OED). Interestingly, 
the word seems to have a mostly technical history, as its earliest use in the late nineteenth 
century applies to the physical sciences, whilst later during the 1960’s and 70’s, the term took 
on  a  meaning  associated  with  communications  between  various  technical  agencies  and 
departments,  whilst  at  the  same  time  the  more  familiar  technological,  particularly 
computational associations arose  (OED). Whilst the second component of the word, ‘face’, 
17 Interestingly, ‘inter’ as a word rather than a prefix means to bury, particularly a dead body into the 
ground. Whilst it is perhaps a specious line of argument, it may be fruitful to consider the different 
implications that arise from this heteronym pair, such as how the player is ‘buried’ within the 
videogame via the interface, or rather intraface, as opposed to simply in contact with.
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might be seemingly straight forward, many of the associations attached to it suggest much 
about the nature of the relation implied by interface. For example, some of the associations of 
the word include to look in a particular direction, to confront, to be confronted by, to meet  
with another,  the outward form or appearance  of  something,  or  the surface  of something 
(OED).  When the two words are combined, we can see that the interface is not simply an 
object that sits between player and videogame, but rather between the important features of 
each, that it can put the player and videogame into a relation of opposition and contest, and 
that it implies a sense of particular orientations, both physical and conceptual, of the player 
towards the videogame and vice versa.
In this manner, the interface can be thought of as what Massumi describes as the ’in-between’, 
“the  being  of the  middle–the  being  of  a  relation”  (Massumi  Parables  for  the  Virtual 70, 
emphasis in original), which is not a given of the individual elements, but rather that which 
puts  them  in  relation  as the “products,  effects,  coderivatives  of  an  immanent  relation” 
(Massumi Parables for the Virtual 71). While our concerns here are rather less ambitious than 
Massumi's immanent political philosophy, our case is the experience of videogame play as 
mediated by the consideration of the interface as a relational object. Each of the terms of that 
relation,  be it player  and game, input and output,  physical  and graphical,  or software and 
hardware;  have meaning only in their  relation to  each other.   Whilst  we can conceive of 
‘player’ and ‘game’ as abstract and individual concepts, as indeed many theorists within the 
field of videogame studies already have, if we wish to dig further into the actual embodied 
experience of videogame play we need to realise that these concepts encourage an abstraction 
where the dynamic emergence of the actual experience of videogame play is lost,  as their 
experience emerges from the intrinsic relation  between the player and the  videogame in the 
act of play, a relation that is effected and enabled only through the interface.
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Thus, if we are concerned with the dynamic emergence of the experience of videogame play 
we should be concerned not so much with simply the outcome of the player’s experience of 
the interface,  such as whether  the graphical  interface  is  seen to  take precedence over the 
physical  interface,  but rather how the particular  relations  between these terms figures  the 
relations those terms are placed in, or out of which they emerge. Taking such a perspective 
allows us to explore how particular relations become shaped in particular ways, for instance 
how the particular relation between the physical and the graphical leads to the graphical being 
experienced as the locus of interaction, or how the relation between input and output lead to 
them being experienced as part of a continuous feedback loop. The key relation from whence 
the others arise is that between player and game, yet these terms in themselves offer initial 
problems, particularly as the definition of what constitutes a videogame is often a contentious 
issue within the field. 
The question of what actually constitutes a videogame at first seems straightforward, yet it is 
a question that has received numerous answers in various attempts to argue for a particular 
formal  basis  for  understanding videogames.  Let  us contrast  here two similar,  but  slightly 
different positions where Juul argues that games are both objects and activities  (Juul  Half-
Real: Video Games between Real Rules and Fictional Worlds 44), while Aarseth suggests that 
games are both object and a process  (Aarseth "Computer Game Studies, Year One"). Both 
positions  share  a  similar  dichotomy between  the  static  and dynamic,  yet  their  individual 
choices for the nomenclature of videogame’s dynamic state stresses the relational nature of 
videogame play as Juul’s ‘activities’ suggests that it  is about what the player does, whilst 
Aarseth’s  ‘process’,  despite  his  intended  meaning  being  that  “Playing  is  integral,  not 
coincidental” to the experience (Aarseth "Computer Game Studies, Year One"), suggests also 
the  contribution  of  the  videogame.  Each position  seems  to  suggest,  though coming  from 
different  directions,  a  meeting  point  between  the  player’s  playing,  and  the  videogame’s 
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processing, a liminal zone between the player and the videogame where the player’s actions 
become events within the videogame, and the videogame’s processes become events within 
the player’s experience of the videogame. The interface sits within this liminal zone between 
the external  world of the player  and the internal  world of the videogame,  facilitating  the 
transition from one to the other,  indeed making each party available  to the other via this 
relation. As Wirman and Leino argue “the interface is an umbilical cord through which, in the 
gaming situation, new senses are enabled rather than the existing ones limited” (Wirman and 
Leino 462). Without the interface,  the player  has no means of access to the world of the 
videogame as a videogame, and the videogame cannot be experienced as a concrete activity 
by the player, but only as an abstracted concept – a static idea or model of the videogame, but 
not the videogame as the dynamic emergence of the videogame as experienced in play. 
In regards to the term ‘player’, a question often unasked as its answer seems self evident is 
simply what does it mean to be a videogame player? If actually playing is integral to the 
experience of videogame play, is it possible to be a player without a videogame to play, and 
what does playing actually entail? It should be clear  in the context of actual play  that, as 
individual terms, player and videogame are comprehendible as concepts only in their relation 
to each other, for without the player  the videogame as an object is simply software code, 
whilst without the videogame the player is not a player at all, rather a more general sort of 
individual (Aarseth “I Fought the Law” 130). As Kücklich notes “it [the videogame] is only 
observable  through playing it,  [.  .  .]  When a game is  being played,  however,  it  not only 
becomes observable to the player, it also forms a cybernetic system of which both game and 
player  are  integral  parts”  (Kücklich  "The  Study of  Computer  Games  as  a  Second-Order 
Cybernetic System" 107). Importantly, this cybernetic system between player and game is in 
actuality  a  second-order  one,  as  “observing  a  game  necessarily  entails  influencing  it” 
(Kücklich "The Study of Computer Games as a Second-Order Cybernetic System" 107), that 
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is to say that the relation between player and videogame is interactive in nature, it is based not 
simply on the player’s playing or the videogame’s  response to that playing but rather the 
cybernetic  feedback  loop  between  player  and  videogame  gives  rise  to  their  respective 
positions  in  their  intrinsic  relation  of  player  and videogame.  As Polaine  points  out,  such 
interaction is circular in its nature, where “the participant’s changed behaviour creates another 
change in the device’s reaction, which results in another change in the interactor’s behaviour, 
thus providing a feedback loop of interaction”  (Polaine 152).  This relation  is  limited  and 
indirect, as the player and the videogame are based in different types of ontical existence, the 
player  in  the  messy,  corporeal,  and immediate  experience  of  our  everyday  world;  whilst 
videogames exist in the ordered digital code of the computer, as such the relation is realised 
through the interface for “The interface is a surface allowing two parties of fundamentally 
different  kind,  the  simulation  and  the  human  player,  to  communicate  with  each  other” 
(Wirman and Leino 461). Within  the formation of the cybernetic system that incorporates 
both player and videogame described above, their relation must not be simply interactional in 
nature but interactional across the divide between the corporeal and digital – this relation must 
have a concrete site or place that constitutes the portal or junction which crosses this gap, in 
other words the interface.   
The interface then is implicit in the player’s experience of the videogame, for as Kücklich 
points out “the player does not interact with the code during gameplay, but solely with the 
interface” (Kücklich "Perspectives of Computer Game Philology" 4-5). The player’s relation 
to the videogame takes place through the intermediary interface which is the immediate locus 
of the player’s interaction, thus the interface itself can be thought of as the site of the relation 
between the player  and videogame.  To explore this  mediating role of the interface in the 
player’s  experience  of  videogame  play  the  broader  player-videogame  relation  which  the 
interface facilitates can be addressed through the series of relations between the pairs of input-
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output, physical-graphical, and hardware-software used by Shinkle to describe the interface. 
As we have already noted these terms can overlap in complex ways when applied to the actual 
apparatus they refer to. For instance, a controller can be described not only as input, but also 
as physical hardware, and furthermore, if it includes tactile feedback, as physical hardware 
output. Similarly,  a screen is at once both physical hardware, but at the same time and more 
importantly it outputs a graphical display based on the videogame software. As such these 
terms should not be seen typologically or taxonomically, but rather as different facings of one 
and the same interface, different ways  of thinking about and describing the interface and its 
relation to the player. By focusing on each particular relation in turn we can start to articulate 
and  unpack  the  complexity  of  the  interface  as  a  whole,  as  each  relational  pair  of  terms 
highlights  particular  aspects  of  the  way in  which  the  interface  facilitates  and figures  the 
relation between player and videogame.  These relations of input-output, physical-graphical, 
and hardware-software, will be used in the following section where we will further investigate 
the question of what an interface is through employing the example of the EyeToy system to 
consider how the different aspects of the interface-player relationship elucidates not only the 
corporeal nature of the experience of videogame play through a videogame interface, but also 
how the wider relation between player and videogame enacted through the interface can be 
understood by the more immediate relation of input-output, physical-graphical, and hardware-
software from which it arises.
Blurring the Boundary: The EyeToy
EyeToy: Play was released by Sony Computer Entertainment Europe (SCEE) in 2003, and 
included both the  actual  camera  device  as  well  as  a  disc  containing  12 mini-games  with 
themes ranging from Kung Fu fighting, to dancing and window washing. Subsequently, more 
videogames were released for the accessory by Sony, including two sequels EyeToy: Play 2 
and  Play 3, the sports themed  EyeToy: Play Sports, the exercised themed  EyeToy: Kinetic, 
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and EyeToy: AntiGrav, the first fully fledged videogame as opposed to mini-game collection 
for the camera. In addition to third party titles developed specifically for the camera, such as 
Sega Superstars, many other PlayStation 2 videogames make use of the EyeToy for additional 
features, such as the Cameo system that takes a scan of the player’s facial features to use as 
the head of in-game avatars used most frequently for sports videogames, extra motion based 
mini-games such as  Jackie  Chan Adventures,  or simply to represent the player  on-screen, 
particularly in performance style videogames such as the SingStar series. 
The EyeToy system is marketed as “a whole new gaming experience” where “instead of just 
playing  the  game  you  could  be  part  of  it!”  (Sony  "Eyetoy  Features").  The  promotional 
material implores its customers to not “just play a game, live the game with EyeToy” (Sony 
"What  Is Eyetoy").  We should be wary of such strongly worded claims as ‘a whole new 
gaming experience’, particularly when dealing with marketing material, but of note are the 
more specific claims made about what the player actually does after setting up the EyeToy and 
standing in front of it – “Then you use your arms, legs, head, bottom [. . .] in fact any part of  
your  body  to  play  the  games”  ("Eyetoy  Features"). EyeToy:  Play  3 makes  some  of  the 
implications of the term interface explicit as the player must orientate themselves towards or 
‘face’ the camera in a certain  manner  in order  to play.  A short  demonstration video that 
launches before the videogame proper starts instructs the player to ensure a particular space 
for play by removing any likely obstacles, how to position the camera, and finally how to 
position themselves in front of the camera, a task made even more explicit  by the use of 
onscreen silhouettes that indicate to the player how far they should stand from the television 
screen before each videogame activity. The aspect of bodily based interaction is a key part of 
the appeal of the EyeToy system as the player’s body is much more explicitly involved in the 
course of play than more conventional videogames, and as such it is important to investigate 
how this foregrounding of the player’s body opens up avenues of inquiry into the general 
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nature of the embodied  player-videogame relation. The camera  that  is  at  the heart  of the 
EyeToy concept is itself little more than a standard 640 x 480 web cam, with a microphone, 
connected to the  PlayStation 2 console via a first generation Universal Serial Bus,18 which 
records  the  player’s  movements  and  displays  them  onscreen  in  real-time. Yet, with  the 
addition of motion capture software that can isolate the player  from their background and 
track their motion, the EyeToy system provides an interesting case with which to examine the 
concept of the interface as it does away with one of the central elements of more conventional 
interfaces, the physical controller through which the player can take action. As in Chapter 
Two, where the uniqueness of  [giantJoystick] made visible the importance of the player’s 
embodied relation to the interface, the unconventional nature of the interface of the  EyeToy 
system brings the question of what an interface is into sharp relief, as we can enquire  what 
and where now is the interface in EyeToy based videogames? Through the direct employment 
of the player’s  body without the mediating aspect of a controller,  joystick,  or other input 
device the EyeToy system seemingly does away with the surface between the simulation and 
the human player as Wirman and Leino put it (Wirman and Leino 461), and thus the interface 
becomes indefinite and elusive. Of course our bodies, generally our hands, are used to play 
videogames no matter what kind of input device we are utilising, and as Shinkle notes, even 
those parts of our body not explicitly involved are none the less implicitly involved due to the 
synaesthic nature of our experience of the world, as she argues “Embodiment and hapticity, in 
other words, are crucial in generating what appears to be an exclusively visual experience” 
(Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 25).  Thus, the experience of playing  EyeToy videogames 
may not on the face of it be anymore embodied phenomenologically than videogame play 
using more conventional videogame controllers, and as such we need to investigate whether 
the EyeToy interface effects a different experience of play, or of the interface, or of the body. 
18 Which has lead to several unofficial efforts to develop device drivers to use it with standard personal 
computers, as well as PC based games that attempt to recreate a similar experience as EyeToy using of 
the shelf hardware and open source software.
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As Polaine  puts  it,  “Once  the  need  to  master  a  fiddly  and  complex  game  controller,  or 
remember complex combinations of special moves is removed the nature of the games that 
are played also changes” (Polaine 156). The question is what the change in the nature of the 
games played through the EyeToy system can tell us about the nature of the interface and its 
role in the experience of videogame play.
EyeToy:  Play  3 presents  a  useful  case  with  which  to  examine  the  EyeToy system  more 
generally, as it is in many ways a quintessential example of the videogames that make use of 
the camera and the movement of the player’s body. Firstly, it is the most recent iteration of 
EyeToy Play, which was the first videogame to feature the camera, and continues to be its 
flagship  series.  Secondly,  Play  3,  like  the  vast  majority  of  videogames  that  employ  the 
EyeToy camera,  consists of a collection of variously themed mini-games,  including sports 
games such as volleyball,  rhythm based music games, as well as more eclectic party style  
games,  and  as  such  presents  multiple  examples  of  how  the  EyeToy  system  engages  its 
audience in body based videogame play. And, thirdly,  EyeToy: Play 3 prominently features 
one  of  the  central,  and  most  interesting,  features of  EyeToy  based  videogames,  the 
representation  of  the  players  and  their  movements  onscreen  and  the  interaction  of  this 
representation of the players’ bodies within the videogame’s graphical interface. Whilst most 
videogames anchor the player’s ability to exert control over the videogame in some graphical 
form, even if it is one as simple as a cursor or pointer, the incorporation of a representation of 
the  player’s own body  into  the  environment  of  the  videogame breaks  down  the  usual 
boundary between the exterior real world and interior world of the videogame, and it could be 
expected that this configuration of explicitly making the player visible within the game-world 
could lead to a somewhat different experience of play. 
Indeed,  the  experience  of  playing  EyeToy:  Play  3 is  different  from that  of  conventional 
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videogames even at the very basic level of the player’s bodily comportment. Videogame play 
is quite commonly seen as a sedentary activity, where the player sits still in front of the screen 
with only the  most  minor  of  movements.  Contrastingly,  EyeToy:  Play 3 does not  fit  this 
stereotype as most of the mini-games it features involve a substantial amount of movement on 
the part of the player, not to mention the fact that the player is expected to stand up during the 
course of play, creating a very different relationship between the player and screen than is 
usually the case. Another divergence arises from the actions required of the player in order to 
play,  as rather than pushing buttons on a normal control pad, the player interacts with the 
videogame through the movement of their own body, movements that are captured by the 
camera and parsed through software designed to “track hand and body movements in real 
time  and  interpolate  them  into  the  videogame.  In  effect,  a  player’s  body  becomes  the 
controller: the player moves their body in real space in order to make things happen onscreen” 
(Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 29). The image captured by the camera is also displayed 
onscreen,  so  that  the  player  can  view  their  own  movements  as  they  play,  and  this 
representation of the player is overlaid with graphical objects with which the player interacts.
By using the player’s own body movements as the source of control over videogame events 
the experience of playing EyeToy: Play 3 feels more natural in a phenomenological sense and 
more direct than the usual case where those movements are translated through some sort of 
physical and mechanical input device. The player does not need to learn the complex and 
often  arbitrary  control  sets  conventional  videogames  use,  but  rather  can  get  straight  into 
actually playing the mini-games (Polaine 156). This accessibility would seem to be the basis 
for  a  definite  sense of  immediacy in  the  player’s  interaction  with  the  videogame,  as  the 
simplicity of the body based controls allows the player to focus on the activity of play in a 
more freeform and less teleological manner, and as Polaine points out with relation to EyeToy 
“a large part of the entertainment comes from the act of playing the videogame, much more so 
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than the winning”  (Polaine 156). Yet, at the same time there is a certain stiltedness to the 
experience after the initial novelty of the motion based videogame play dissipates – not that 
the  various  mini-games  lose their  enjoyable  qualities,  but  rather  that  the  promise  of  free 
movement  and direct  access  to  the  activities  of  play  is  not  completely  matched  by what 
EyeToy: Play 3 offers as the player becomes increasingly aware that their movements do not 
always  have  the  desired  effect  within  the  game-space  –  the  EyeToy interface  retains  the 
intermediary role of videogame interfaces more generally and thus exerts an influence on the 
player’s experience of videogame play. This is not meant as an evaluation of the technical 
capacity of the  EyeToy system, but rather to highlight that despite the more direct sense of 
interaction  and involvement  it  offers  it  none the  less  still  constrains  the  player  and their 
movements within a computational logic.  To understand these particular constraints on the 
experience of playing  EyeToy: Play 3 we need to examine the videogame in terms of its 
interface,  that is, the particular relation between player and videogame it facilitates which 
enables that experience. By thinking about how the aspects identified by Shinkle that we are 
considering  as  relational  pairings,  namely  input  and  output,  hardware  and  software,  and 
physical and graphical, contribute to the broader relation between the player and videogame 
we can unpack the complexity of the EyeToy interface. 
Input and Output
In the case of EyeToy: Play 3 the physical output differs little from conventional videogames, 
in that it uses graphics and sounds to depict the ongoing action of the videogame, though the 
player’s movements are now represented onscreen. However, given that  the input aspect of 
the interface is not present in its usual form, as there are none of the controllers or joysticks  
with which this aspect is generally identified with, it is worth asking what actually constitutes 
the input or the input device in the context of EyeToy: Play 3. The camera itself does provide 
the input for the videogame system, and though the player doesn’t physically manipulate the 
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camera as they would a controller, but rather is observed by it, it none the less puts the player 
into relation with the videogame by transferring the player’s movements into the game-space. 
Yet, if input is based on movement, and an input device is simply a question of tracking the 
player’s movement, the difference between the EyeToy camera and a conventional controller 
is minimal at a conceptual level, after all, a controller measures the movement of the player’s 
body no less than the EyeToy through the displacement of the button in the case of the former, 
and  through  the  player’s  displacement  in  space  in  the  case  of  the  latter.  Yet,  there  is 
something  that  doesn’t  feel  quite  right  with  this  comparison,  in  that  there  is  something 
qualitatively different between manipulating a controller  held in the hands and moving in 
front of a camera, as the latter doesn’t feel so much like direct discrete control as it does a 
ubiquitous scrutiny,  your bodily movement being tracked incessantly during the course of 
play. At a simple level, there is the difference between the fine motor control focused in the 
hands  required  by  conventional  videogame  controllers  and the  more  broadly  based gross 
control  of  the  body  required  by  the  EyeToy  system.  More  significantly,  the  ubiquitous 
scrutiny of the player by the camera changes the nature of the player’s agency within the 
videogame. Suddenly, what would be incidental and largely inconsequential movements by 
the player using a more conventional controller, such as a stray movement of the arm, or even 
another person moving through the camera’s field of view, can have an unintended effect on 
the course of play.  Indeed while playing EyeToy: Play 3, I often inadvertently select a menu 
option while moving within the view of the camera, such as in moving towards it to adjust the 
focus of the camera, or moving out of the frame to attend to some non-game related activity. 
Whilst active, the EyeToy camera renders all movement of the players within its view as ludic 
movements, the space which the players inhabit is no longer just the space in which they are 
located during the course of play, but rather is explicitly part of the videogame environment.
Of course, at a technical level, the EyeToy camera should be considered as the input device, as 
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it is via the camera that the player controls the videogame. Yet, speaking of the experience of 
playing videogames utilising the  EyeToy system, there isn’t a sense of interacting with the 
camera in the way in which the player would manipulate a videogame controller, but rather a 
much more direct sense of interacting with what is displayed onscreen, not just the graphical 
aspects but also, and importantly so, the representation of the player back to themselves, a 
sense of interaction with the image captured by the camera.  This is due to the use of the  
player’s body to control the videogame, as our body is generally ready-to-hand to us, for as 
Merleau-Ponty  puts  it  “my body itself  I  move  directly,  I  do  not  find  it  at  one  point  of 
objective space and transfer it to another, I have no need to look for it, it is already with me” 
(Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 108). Is it then in the form of the player’s own 
body then that  we find the elusive input  aspect  of  interface  of  the  EyeToy system?  It  is 
through the movement of the player’s body, particularly of the arms, that the player plays? 
Yet, if the camera is not working correctly, or even if it is not properly placed so that it frames 
the player in the manner in which it is designed, the player’s bodily movements may have 
unexpected or even no effects within the game-space. This is particularly notable in mini-
games  which  require  movements  that  correspond  to  the  extremities  of  what  is  displayed 
onscreen – occasionally the player’s movement, despite seeming to be appropriate, does not 
trigger  the in-game action expected,  and the link between the player’s  movement in real-
world space and its representation within the videogame environment is momentarily broken.
Clearly, neither the camera’s  ubiquitous scrutiny, nor the player’s movement in themselves 
are sufficient to control the videogame, as both are necessary to the other, in fact in keeping 
with their relational nature they are the consequence of the other. Keeping in mind what was 
argued earlier for the concept of an interface not being the entities involved but rather the 
relation between them, it is unsurprising that the player and the EyeToy camera are reciprocal 
parties  that  require each other if  the videogame is to be played.  As such it  is neither  the 
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player’s movements  nor what the camera sees in themselves that are important, but rather 
which of the player’s movements the camera can ‘see’. At a trivial level the basis of this 
relationship is given away by one of the two LED bulbs on the front of the EyeToy camera’s 
housing. Whilst the blue LED on the right side of the housing illuminates to indicate that the 
camera is properly plugged in and working, the red LED on the left side illuminates only 
when the camera detects that there is not enough light available in the room for the camera to 
operate effectively. That is to say, that the in-between of the player’s body and the  EyeToy 
camera, the interface between them, is at a physical level based upon the camera’s ability to 
effectively ‘see’ the player, the interface is a relation based on the visibility of the player’s 
movements  to  the  EyeToy camera.  Therefore,  it  is  the space  between the player  and the 
camera, the space in which the player explicitly moves and is observed by the camera, which 
provides the input aspect of the interface between player and videogame.
However this does not account  for the totality of the relation between the player  and the 
videogame, for by ‘seeing’ here I mean not only the ability for the camera to capture the 
player and their movements as input into the videogame environment, but also for the EyeToy 
system, which includes both the camera itself as well as the PlayStation console to which it is  
connected, to ‘understand’ the player’s movements, that is, to figure the player’s movements 
as  game  relevant  actions  through  parsing  those  movements  into  commands  within  the 
software code.  A wave of the hand at a certain point in space becomes,  for instance,  the 
command to select a particular onscreen option, or clapping hands at another point becomes 
popping a balloon.  I  have already noted how occasionally a movement  performed by the 
player does not have the desired effect, and in my own experience this leads me to alter my 
movements  to  find  the  ‘sweet  spot’  where  my  actions  are  properly  ‘understood’  by  the 
camera. In other words the player alters their movements in the real-world space in which 
they  inhabit  so  that  the  image  of  themselves  which  is  displayed  onscreen  achieves  the 
outcomes actually desired by the player – their movements are constrained by the limits and 
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logic of the  EyeToy system, as the game-space begins to take a primacy over the player’s 
immediate environment.
Physical and Graphical
Thus the privileging of vision that Shinkle argues against reasserts itself, however this time in 
the form of computer vision, and the player, despite the pretence of free movement, must once 
again take part in the homogenisation of gesture.  This is to say that between the player’s 
movements in their immediate environment and the associated movements within the game-
space there is  a relation of control,  but  rather than simply being a unidirectional  flow of 
control into the videogame environment this control is bi-directional, as the player alters their 
immediate movements to make them more effective.  This requirement on the player, to fit 
their movement to the needs of the game-space, raises the question of which body the player 
is actually controlling, is it their own immediate physical body or the one represented back to 
them as their own, onscreen, over which the videogame exerts its influence? On the face of it 
this  question  may  seem  absurd,  for  in  our  general  experience  our  control  of  our  own 
movement is automatic. However, if we consider this in relation to the ready-to-hand, where: 
The  peculiarity  of  what  is  proximally  ready-to-hand  is  that,  in  its 
readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-
to-hand quite  authentically.  That  with which our everyday dealings 
proximally dwell  is  not the tools themselves.  On the contrary,  that 
which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to be 
produced at the time; (Heidegger 358) 
We see that whilst the body is the equipment we use to play our immediate body withdraws 
from  our  attention,  which  turns  instead  towards  the  represented  body  onscreen  which 
accomplishes the ‘work’ of the play activity and as a result the player’s proximal body, their  
immediate  physical  body,  becomes  subordinated  to  the  requirements  of  the  primary 
represented body to complete its ‘work’, the intentional concern towards which the player is 
directed. This is not to say the body becomes invisible, as the player is of course still quite 
aware of their own movement, but rather that the immediate body becomes subsumed within 
the  extended  sense  of  embodied  being  that  arises  from  the  bodily  incorporation  of  the 
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represented body onscreen, and the resulting extension of the player’s intentionality into the 
world of the videogame, and as such the immediate body withdraws into the background of 
the player’s experience.  This does not exclude its reassertion though, for we have already 
noted the importance of affective dimensions raised by Shinkle to the experience of playing 
videogames, where in the case of EyeToy: Play 3 extended play will lead to an important part 
of the affective intensity of the videogame, the intrusion of the body into the experience again 
due to physical exertion and tiredness. It is possible that the mini-game structure of EyeToy:  
Play 3, which partitions what Newman describes as online engagement, the actual ludic and 
interactive elements, into relatively short and discrete chunks, is in part an acknowledgement 
of  the  sometimes  intense  physicality  of  the  videogame  which  might  render  longer  play 
sections as too exhausting for what is intended as a casual play experience.
Figure  Three:  EyeToy:  Play  3 ‘screenshot’  depicting  the  ‘Maestro’  mini-game.19 (Image 
copyright Sony Computer Entertainment Inc, reproduced with permission).
19 Note that it is actually a digitally doctored, rather than authentic screenshot, as the player’s actual 
surroundings have been removed, and the player’s representation is suspiciously bright and clear for a 
640X480 webcam.
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We may very well ask why  EyeToy videogames feature the particular aspect of the player 
being represented onscreen as themselves rather than in the form of a fictional avatar which 
are used in more conventional videogames. Whether it is the more common situation where 
the entire background of the videogame is constituted by the space behind the player in a 
mirror type of effect as in Figure Four, or whether the scene captured by the camera shrinks to 
represent  the  player  within  the  virtualised  game-space,  as  in  Figure  Five,  the  player  is 
explicitly represented on-screen as themselves, rather than indirectly through an avatar that 
provides them with a specific role within the videogame. There are certainly practical reasons 
why the player needs to be represented onscreen, as the overlaying of the graphical interface 
on the representation of the player and their physical surroundings means that the player must 
adapt  themselves  to  this  videogame space  –  the  onscreen  buttons  they  need  to  push  are 
relative to the orientation of the camera, not of the player, and as such the player needs the 
representation of themselves onscreen to be able to re-orientate their real-world body to the 
game-space. Without it the player’s interaction with the videogame would be haphazard, and 
as such the bodily representation onscreen forms a vital part of the cybernetic circuit linking 
player and videogame. 
The  onscreen  representation  of  the  player’s  body,  therefore,  forms  part  of  the  graphical 
interface  as  a  type  of  output  which  enables  the  player  to  meaningful  co-ordinate  their 
movement in actual  space with their  movement within the graphical  interface.  Yet,  at  the 
same  time,  this  represented  body also  interacts  with  the  other  elements  of  the  graphical 
interface, and it is through this represented body that the player interacts with the game-space 
towards which the player is intentionally concerned. This is to say that the represented body 
simultaneously functions as a type of input within the graphical interface, as well as providing 
on the output side feedback for the player, that it is at once  that which provides the player 
access to the action of the videogame and that with which the player can track the course of 
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their involvement in the action of the videogame. Is it possible then to even consider the input 
and  output  aspects  of  the  graphically  represented  body  as  separate  entities,  as  terms  in 
relation? Indeed, it seems difficult to even speak of the onscreen body as a representational 
visual object if that represented body becomes incorporated into the player’s bodily schema as 
a ready-to-hand extension of that schema, when as Heidegger argues “No matter how sharply 
we just  look at the ‘outward appearance’ of Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot 
discover anything ready-to-hand” (Heidegger 357, emphasis in original). It follows that to 
interact with the videogame through the onscreen represented body requires the incorporation 
of  that  body  into  the  player’s  bodily  being,  and  as  such  we  should  recognise  that  the 
represented  body  is  not  a  thing  simply  viewed  by  the  player  but  imbued  with  their 
intentionality.  Our  question  then  is  how to  resolve  the  player’s  experience  of  a  sense  of 
control over the represented body arises, and more importantly through that body to interact 
with the videogame,  if  not  through simply visual  co-ordination of the motion  of  the  two 
bodies?
The player’s representation of themselves is always orientated in a mirror like fashion, even in 
two player mini-games where logically the players should be facing each other, such as in two 
player games of volleyball. In part this is simply a practical requirement of using the camera,  
as  it  cannot  capture  that  which  is  not  facing  it,  yet  at  the  same time  it  draws  upon our 
familiarity  with  our  reflected  image,  thus  when  I  raise  my  right  arm  I  perceive  the 
representation on screen as me raising my right arm, rather than another person raising their 
left  arm,  which  in  absolute  terms  is  actually  the  case.  This  mirroring  also  draws  on our 
awareness, and the orientating effect of that awareness, of our immediate surroundings, the 
lounge behind me, the kitchen door behind my right shoulder, the coffee table to my left, 
these borders to my physical  play space appear on screen as a visual background against 
which  I  move  as  part  of  a  gestalt  of  figure-ground.  This  reflection  of  my  immediate 
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environment and the familiarity with my reflected image enables my phenomenonal body, the 
one where “there is not a perception followed by a movement, both form a system which 
varies as a whole”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology of Perception 127), to be extended into 
my represented body which is thus incorporated into my phenomenological body, moving as I 
move without needing me to posit and reflectively translate my immediate motility into that 
required in the game-space. As Merleau-Ponty argues, “Consciousness is in the first place not 
a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’” (Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 159), 
which is to say that what concerns the player is not the abstracted and conscious appraisal of 
their  options  within  the  game-space  but  rather  the  more  immediate  potentials  for  actions 
towards  their  intentional  concern  that  are  made  available  by the  extension  of  their  body 
through the incorporation of the represented body. 
Indeed, it is difficult to account for the general sense of immediate and direct control over the 
represented body without this sense of bodily extension, for as Merleau-Ponty argues “It is 
never our objective body that we move, but our phenomenal body, and there is no mystery in 
that, since our body,  as the potentiality of this and that part  of the world, surges towards 
objects  to  be  grasped and perceives  them”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology of  Perception 
121). The extension of the player’s body brings the game-space of  EyeToy: Play 3 into the 
reach of the player  as a space of potential,  as a space of ‘I can’,  yet  this extension itself 
depends on the assistance of the interface, for as Wirman and Leino note, the interface makes 
the  game-space  available  to  the  player  in  a  way  “which  the  meatspace  senses  cannot 
necessarily  grasp  from  the  mere  diegetic  representation”  (Wirman  and  Leino  461).  The 
camera’s potentialising of the immediate space around the player expands the potentiality of 
the  player’s  intentionality  into  the  world  of  the  videogame and thus  to  move  it  from an 
detached and abstracted sense of ‘I possibly could’ into the more engaged and concrete sense 
of ‘I potentially can’.20
20 Though in everyday language the distinction between ‘possible’ and ‘potential’ is not large, here we 
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Thus, rather than the represented body merely being a visual object for the player it becomes 
an  extension of  their  body  schema,  that  total  and  immediate  sense  of  our  body  and  its 
movement which Merleau-Ponty describes as “a way of stating that my body is in-the-world” 
(Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of  Perception 115),  suggesting  that  the  videogame 
environment is reciprocally incorporated into our immediate environment through our body’s 
ability to merge the physical and the graphical environment it simultaneously inhabits. Yet, as 
we have seen, this sense of increased potential does not always eventuate, and accompanying 
this shortfall is a loss in the sense of bodily extension into the game-space – the familiarity 
with, and extension into the player’s reflected body remains, but falls short of incorporating 
the graphical environment fully into their physical environment. And this incorporation is of 
course not static, but dynamically changing as the player begins to understand and incorporate 
into their conduct the peculiarities of the EyeToy camera’s abilities to ‘see’ their movement, 
thus  negotiating  a  path  between  the  potentiality  suggested  by  their  familiarity  with  their 
reflected and own body, and how the videogame engine parses their movements. 
The inherent contingency of this sense of bodily extension, and the incorporation of graphical 
space into the player’s immediate space, and hence the importance of the habitual familiarity 
of the mirror image, is underlined by one of the minor mini-games included in EyeToy: Play 
3. This mini-game is used primarily in multiplayer tournaments, and consists of two stages, 
firstly  a  series  of  rotations  and  inversions  of  the  screen  in  various  directions  and  along 
different  axes,  and a second stage requiring each player  to  wave their  hand over an area 
highlighted corresponding to each player before their opponent can. The immediate effect of 
the rotation and inversion is a strange one in that you experience a strong sense of bodily 
are employing the terms as defined by Massumi, for whom the “forward projection of perception into 
latent action-choice is its possiblization. To possibilize is to stretch perception down the continuum in 
the direction of only-thought.” Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual, Post-Contemporary 
Interventions, eds. Stanley Fish and Fedric Jameson (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002) 92. Thus, 
“The possible is not just an active selection of potential, but a systematic simplification of it,” in that it 
abstracts individual potential actions into a set of possible actions “determined as alternatives to one 
another.” Massumi, Parables for the Virtual 93, 91.
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disorientation, almost dizziness, as the effortless connection that previously existed between 
your immediate and represented body is, quite literally, turned upside down and back to front, 
causing the incorporation of the represented body into the player’s extended bodily schema to 
be disrupted. Rather than simply moving their body in the intended direction, the players are 
forced  to  fall  back to  objectively  perceiving  the  environment  represented  onscreen,  using 
positional  cues  within  their  immediate environment to  objectively  re-orientate  their 
represented body and their immediate one.
Figure Four: Screenshot from the ‘Volleyball’  mini-game, where the player  is represented 
within a smaller  frame.21 (Image copyright  Sony Computer  Entertainment  Inc,  reproduced 
with permission.)
21 Please note, that like Figure Three, this screenshot also appears to be doctored.
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Thus, despite EyeToy’s marketing claims of simple and direct bodily involvement in the mini-
games it is apparent that something much more complex is happening at a phenomenological 
level. Whilst the representation of the player’s body on screen moves simultaneously as the 
player moves as if it were a mirror-like image, there is still a strange sense of disconnection, a 
feeling that the person on screen is ‘I’, but at the same time ‘not I’, an external visual object or 
perhaps a more usual sort of videogame avatar. Perhaps this has something to do with the way 
in which the represented body is visually available in a way the player’s immediate body is 
not, for as Merleau-Ponty argues “I observe external objects with my body, I handle them, 
examine them, walk round them, but my body itself is a thing which I do not observe: in order 
to  be  able  to  do  so,  I  should  need  the  use  of  a  second  body  which  itself  would  be 
unobservable”  (Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 104).  Yet, as we have already 
seen, the  player  can experience a sense of bodily extension that incorporates what should 
logically be the observed external object, the represented body onscreen, into the player’s 
body  schema. Paradoxically,  we  have  a  situation  where  the  body  we  observe,  and  the 
immediate body with which we observe it that should itself be unobservable, coexist within 
the player’s  experience,  simultaneously both visible  and invisible. Or rather,  we have the 
situation Merleau-Ponty describes, where “the mirror arises upon the open circuit [that goes] 
from seeing body to visible body. [. . .] I feel [. . .] not only where my fingers are but also in  
those ghostlike fingers, those merely visible fingers inside the mirror”  (Merleau-Ponty "Eye 
and Mind" 168). Taking these two arguments from Merleau-Ponty together, it would seem 
that the represented body the player observes on screen is in fact not observed at all, in as far 
as it is incorporated into the player’s bodily being – as Macke observes the representation of 
my body “does not operate as one [a representation] if my proprioceptive focus remains on 
the object in the mirror” (Macke 26). Beyond the surface of this representation lies a deeper, 
bodily connection that goes further than what is objectively visible. It is not a case of me 
consciously associating the visible image of myself, and my movements on screen, with the 
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sense  of  movement  of  my  immediate  body  by  some  kind  of  reflexive  accordance  that 
compares the two bodies and thus identifies a similarity after the fact, but rather an immediate 
and pervasive familiarity – it could be stated that the player’s represented body is not so much 
‘seen’ as it is ‘felt’. Yet the player’s image is still visible onscreen, and as we have already 
noted its visibility is a practical requirement to enable the player to be able to orientate their 
body to the game-space, so if it is not ‘observed’, how is this image to be understood?
The  question  of  how to  resolve this  problem  might be  answered by contending that  the 
represented body is what Massumi describes as a part-subject which “catalyses the play as a 
whole but is not itself a whole. It attracts and arrays the players, defining their effective role in 
the videogame and defining the overall state of the videogame, at any given moment, by the 
potential movement of the players with respect to it” (Massumi Parables for the Virtual 73). 
Massumi uses a soccer ball as an example of what he means by  a  part subject, stating that 
“The ball, as a thing, is the object-marker of the subject [. . .] the ball as a substantial term 
doubles the subject of play, which is itself invisible and nonsubstantial”  (Massumi  Parables 
for the Virtual 73), the ball becomes the focal point of the unfolding of the course of the game 
as “the subject of the play is the displacements of the ball and the continual modifications of 
the field of potential those displacements effect” (Massumi Parables for the Virtual 73). Like 
the soccer ball, the player’s represented body could be thought of in terms of the part subject, 
as  the subject  of  the various  mini-games  that  comprise  EyeToy:  Play  3 is  seemingly the 
displacement of the player’s represented body and the changing fields of potential that this 
movement effects. But importantly this represented body as part subject also stands in as the 
visible ‘object marker’ for the player’s extended phenomenological body, for as Wirman and 
Leino argue “the true subject body is that which is constructed by enhancing the physical 
body’s  abilities  into  the  virtual  through  the  interface”  (Wirman  and  Leino  463).  The 
movement  of  this  phenomenological  body  is  doubled  into  forms  that  both  player  and 
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videogame can parse and understand, giving that which is ‘invisible and nonsubstantial’, the 
player’s own proprioceptive sense of movement and action, a visible and substantial  form 
through rendering it  into discrete videogame actions,  and as such defining the role of the 
player in respect to the videogame, and the state of the videogame by the potential movement 
of the player as the player of the videogame. 
Thus, in EyeToy: Play 3 the represented body onscreen performs a similar role to the ball in a 
game of soccer in that it substantialises the actual subject of play,  catalysing  the interaction 
between player and videogame and body and avatar by extending the player’s body into the 
game-space  through  the  incorporation  of  their  represented  body  within  their 
phenomenological  body.  However, the  situation  is  somewhat  more  complex  as  the 
represented body is itself  insubstantial, an onscreen image that relies on its  proprioceptive 
incorporation into the player’s body schema to merge the gap between the substantial world in 
which the player’s body is embedded and the insubstantial world of the videogame. This can 
be seen most  simply in  one of  EyeToy:  Play 3’s ‘Laboratory’  mini-games,  a category of 
‘software toys’ without the ludic elements of the ‘Games’ category, called ‘Copy Cat’, which 
remediates  the children’s mimicry game  of  repeating  another’s  words  and  gestures 
immediately after they do.22 Unlike all other interaction with  EyeToy: Play 3, ‘Copy Cat’s’ 
representation of the player onscreen lags a few seconds behind the player’s own movements, 
emphasising the separation between the player and their representation onscreen. Without the 
spontaneous replication of the player’s own movement by their onscreen representation the 
‘not I’ of the representation is thrown into sharp relief, the imageness of the avatar is made 
plain, it is no longer the conjoined body that can be both observed as an object and employed 
22 Interestingly this activity often seems to be performed with the intention of annoying the other party, 
something in which from experience seems quite often effective. Whilst it is speculative and beyond 
the bounds of the discussion here, it is interesting to ponder whether the power of this simple game 
derives from an ability to disrupt the target’s sense of self, that the mimicry in some way renders the 
target observable to themselves and thus an object.
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as equipment. It no longer seems to be a reflection or replication of the player’s body but 
rather merely a shadow that trails after it, it is still my body but not in the immediate sense of 
the lived body,  but rather a part  subject which no longer doubles the subject of play,  the 
players proprioceptive experience of movement. 
The strangeness  of  the  player’s  relation  to  this  part  subject  in  EyeToy:  Play  3 is  further 
underlined by the experience of observing play, rather than partaking in it. Shinkle remarks 
that “Watching somebody play with the Eye Toy is a bit like watching somebody dancing to 
music  that  you  can’t  hear:  their  performance  is  marked  by strangely  discordant  gestures, 
originating in one domain, but meaningful in another” (Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 29-
30). The strangeness of the gestures by which one plays  EyeToy: Play 3 is reinforced with 
snapshots of the player’s actions presented to them at the conclusion of some mini-games. 
Take, for example, the American football based ‘Touch Down’, where as the name suggests, 
the player is required to score touch downs, firstly by taking the role of the quarter-back and 
throwing the ball to a receiver, where the player is then switched to the role of the receiver,  
and must avoid opposition players by fending them off. I find that the most effective way to  
deal with the running to the endzone portion of ‘Touch Down’ is to constantly punch both to 
the left and right whilst running on the spot, and unsurprisingly, when this posture is captured 
by one of the aforementioned snap shops I look absolutely ridiculous. Yet, at the time of 
actually performing these actions these images were still  present to my awareness as they 
were represented onscreen yet did not seem ridiculous, though they did indeed seem foolish 
and amusing. As we have seen, the movements of the player attends to the logic of the game-
space  in  which  they have  an  effect  and towards  which  they are  intentionally  directed,  it 
matters little to me that during the course of play that my movements bear little resemblance 
to actually running with a football,  as the domain in which my movements are judged, in 
which they find their meaning, is on the screen in the world of EyeToy: Play 3.
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Software and Hardware
If the player’s intentionality is directed towards the game-space of  EyeToy: Play 3 as it is 
displayed onscreen, it would seem that the wider focus on the graphical interface within the 
field of game studies whilst limited is not completely unwarranted. After all, when playing 
EyeToy: Play 3 it is on the screen that we find the buttons and sensitive areas with which we 
interact with to play. It is on the screen that our movements in space are put into their context 
as videogame playing actions,  and it  is on the screen that we receive feedback about the 
outcomes and effects of those actions. Indeed, as was noted earlier in Chapter Two, when we 
discuss videogame play we are generally speaking about what happens onscreen, or more 
correctly, how the outcomes of our actions are displayed onscreen. Of course, the graphical 
interface becomes the intentional focus of the player not only due to the images onscreen that 
we perceive, for if this was the case we would be unable to say that we interact with them 
beyond comprehending their  meaning as with any other type  of visual image,  rather than 
specifically as a videogame. However, if we recall that what is presented onscreen is often 
described  as  output,  we  can  identify  what  is  onscreen  as  the  output  of  both  software’s 
computational processes and the player’s own actions. More specifically,  the output is the 
result of the interaction of these two elements, for as Leino argues when taking action in a  
videogame “I subject them to be evaluated by the game, which can in turn, decide on the 
consequences my choices will have”  (Leino "Understanding Games as Played: Sketch for a 
First-Person Perspective  for  Computer  Game Analysis"  11).  Though the two elements  of 
player  action  and  computational  processes  are  in  effect  intertwined  in  actual  videogame 
output, for the purposes of investigating the software and hardware aspects of the interface of 
EyeToy:  Play  3 we  will  keep  them somewhat  separate  to  focus  on  what  the  interaction 
between the player and the videogame system can tell us about the interface.
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When we interact with the graphical interface, what we are also actually indirectly interacting 
with is the underlying software which it represents. Between the player’s movement of their 
body in  their  immediate  environment,  and  their  perception  of  the  representation  of  their 
body’s movement onscreen, lies a series of implicit stages of computational processes that 
first renders the player’s movements captured by the camera into the logic of the software 
code  before  further  rendering  the  videogame  state  into  the  graphical  display  represented 
onscreen. It would seem that between the physical and graphical aspects of the interface we 
find the reassertion of the classic input-process-output model of computing, yet importantly 
that output feeds back again in the action of the player in the characteristic cybernetic loop of 
videogame play. This underlines the insufficient nature of the terms ‘physical’ and ‘graphical’ 
when applied to the interface, for in a way the output from the screen is both physical and 
graphical,  in  that  “the  sensory  stimuli  originating  in  the  virtual  reaches  its  presentation 
through rays of light reflecting on the retinae” (Wirman and Leino 462). More importantly, as 
Kücklich points out “the player does not interact with the code during gameplay, but solely 
with  the  interface”  (Kücklich  "Perspectives  of  Computer  Game  Philology"  4-5).  In  the 
experience of the player what we are actually talking about is not a transition from analogue 
to digital and back to analogue – a change from continually variable movement to discrete 
positioning  and  back  again  –  for  that  transition  takes  place  inside  the  hardware  and  is 
inaccessible to the player. 
Here the issue of intentionality arises, specifically the question of where or what the player is 
intentionally directed towards and that with which they are concerned with.23 Given that the 
23It should be noted that the following discussion covers similar ground relating to intentionality to the 
postphenomenological work originating from Ihde's notion of technological artifacts and their 
implications for our intentional relation to the world, which Verbeek outlines as generally relating to the 
mediation of human intentionality by technological devices (Verbeek 389). This work is not dealt with 
in detail here for several reasons, generally relating to how this line of theoretical development 
introduces ontological issues beyond the concerns of this thesis. For instance, the degree to which 
technological artifacts comprise the alteration or even production of new kinds of human subjects 
(such as the figure of the cyborg that Verbeek draws upon) which, while both important and 
interesting, is not seen as necessarily relevant in understanding the mundane or everyday experience 
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graphical interface is important to the player insofar as it represents the processes taking place 
within the software code that runs the videogame and towards which they are intentionally 
directed,  is  the  experience  of  interacting  with  the  EyeToy  interface  then  one  of  actually 
interacting,  albeit  indirectly,  with a movement processor through it? More specifically we 
could ask if it is the processing in itself with which we are intentionally directed, or if it is 
rather the movements which are processed, our own movements, that are the focus of our 
concern?  When  a  player  alters  their  movement  to  accord  with  the  internal  logic  of  the 
videogame are they directed  towards the processing of their  movement  as it  is  displayed 
onscreen, or is their  concern focused on their movement in itself.  This distinction and its 
implications can be seen in the relation between the physical and the graphical interface of 
EyeToy: Play 3, particularly in regards to spatiality.  Though the player is able to move in 
three dimensional space, EyeToy: Play 3 can process movements in only two axes – vertical 
and horizontal. Generally, at the start of each mini-game, a silhouette indicates to the player 
the appropriate distance to position themselves from the screen to be able to properly interact 
with the videogame during the course of play so that they can effectively trigger the various 
onscreen buttons effectively. However, not all the mini-games contained within EyeToy: Play 
3 contain on-screen buttons or other elements with which the player must interact, for instance 
‘Touch  Down’  switches  the  player’s  representation  between  different  framings  within  a 
graphical  representation  of  a  football  field  to  indicate  the  current  role.  This  mini-game 
involves  several  different  activities,  each  controlled  through  different  movements.  For 
instance, the player is required to fend of or avoid tacklers through punching to the left or 
of videogame play. Furthermore, while consideration of how videogames and in particular interfaces 
may be thought of in terms of the different kinds of human technology relations Ihde identifies is 
definitely a valuable area for further research, as Leino's work in this area indicates (c.f Leino 
“Emotions in Play” 166-77), his point regarding the necessity of resolving the exact ontological position 
of videogame worlds in undertaking such work similarly goes beyond the concerns of this thesis, which 
is content with describing how the space if videogames are experienced as 'worlds' due to the player's 
bodily involvement with and presence in those worlds. Finally, it is felt that the central important 
contribution of this work, namely the mediation and influence of human intentionality by technological 
artifacts, is for the purposes of this research sufficiently covered by the theoretical work drawn upon, 
for example the substantial explication of Heidegger's notion of equipment draws heavily of the 
processes by which we come to incorporate the 'in-order-to' of particular equipment into our conduct.
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right, ducking out of the frame, or ‘jumping’ by moving their hands in an upward motion. In 
all these cases there is not a specific button or highlighted hotspot onscreen to indicate to the 
player the appropriate area for their movement, though there are arrows indicating in which 
direction they must move. As a result, the player’s movements are sometimes not recognised 
by the  EyeToy system, for example,  despite physically ducking down as instructed by on-
screen arrows the player’s represented body may not follow suit, and as a result the player is 
tackled. In these cases, while there are not explicitly specified areas onscreen with which the 
player must interact, there remains the requirement that the player position themselves in a 
certain way within the frame so that the EyeToy camera can properly parse their movement. 
The player has moved, but this movement has not been processed as such by the videogame.
The smaller frame used by the ‘Touch Down’ mini-game is also used in several other mini-
games,  such as ‘Volleyball’  and ‘Boot  Camp’.  In each of these mini-games the player  is 
placed within a more traditional graphical game-world, representing beach volleyball fields 
and obstacle courses respectively. Interestingly, the player’s representation can often move in 
three dimensions within these mini-games, giving these game-worlds a sense of depth, even 
though the player themselves must remain a certain distance from the screen, and are as such 
constrained to  movements  in  only the vertical  and horizontal  planes.  For instance,  in  the 
‘Touch Down’ mini-game, the player is at times called upon to tackle an opposition player, 
who generally is located some distance from the player’s onscreen representation. To close 
the gap, represented through three dimensional depth effects such as relative size and linear 
perspective, the player must run on the spot, and the  EyeToy system interprets the vertical 
movement of the player’s body up and down into forward movement within the game-world. 
A similar running on the spot movement is used to make the player’s onscreen representation 
traverse space in other mini-games that feature a three-dimensional graphical environment, 
but what is of interest to us is the connection the player makes between running on the spot in 
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one sense, yet moving through space, albeit graphical space, in another. As Massumi notes in 
relation to word processing software “what  is  processed inside the computer  is  code,  not 
words. The words  appear on screen, in being read” (Massumi  Parables for the Virtual 138, 
emphasis in original). Similarly, the player’s movement onscreen appears to the player when 
they are engaged in the experience of playing EyeToy: Play 3 and it is through that experience 
that they understand their movement.
If we consider the software and the processes it executes as part of the interface, and as such 
part of the equipment used to play,  we can begin to see how this  question elucidates our 
earlier question about whether the player is directed towards the processing of their movement 
as displayed  on-screen,  or  on their  movement  in  itself.  This  notion of equipment  is  both 
relational  and  intentional  in  character,  in  that  for  Heidegger  “Equipment  is  essentially 
‘something in-order-to’  [. . .] In the ‘in-order-to’ as a structure there lies an  assignment or 
reference of something to something” (Heidegger 356, emphasis in original). Taking software 
as the something in-order-to, the question then is to the second something or somethings to 
which it is assigned and this is not straightforward as “The assignments themselves are not 
observed; they are rather ‘there’ when we concernfully submit ourselves to them. But when 
an assignment has been disturbed—when something is unusable for some purpose—then the 
assignment becomes explicit”  (Heidegger 360, emphasis in original). In the example of the 
player  altering  their  movement  to  accord  with  the  internal  logic  of  the  videogame  the 
assignment becomes visible and we see that their movement is directed towards the game-
space as displayed on screen, and thus indirectly they are directed towards the processing of 
their movement, rather than their movement in itself. The software aspect of the interface as 
such becomes something in-order-to process the movement of the player’s body and to output 
back to them the outcome of their movements in terms of its meaning within the game-space 
and enabling them to play EyeToy: Play 3.
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However,  the player  cannot interact  directly with this  processing which occurs within the 
internal world of the computer and as a result requires the hardware aspect of the interface, 
which is both something in-order-to run the software and in-order-to provide the software 
with input and represent its output. So far in our treatment of  EyeToy: Play 3 we have not 
examined what constitutes the hardware aspect of the interface, but rather left it implicit in 
our  discussion  of  cameras  and screens,  particularly  as  the  technical  means  by  which  the 
interface  operates  as a transition point  between the analogue and the digital,  between the 
player’s world and the game-world. As the border between the exterior world of the player  
and the interior  world of the videogame,  the hardware aspect of the interface also sits in 
relation to the player, in-order-to enable the player to interact with the game-world. Yet, we 
have  already described the  player’s  body earlier  in  terms  of  equipment,  so  how does  an 
intentional conceptualisation of equipment apply to the player’s body? The player uses their 
body in-order-to play the videogame, and we have already noted earlier in this chapter that the 
player and videogame form a cybernetic circuit of which both are integral parts. Furthermore, 
in both this chapter and in Chapter Two we have argued that the ready-to-hand becomes an 
extension of our bodily being, and as such we should speak not of cameras and screens in 
isolation but body-camera and screen-body conjunctions as well to account for these elements 
of the interface being taken up by the player as ready-to-hand extensions of their body. In 
fact, we should go further and speak of how the player simultaneously inhabits both their 
immediate  environment  as  well  as  the  videogame  environment,  and  as  Merleau-Ponty 
evocatively argues "In the action of the hand which is raised towards an object is contained a 
reference to the object, not as an object represented, but as that highly specific thing towards 
which  we  project  ourselves,  near  which  we  are,  in  anticipation,  and  which  we  haunt" 
(Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 159). This sense of haunting, given the greyed 
out  and  low  resolution  image  which  represents  the  player  in-game,  is  perhaps  a  quite 
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appropriate term to apply to the experience of playing EyeToy: Play 3, which involves a sense 
of presence within  the game-space,  despite  the player  and the videogame being based in 
different types of ontical existence as we have noted earlier in this chapter. As Wirman and 
Leino argue “to inhabit a computer game the player has to be able to perform their embodied 
intentionality, or, motility, in the game. The most important thing that the game interface can 
facilitate is this particular inhabitance of a computer game player within a new information 
environment” (Wirman and Leino 461). In the case of EyeToy: Play 3 this sense of particular 
inhabitance takes on a ethereal nature, that lingering sense of a disconnection where the body 
onscreen is ‘I’ but also ‘not I’. What the player sees onscreen is not their reflection or a mirror 
image  of  themselves  and  their  movements  but  the  incorporation  of  their  body and  their 
movements into the game-space, processed and evaluated by the logic of the game-space. 
Whilst in the short term the body movement based interface of EyeToy: Play 3 might increase 
the ease with which it can be taken up as ready-to-hand, in the longer term over the course of 
play the experience provides evidence to Wirman and Leino’s claim that:
The temptations of games with ‘transparent interfaces’ are aimed at 
those who refuse the enhanced sensory repertoire. These games do no 
make  use  of  the  full  range  of  capabilities  of  the  computer  game 
medium  and  seem  to  resemble  interactive  narratives  instead  of 
simulations. [. . .] In games with so-called ‘transparent interfaces’ the 
player is forced to suspend her disbelief and accept that the diegesis 
consists of representations which, when compared to the meatspace, 
are crude regardless of the state-of-the art technology involved. Even 
with disbelief suspended, the player can only act ‘as if’ it was her own 
unique body that was reaching towards ‘the world’; the universe into 
which we can plunge through ‘transparent interfaces’ is more fictional 
than virtual. (Wirman and Leino 463)
Of course, as underlined by the example of the rotating image mini-game mentioned earlier, 
our ability to successfully experience a sense of inhabiting the game-world of EyeToy: Play 3 
is reliant on our habituation to its representational address, for "Habit expresses our power of 
dilating our being-in-the-world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments" 
(Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 166). Again, it is appropriate that in this quote 
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Merleau-Ponty speaks of instruments in the plural, for as we have seen it is difficult to set out 
the interface as simply a singular instrument as our relation to it is in actuality a complex of 
multiple relations. Again, it should be noted that the interface itself forms the basis of our 
relation to the videogame, it is something ‘in-order-to’ play those videogames with, yet it is 
also important to remember that the activity of play does not take place in an interface, and as 
such we would do well to acknowledge the essential embeddedness of the interface within the 
particular circumstance of our lived world. The space in which EyeToy: Play 3 is most likely 
to be played, for example the family living room, is an important part of the context of play, 
as it is a private yet shared space of relaxation, leisure, and entertainment, as opposed to the 
more public context of [giantJoystick] in Chapter Two. Furthermore, the family living room 
furnishes much of the equipment besides the specialised console equipment required to play 
the  videogame but  which  are  generally  overlooked  and not  considered  part  of  the  wider 
context  when  considering  more  conventional  videogames,  from  the  floor  on  which  the 
player’s stand and move, to the ability to control light levels through curtains and ceiling 
lights, and of course the television on which the camera sits, and the player views. 
At one level this point might seem overly simplified, as the importance of the room as a room, 
that is with floor, walls, and roof, to the activity of playing EyeToy: Play 3 seems to require 
little more to be said about them. And, indeed, this is true once their physical qualities, such 
as  the height  of  the  ceiling  or  the  amount  of  floor  space  available,24 are  taken  into 
consideration. These  physical  qualities seem  to  have  little  relevance  –  we  are  after  all 
concerned with the experience of videogame play here, which doesn’t often concern itself 
with the vagaries of domestic  architecture.  Yet, if  we recall  Heidegger’s points about the 
withdrawal of the ready-to-hand from our immediate  experience, and the  way in which a 
24 As someone who lives in a flat with an excessively low hanging light fixture in the living room, 
such considerations, particularly as they relate to my health and wellbeing, are not to be taken lightly 
whilst playing EyeToy: Play 3.
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disturbance  of  the  assignment  of  the  in-order-to  brings  that  assignment  into  our  explicit 
awareness (Heidegger  358, 60),  we can understand not only how videogames employ our 
embodied  experience  of  our  habituated  space,  but  also  how they  broaden  our  embodied 
experience  of those spaces through disruptions to our established relations to those spaces. 
During  the  experience  of  playing  EyeToy:  Play  3 our  habituated  spaces,  particularly  the 
normally ‘dead’ space between lounge and television, take on new life as not only spaces of 
play,  but play space in itself – active spaces of movement. The  room which supports the 
player during the course of their movement could then rightly be considered part of the wider 
physical interface, as it itself enables that movement and as such enables the player to play.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the question of what an interface is by applying that question to a 
specific  example,  EyeToy:  Play  3,  and through this  consideration  of  what  constitutes  the 
interface  between  player  and  videogame,  unpacking  the  complexity  of  the  interface  by 
considering the different parts or aspects of which it is composed. In this  example we have 
uncovered many different aspects that could be considered as part of the interface, such as the 
player’s body, the represented image,  the internal software processes, and even the room in 
which the activity of play takes place.  Importantly,  the concept of the interface developed 
here extends beyond the more limited technical definitions generally associated with the term 
within the field of videogame studies to demonstrate its relational nature, particularly its role 
as the site or surface which brings into relation player and videogame by providing the means 
for these two parties that exist in different kinds of reality to communicate and interact. Such 
an approach leads to a richer and more varied understanding of the interface by taking into 
account the complexity of the player’s embodied relation to the interface as the facilitator of 
their experience of videogame play which when taken up as a ready-to-hand extension of their 
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bodily schema enables a particular form of inhabitance or presence within the game-space. 
Yet at the same time the interface becomes more ambiguous, more difficult to pin down as a 
separate thing or object, for in being relational in nature its borders necessarily are not fixed 
or  determinate,  and  it  permeates  the  experience  of  videogame  play  whilst  being  also 
somewhat outside of that experience. For instance, when its physical aspect is taken up as a 
ready-to-hand extension of the player’s bodily schema and thus incorporated into their bodily 
schema it  withdraws from the  player’s  intentional  concern and becomes  something  acted 
through rather than upon. For this reason the following two chapters continue to consider the 
interface,  and in  particular  its  role  in  the experience  of videogame play.  This is  done by 
focusing more closely on the player’s relation to the interface in both the physical world the 
player inhabits, and the digital world of the game-space towards which they are intentionally 
directed, to attempt to articulate the role of the interface in the experience of videogame play 
given  its  being  as  tangible  and  intangible,  representational  and  affective,  part  of  the 
videogame  and  of  the  player.  Firstly,  we  will  turn  towards  the  physical  aspects  of  the 
interface, which we will highlight by taking for our example tangible interface videogames 
that  bring the physicality  of  the  interface  more  firmly to  the centre  of  the  experience  of 
videogame  play.  This  will  be  followed  by  Chapter  Five  which  considers  how the  more 
intangible levels of the interface,   such as the avatars and characters used onscreen to act 
within the game-space, can be theorised in terms of the player’s embodied relation to the 
interface and their presence within the game-space.
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CHAPTER 4:
THE PHYSICAL INTERFACE
 AND VIDEOGAME PLAY
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In the preceding chapter we asked the question of what and where an interface is, arguing that 
it was the site of the relation between player and videogame, which facilitates the circular 
interaction  loop between player  and videogame that  is  characteristic  of the experience  of 
playing  videogames.  Further,  we saw that  the  interface  was  itself  comprised  of  a  set  of 
relations, between input and output, physical and digital, and software and hardware which 
were used to consider the nature of the interface in  EyeToy: Play 3. This indicated that the 
interface, considered as a site of relations rather than more simply as a device or technique, 
was nebulous and extensible due to the way in which it was incorporated into the player’s 
bodily  schema  and  thus  made  complex  the  distinction  between  the  player’s  immediate 
physical environment and the game environment. Consequently, it was argued that to arrive at 
a  better  understanding  of  the  videogame interface  required  further  investigation  that  was 
sensitive to its heterogeneous and embodied nature, an articulation that could express its being 
as tangible and intangible,25 representational and affective, part of the videogame and of the 
player.  This chapter seeks to undertake the first step of this task by focusing on the most 
immediate part of the player’s experience of the interface, the physical devices which afford 
them the ability to input their intentions into the world of the videogame.
Therefore, this chapter will focus on examples of videogames where the physicality of their 
interface is emphasised, videogames that rely to an extent on the physical presence of their  
interfaces  to  elicit  a  particular  experience  from their  users,  where rather  than being fully 
incorporated  into  the  body  schema  of  the  user  and  being  taken  up  as  a  ready-to-hand 
extension of their body, there is a sense of the users acting upon the controller as a key part of 
the  interactional  process,  rather  than  through it  to  the  interactional  processes  abstracted 
onscreen. That is to say interfaces that are both the equipment used for the task of videogame 
25 Whilst the concept behind the word ‘tangible’ has a range of connotations, it is used here primarily 
to refer to that which has a physical, touchable presence in the world, in keeping with the concerns 
raised by the research work around tangible user interfaces referenced later in the chapter.
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play, thus ready-to-hand, yet at the same time an entity for the player, thus also present-at-
hand.  This  is  in  keeping  with  our  choice  of  examples  thus  far,  for  as  with  the  scale  of 
[giantJoystick] bringing back to awareness the fundamentally embodied relation between the 
player and the interface, and with the explicit use of the player’s body in EyeToy: Play 3 as an 
element of the interface highlighting the complex of relations between player and videogame 
that the interface facilitates. Whilst the examples to be employed within this chapter diverge 
somewhat  from more conventional  videogame interfaces,  by focusing on videogames that 
foreground the physicality of their interfaces, we similarly make visible the importance of that 
physicality in the player’s experience of videogame play, something equally important to the 
more conventional interface yet not visible to us in the normal course of the experience of 
videogame play.
It is for this reason that here we turn towards the concept of tangible interfaces. At first this 
might seem disingenuous, for surely the most immediate aspect of the player’s experience of 
the interface is that part of it which provides the player with the feedback that represents the 
ongoing action of the videogame, predominately the screen which presents the unfolding of 
events within the game-world. Yet, as we have seen in the previous analysis of EyeToy: Play 
3 and  [giantJoystick] this  audio-visual  feedback is  consequential  to  the  player’s  sense of 
actively taking part  in this unfolding of events only insofar as they have incorporated the 
physical interface into their bodily being, and are thus able to extend their intentionality into 
the game-space without consciously needing to transcribe their desired outcomes into a series 
of actions upon the physical interface. They no longer act upon the physical aspect of the 
interface as a physical device but rather through it as part of the broader interface used to 
play. The two previous examples contrasted in that EyeToy: Play 3 showed how this process 
of bodily incorporation can be made relatively straight forward by relying on the player’s own 
sense of bodily familiarity and proprioceptive awareness, effectively employing the player’s 
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own body as the physical interface, whilst [giantJoystick] demonstrated the importance of the 
process  of  bodily  incorporation  by  simply  increasing  the  size  of  the  classic  Atari  2600 
joystick to such an extent that a player’s familiarity with the original on which it was based 
would have little bearing, even though the basic concept of a joystick with two axes and a 
single  button  remained  unchanged.  For  this  reason  in  this  chapter  we  will  focus  on  the 
player’s experience of the physical aspect of the interface, those objects which we can touch 
and with which we interact with in our immediate ‘real’ reality to take action within the world 
of the videogame. To undertake this investigation of the physical aspect of the interface we 
will consider examples of videogames, particularly  The Eye of Judgement and  A Game of  
Marbles, in which the physical aspect is fore-grounded in the player’s experience due to the 
nature of the player’s engagement with the interface during the course of play.  
Dourish and Tangible Computing
Currently within the field of videogame studies issues relating to notions of tangibility are in 
general absent from contemporary debates, though as both this subsection and the one that 
follows it demonstrates such issues are definitely emerging, often clustered around specific 
types of gaming practices, or conversely developments in interface modalities such as haptic 
interfaces.  Given this  state  of  affairs,  we need to  situate  what  we mean here by making 
reference to the tangible and its relation to computation and interfaces to identify the types of 
videogame artefacts and the experiences of playing them that we are addressing – in short 
defining the category of tangible interface games. Once again, Dourish offers a useful starting 
point in this regard due to his work in this area, and also due to the fact that a substantial  
proportion of previous research on videogames and tangibility locates itself within the field of 
HCI.  The  following  section  considers  the  applicability  of  Dourish's  notion  of  tangible 
computing to the domain of videogames.
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The historical model of interaction put forward by Dourish, that was referred to in Chapter 
Three, extends beyond the graphical paradigm to consider emerging paradigms within HCI, 
one of which Dourish terms tangible computing. This is an umbrella term that incorporates 
the related developments of ubiquitous computing and augmented reality (Dourish 15, 211). 
Dourish identifies several trends within this emerging paradigm, but the two that interest us 
here, in that they have the most direct relevance to videogame interfaces, are firstly, a trend 
towards “augment[ing] the everyday world with computational power, so that pieces of paper, 
cups, pens, ornaments, and toys can be made active entities that respond to their environment 
and people’s activities” (Dourish 15), and secondly, approaches “in which we interact directly 
towards physical  artifacts  rather  than traditional  graphical  interfaces  and interface  devices 
such  as  mice”  (Dourish  16).  According  to  Dourish,  the  basis  of  tangible  computing  “is 
exploring how to get the computer ‘out of the way’ and provide people with a much more 
direct—tangible—interaction  experience”  (Dourish 16).  To paraphrase this  statement  with 
regard  to  interfaces,  we  could  say  that  it  is  exploring  how  to  position  the  interface  as 
somehow outside the computational processes it controls, which would in turn provide people 
with a more direct and tangible experience of interaction by removing those computational 
processes from the immediate concern of the user.
Dourish notes several common features that arise out of the variety of tangible computing 
projects  he surveys,  and we would do well  to  consider  these recurring features  in detail. 
Firstly, Dourish notes that often “in tangible computing, there is no single point of control or 
interaction. [. . .] there is not even a single device that is the object of interaction” (Dourish 
50-51). This diverges from conventional computer interfaces, which “have a single center of 
interaction,  or  at  least  a  small  number.  Only  one  window  has  the  ‘focus’  at  any  given 
moment; the cursor is always in exactly one place, and that place defines where my actions 
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will be carried out’  (Dourish 50). This distribution of points of control over the process of 
interaction  helps  facilitate  the  second  recurring  feature  identified  by  Dourish,  namely  a 
movement away from the sequential ordering of activities in conventional systems “used both 
to  manage the interface  and simplify system development”  (Dourish 51),  towards a more 
freeform style as “there is no way to tell quite what I might do next, because there are many 
different ways in which I might map my task onto the features of the environment” (Dourish 
51).   Though  these  first  two  points  paint  a  picture  of  a  chaotic  and  complex  form  of 
interaction, this is somewhat abated for as “in tangible design, we use physical properties of 
the interface to suggest its use” (Dourish 52). In effect, this third feature acts to curb the chaos 
suggested by the first two for “Taking this approach, designers can create artifacts that lead 
users through the process of using them, with each stage leading naturally to the next through 
the ways in which the physical configuration at each moment suggests the appropriate action 
to take” (Dourish 52). Gaver’s concept of ‘sequential affordances’ provides a good example 
of such guided interaction, for example when applied to a common door with a horizontal 
door handle which rotates to a vertical position, for as a result of the user’s manipulation the 
“new configuration [of the door handle] is one from which pulling is natural. [. . .] When 
grasping the vertical bar, the hands and arm are in a configuration from which it is easy to 
pull”  (Gaver  80-81).  Furthermore,  as  Gaver  points  out,  exploration  of  the  physical 
configuration of the artefact “leads to discovery of the system”  (Gaver 82), it is something 
learnt through actual doing.
Given that the examples on which Dourish bases these recurring features could largely be 
described as utilitarian, for instance aids to dealing with urban planning problems, or work 
desks that afford more direct interaction with the objects and materials being worked with, it 
is  important  to  query  the  relevance  of  these  features  to  the  context  of  videogames.  For, 
“Videogames  are  not  used  instrumentally  to  accomplish  another  task,  as  use  of  a  word 
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processor is instrumental to the composition of a legal brief”  (Bardzell et al. 3663), and as 
such it is not clear whether an approach largely developed for instrumental tasks is applicable 
to activities where the system’s “‘use’ is the experience it affords” (Bardzell et al. 3663). In 
other words, the experience of videogame play is to an extent  an end in itself.  However, 
though tangible  computing  is  still  a  relatively emergent  form of  interface  design,  several 
tangible  interface  videogames  have  been  created,  mostly  within  universities  and  other 
research institutions, but also including commercially developed videogames such as The Eye 
of Judgement. Many of these tangible interface videogames aim to augment table-top style 
games with computational elements, “To unite the advantages of computer games with the 
social  advantages  of  board  games”  (Bakker  et  al.  151),  and  as  such  “eliminate  the  gap 
between  the  interaction  with  a  natural  environment  and  the  interaction  with  a  computer 
system” (Ulbricht and Schmalstieg 1). For instance, The Eye of Judgment is essentially a turn 
based card battle game, yet the cards themselves can be read by the PlayStation Eye camera 
device, and the moves made by the players are processed by the game console, which keeps 
score and provides  graphical  embellishments  such as  scenes  of  battles  between opposing 
creatures.  Another  approach  is  well  represented  by the  Entertaible,  a  flexible  videogame 
platform that comprises of an LCD panel mounted horizontally in a table top and a multi-
touch detection system such that the player interacts with it either through direct touching or 
game pieces (van Loenen et al. 16-17). Whilst not all tangible interface videogames are based 
around table  tops,  for  instance  some utilise  wearable  Radio Frequency Identification  tags 
(RFID), the majority seem to require some sort of flat, table like surface, if only to provide a 
stable area on which to place the physical game pieces and house the technical apparatus to 
provide what could generally be considered a digital game board. For this reason, we will 
focus primarily on table based tangible interface games when considering the relevance of the 
features identified by Dourish to the context of videogames, though other types of tangible 
interface videogames will be mentioned where relevant, as many videogames that resonate 
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with Dourish’s conception of tangible computing are often labelled under largely synonymous 
terms. 
The first feature, the distribution and multiplication of points of control and interaction, is a 
significant move away from the conventional desktop model of computing where the user’s 
point  of  access  is  centralised.  An  example  of  this  movement  of  computing  into  the 
environment is  The Ambient Room, “a small office cubicle that has been augmented with a 
variety of ‘ambient displays,’ designed to provide peripheral, background information to the 
occupant of the room”  (Dourish 47). ‘Displays’ is in a way a misnomer for “Examples of 
ambient displays include projected light patterns, non-speech sounds, and objects that respond 
to changes in air flow” (Dourish 47), onto which various kinds of information can be mapped, 
“typically information about activities in either physical or virtual space, such as the presence 
or activity of others, e-mails arriving, people logging in and out, and so forth” (Dourish 47). 
Similarly, the distribution and multiplication of points of interaction is clearly something that 
conventional videogame systems lack, as each player’s point of control is generally fixed in a 
certain location, the control pad, joystick, or other input device, and their ability to act within 
the game-world itself is usually centred in some kind of avatar, such as a character or even a 
simple  mouse  pointer.  Surprisingly,  many  tangible  interface  videogames  similarly  have 
singular points of control for each player  centred in a single game piece, even though the 
general adaptability of the game-table style of tangible interface videogames would afford the 
multiple  points  of  control  exhibited  by  many  traditional  board  games  such  as  chess  or 
backgammon. Though this situation could arise for many reasons, for instance the desire to 
design multiplayer games yet having limited input channels, or even more simply the relative 
newness  of  the  game table  model  leading  to  less  ambitious  projects  than  what  might  be 
possible  with  further  development,  more  broadly  speaking,  the  interactive  game  table 
approach is bound to limit the players’ points of control to the sensible part of the table and 
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the  play  pieces  used,  leading  to  a  situation  where  individual  points  of  control  may  be 
distributed, but distributed within a finite zone of focus upon the table top. 
Moving beyond the table-top approach, examples of distributed points of control do arise, 
such as Real-Life Sims, where “a player performs common, everyday activities that implicitly 
control an avatar living in a virtual home. Objects around the player’s home or office are 
tagged with RFID tags, and the player wears a wireless RFID reader” (Medynskiy et al. 47), 
sensing and replicating the player’s actions in the real home within the virtual home. A more 
extreme example of distributed points of control would be those games that are variously 
called pervasive,  ubiquitous,  or alternate  reality games (ARG), the common feature being 
“that they break the boundary between the game and the ordinary world” (Stenros et al. 122). 
For example, the ARG  The Beast featured “plot developments and evidence that circulated 
mostly  through web sites  and emails,  but  also through phone calls,  faxes,  television  and 
newspaper ads, as well as occasional real-time and offline events” (McGonigal 117). Unlike 
the game tables mentioned above, in ARGs play activities are not organised around a specific 
site  of  play,  but  rather  distributed  through  the  world,  including  through communications 
technologies, not necessarily through imbuing everyday objects with computational potential, 
but rather in taking up the computational  potential  already existent  in our technologically 
mediated style of living, for instance the near ubiquity of the mobile phone, to overlay our 
everyday world with play activities and thus rendering it in part a game-space. 
Montola notes that the concept of pervasive games contains two distinct approaches, “one 
discussing games based on pervasive computing applications and the other looking at games 
with pervasive gameplay” (Montola 179, emphasis in original). This is a difference in focus 
between the technology used to play and the conception of space in which play takes place. 
These  are  not  necessarily  mutually  exclusive  approaches,  but  a  similar  tendency  can  be 
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identified in Dourish’s treatment  of tangible computing,  with the latter  sense of pervasive 
games  described  by  Montola  as  something  of  a  corollary  to  what  Dourish  addresses  as 
ubiquitous computing. In any case, it seems that to a degree the terminological problem that 
arises from these overlapping yet  distinct approaches within game studies has fortuitously 
settled  to  generally  describing  games  that  predominately  focus  on  pervasive  computing 
techniques as tangible games, perhaps as short hand for tangible interface videogames, whilst 
the  broader  second  approach  mentioned  by  Montola  is  usually  described  as  pervasive, 
ubiquitous or ARG games, the main distinction being that “in the latter category the game has 
to pervade everyday life in some way”  (Montola 179). These pervasive games raise certain 
problems if we wish to focus on videogames, for arguably they are not videogames in the 
traditional sense, but rather share more in common with traditions of live action role-play 
(LARP), orienteering, and the genre of assassin style games mentioned by Montola (Montola 
180). Indeed, within the field of game studies these styles of pervasive games are already 
addressed substantially in what appears to be developing as a specialist area with concerns 
that  diverge  to  a  significant  degree  from  theorists  that  focus  on  more  conventional 
videogames.  Therefore, such pervasive games will not be addressed in detail  here as they 
diverge from the specific concerns of the role of the tangible interface in the experience of 
videogame play.
The second feature identified by Dourish as characteristic of tangible computing, the move 
away from sequential and structured interaction with the interface to a more freeform style of 
interaction,  is  related  to  the  dispersion  of  interface  points  of  control,  and  can  again  be 
demonstrated  by the  example  of  The Ambient  Room.  As the  user  has  several  streams of 
information available and accessible with minimum effort there is no way to know when the 
user  might  begin  to  attend  to  one  or  more  of  the  ambient  streams  and  incorporate  that 
information into their current activity,  indeed the user may even begin to attend to one or 
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more of the informational streams subconsciously. The move towards a more freeform style 
of interaction is arguably present within some tangible  videogames,  yet  a more important 
question to address is whether this situation actually represents a meaningful difference from 
the  situation  with  more  conventional  videogames.  Though  many  videogames  could  be 
described as being constructed around linear progression, whether by narrative advancement 
or simply through the succession of different levels, or stages, or required actions, each of 
which must be completed in turn, outside of this overall structure the actions of the player at 
any individual moment could proceed in many ways. And this is not even to take into account 
so-called open-world or sandbox style  videogames,  where the player  has a wide range of 
activities and actions to take up at any time, and is left largely free to choose between these 
activities and actions. Furthermore, as we have already noted, a videogame is not necessarily 
teleological in that its ‘use’ can be “the experience it affords” (Bardzell et al. 3663).
While interface points of control are generally centralised in conventional videogames, the 
experience  of  videogame  play  in  general  already  seems  to  be  highly  chaotic,  and  this 
indeterminacy underlines one of the problems with attempting to apply theoretical insights 
from a HCI context to one of videogame play without due consideration to the important 
differences  between  the  two situations.  Though the  situation  is  beginning  to  change,  for 
example through “a call to move from thinking about activity to thinking about experience” 
(Bardzell et al. 3663), and from there to particular subsets of experience, as noted earlier HCI 
research and theory has traditionally been focused on productive activities,  evidenced in a 
way by the centrality of concepts such as workflow. Yet videogame play is an activity often 
taken up for what it offers in itself, whether this be entertainment, diversion, or simply the 
challenges of game-play,  “its ostensible content is often almost incidental”  (Bardzell et al. 
3663). As a result, the focus is not so much on the end result of interaction with the interface 
but rather on the moment of that interaction itself during the course of videogame play, how it 
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unfolds and the player’s response to that unfolding, where contingency and the dynamic turn 
of  events  is  favoured  over  predictable  and structured  outcomes.  Videogame  play  already 
heavily  features  the  move  away  from  structured  and  sequential  interaction  that  Dourish 
identifies  as  a  key  feature  of  tangible  computing.  Indeed,  a  consequence  of  this  is  that 
videogames may provide the ideal conditions with which to study more freeform styles of 
workplace interaction, simply because the greater focus on the unfolding of events makes that 
unfolding more accessible as a process to be studied. 
Whilst  a  tangible  approach  to  videogames  may  magnify  this  tendency  towards 
unpredictability,  particularly through an elevation of the physical sites of interaction to the 
forefront of the player’s attention, the essence of Dourish’s second feature, “that there is no 
way to tell quite what I might do next” (Dourish 51), does not seem to be a meaningful point 
of differentiation between tangible videogames and more conventional videogames in general. 
If we retain the importance that Dourish places on the distribution of points of control across 
multiple physical devices in our application of this second tendency, which to an extent relies 
upon  this  distribution  to  undermine  the  sequential  nature  of  more  conventional  interface 
modalities  (Dourish 51),  many of  the existent  works that  would fall  into the category of 
tangible games would not meet this criteria if it is robustly applied. For instance, as mentioned 
earlier  in  the  chapter  the  majority  of  projects  that  are  described  as  tangible  or  tangible 
interface games tend towards a table top style, essentially digitally remediated board games, 
and as a result tend to concentrate their points of control within a well bordered area, even 
when multiple game pieces are used. Describing such a spatial organisation of interface points 
of control as distributing “activity across many different computational devices” (Dourish 51), 
would mean that the conventional keyboard and mouse combination used for PC first-person 
shooters could equally be described as employing multiple points of control, though neither 
case would accord with the situation Dourish describes. Thus, it would seem that the second 
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feature  that  Dourish  describes  has  little  bearing  on conventional  videogames,  or  tangible 
videogames for that matter. However, this combination between the first and second features 
Dourish  discusses  quite  clearly  has  implications  for  other  game  forms  that  do  disperse 
interaction  with  the  wider  computational  system  used  to  play  throughout  the  physical 
environment,  particularly  for  ARGs,  which  as  noted  above  make  use  of  various 
communication technologies, physical objects, and spaces both physical and digital. Indeed, 
given the puzzle based nature of many ARGs and the multitude of ways those puzzles can be 
discovered and solved in such games, a large part of the attraction for players would seem to 
be that they themselves are not quite sure what they might, or even need, to do next. 
The  third  of  Dourish’s  features  of  tangible  computing,  the  way  in  which  the  physical 
properties of the objects used in interaction can be employed to suggest the way in which they 
are meant to be used, similarly offers few points of differentiation between tangible and more 
conventional videogames, at least at a superficial level. As Dourish himself argues “This is 
nothing new; arguably,  it is what product design or other forms of physical design are all 
about” (Dourish 52). Yet, as we noted in Chapter Three the majority of videogame interface 
devices are standardised by the platform for which they are designed. The PlayStation Dual 
Shock controller, for instance, might have superficial design cues such as ergonomic features 
to indicate how the controller is best held in the hands, or even more simply that the buttons, 
by virtue of their buttoness, are for pushing. But deeper levels of integration between form 
and function are generally absent – there is no apparent indication why one button achieves 
one action and not another, or even why that particular action is mapped to that button at all. 
Given the general purpose nature of these controllers this should not surprise us, but if we 
move our consideration towards controllers designed specifically for particular videogames or 
style of videogames the importance of Dourish’s observations about the physical design of 
143
interfaces becomes apparent.  The guitar controller  for the popular  Guitar Hero series is a 
useful case in point, as the locations of the buttons and other controls are modelled on an 
abstracted version of how an actual guitar is played. As such, the player’s left hand operates a 
series of buttons on the neck of the guitar that roughly accord with the concept of specific  
notes, whilst the right hand operates the strum bar, a two-way, clickable switch which draws 
upon the idea of plucking or strumming particular strings to create sounds.26 Furthermore, the 
use of the guitar form suggests that the videogame is meant not merely to be played, but is 
also an act of performance in itself, it may be a toy musical instrument, but it is a musical 
instrument all the same. It would then seem that it is in the actual tangibility of the interfaces  
of videogames that we find the most relevance for Dourish’s concept of tangible computing, 
and thus we will now turn to focusing on the notion of tangible videogame interfaces.
Tangible Interfaces
As the preceding analysis of the relevance of Dourish’s features of tangible computing should 
show, their relevance for videogames is hard to pin down in an exact way. This is somewhat 
due to the inclusion within the category of a range of closely associated trends including 
ubiquitous computing, pervasive computing, and tangible interfaces, which, despite sharing a 
common thread of investigating “the relationship between computers on the desktop and the 
world in which they (and we) operate”  (Dourish 27), nonetheless explore this in somewhat 
divergent  directions.  Indeed,  this  is  reflected  by  the  examples  with  which  we  have 
investigated their relevance, which in their own way participate in this investigation of the 
relationship between computing and the wider world in which it takes place. After all,  an 
ARG  such  as  I  Love  Bees presents  a  vastly  different  kind  of  design  approach,  and 
subsequently experience  of  play,  than  The Eye  of Judgement,  which  in turn is  also quite 
different,  but  perhaps  to  a  lesser  extent,  to  Guitar  Hero,  yet  all  could  be  said  to  be 
26 Of course, left handed guitar players might object to this analysis.
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interventions into a wider conversation over the forms which videogame interfaces can take. 
Clearly,  we  need  to  narrow the  focus  somewhat  if  we  are  to  investigate  the  concept  of 
tangibility at a detailed level, and in accordance with this need, and with the specific focus of 
the thesis, a concentration on tangible interfaces rather than the broader terms of Dourish’s 
conception of tangible computing is of value, as it aligns most closely with the problem of 
videogame interfaces. This focus on tangible interfaces lessens the relevance of the first two 
of Dourish’s features, for while it is true that points of control can still  be distributed and 
interaction with those points unstructured within a focus on tangible interfaces, the tangibility 
of the interfaces themselves comes to the fore as a key concern when the interface itself is our 
central concern.
This focus on the physical aspects of the interface employed in tangible interfaces systems 
becomes clear when we look at Ullmer and Ishii’s definition of tangible interfaces as giving: 
physical form to digital information, employing physical artifacts both 
as representations and controls for computational media. TUIs couple 
physical representations (e.g., spatially manipulable physical objects) 
with  digital  representations  (e.g.,  graphics  and  audio),  yielding 
interactive systems that are computational mediated but generally not 
identifiable as “computers” per se. (Ullmer and Ishii 581, emphasis in 
original)27
The key point of this quote is the dual functioning of the physical artefacts as both controller 
and  representation,  for  this  is  what  distinguishes  Ullmer  and  Ishii’s  concept  of  tangible 
interfaces  from traditional  user  interface  devices  which  are  themselves  physical  artefacts 
(Ullmer and Ishii 581). This coupling or integration of control and representation presents an 
important  divergence  from  conventional  computer  systems,  which  “make  a  fundamental 
distinction between ‘input devices,’ [. . .] and graphical ‘output devices’”  (Ullmer and Ishii 
27 Note that the acronym TUI stands for Tangible User Interface. Tangible interface is preferred as 
terminology here, partly as the user is assumed anyway, but also due to the wider sense of the concept 
of the interface developed in the preceding chapter, which goes beyond the usual sense of the ‘user 
interface’. 
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579-80). Conversely, “Tangible interfaces, [. . .] explore the conceptual space opened by the 
elimination of this  distinction”  (Ullmer and Ishii  580).  This does not mean that  output is 
absent, for “digital representations—especially graphics and audio—often present much of the 
dynamic information processed by the underlying computational systems” (Ullmer and Ishii 
585),  only  that  the  physical  artefacts  through  which  the  user  controls  the  system  also 
represents information about the system, as “The physical state of interface artifacts partially 
embodies the digital state of the system. [. . .] TUI artifacts frequently may be ‘read’ by both 
people  and  computers  by  their  physical  state,  with  their  physical  configurations  tightly 
coupled to the digital state of the systems they represent” (Ullmer and Ishii 585, emphasis in 
original).
Before  considering  the implications  of  Ullmer  and Ishii's  work on tangible  interfaces  for 
tangible  interface  videogames,  we  would  do  well  to  contextualise  just  what  we  are 
considering through the use of examples, especially given the somewhat amorphous use of the 
notions of tangible and ubiquitous computing noted in relation to Dourish. Here we will draw 
upon two examples  which emphasise different  aspects  of the trends and features  grouped 
within the concept. The first example,  Siftables, were “inspired by observing the skill that 
humans have at sifting, sorting, and otherwise manipulating large numbers of small physical 
objects”  (Merrill,  Kalanithi  and  Maes  75).  Siftables is  a  multipurpose  tangible  interface 
platform28 consisting of physical blocks that are “compact  devices with sensing, graphical 
display, and wireless communication” (Merrill, Kalanithi and Maes 75). The graphical display 
is  used to  represent  particular  bits  of  data,  such as  individual  photos,  whilst  the physical 
devices  themselves  include  a  range  of  sensing  technologies  including  an  accelerometer, 
28 Whilst the project’s creators describe it as a subset of tangible interfaces called Sensor Network 
User Interfaces (SNUIs), this more fine grained classification goes beyond the concerns being 
addressed here, though it is interesting to note that according to the creators the “usage implies that the 
sensor network is the user interface itself.” David Merrill, Jeevan Kalanithi and Pattie Maes, 
"Siftables: Towards Sensor Network User Interfaces," Proceedings of the 1st international conference 
on Tangible and embedded interaction (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: ACM, 2007), 75fn.
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infrared  transceivers,  and a  radio,  which  afford  the  user’s  interaction  with  the  individual 
Siftables, and via the interaction between the individual units, interaction with the entire set 
(Merrill, Kalanithi and Maes 78). The use of multiple communicating devices means that the 
Siftables platform is highly distributed,  with points of control over the system as a whole 
arising over the user’s manipulation  of individual  units  and the interaction  between these 
individual units. For instance,  in a photo sorting task each Siftable represents a particular 
image,  conveyed by a thumbnail  image on the digital  display.  These images  can then be 
sorted into groups by placing individual Siftables into piles, as the “devices will sense these 
movements  and  impacts  using  their  accelerometers,  and  will  use  their  radios  to  share 
information about these events amongst each other”  (Merrill, Kalanithi and Maes 79). This 
sorting task demonstrates one of the key points of Ullmer and Ishii’s approach to tangible 
interfaces, as the physical collections of Siftables upon the work space will correspond to the 
digital groupings of the photos established by the sorting activity, the individual Siftables both 
represent digital media and can be used to manipulate that digital media.
Our second example, and one of the key examples used by both Dourish, and Ullmer and 
Ishii,  is  Urp,  “an  urban  planning  workbench  in  which  physical  models  of  buildings  are 
combined with electronic simulations of features such as air flows, cast shadows, reflectance, 
and so forth” (Dourish 48). The system combines both physical and digital aspects combined 
into  the  one  workspace,  such  that  “The  interface  combines  a  series  of  physical  building 
models and interactive tools with an integrated projector/camera/computer  node called the 
'I/O Bulb’”  (Ullmer and Ishii 580). Two sets of physical controls are used to interact with 
Urp, firstly, the building models themselves, which when placed on the workbench surface 
are  tracked  by the  I/O Bulb  system in real  time,  which  then  projects  an image  onto  the 
workbench such that “the user can obtain a visualization of the shadows that the buildings will 
cast, or the wind patterns around them” (Dourish 48-50). The second set of physical controls 
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function as tools to change variables such as wind speed and direction, time of day, and even 
“A 'material  wand'  [that]  can  be  used  to  bind  alternate  material  properties  to  individual 
buildings”  (Ullmer  and  Ishii  580),  that  have  different  properties,  “so  that  the  computed 
reflectance patterns will simulate buildings clad in brick or glass” (Dourish 50).
Urp exhibits many of the key features of tangible interface systems that were detailed earlier 
in our discussion of both Dourish's, and Ullmer and Ishii's, work on tangible computing and 
tangible user interfaces. For instance, the controls for the system are distributed through the 
physical control objects, though to a lesser extent than exhibited by the  Siftables platform, 
which subsequently means that there is not a strict sequential ordering of the user's interaction 
with the system as any of the various tasks the system can perform can be accessed at any 
time. Furthermore, the physical controls are designed in such a way that they indicate to the 
user what they are and how they are used, for example the time of day control, where “The 
position of the sun can be controlled by turning the physical hands of a clock tool” (Ullmer 
and Ishii 580). This provides a degree of functional specificity lacked by the more general 
purpose  Siftables.  Importantly,  the  physical  controls  act  not  only  as  controls  but  also  as 
representations of the underlying simulation – the placement and orientation of the building 
models not only controls the shadows that are cast, but simultaneously represent the digital 
modelling  of  the  placement  and orientation  of  the  building  objects  within  the  simulation 
software. 
It is at this crucial point of the combination of control and representation that some videogame 
interface systems, which would seem to be included within the concept of tangible interfaces, 
come unstuck. The Nintendo WiiMote motion sensitive controller is one such case, as the 
physical  controller  does  not  in  itself  represent  the  simulation  system  underlying  the 
videogame.  Haptic  interfaces,  such as  those used for  the  touch  screen  based videogames 
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prominent on the iPod touch, iPhone, and iPad, similarly fall outside the concept of tangible 
interfaces, for the physical controls, in this case the player's finger, also do not generally fulfil  
any  representational  role.  This  is  not  to  say  that  such  interface  systems  are  in  any way 
conventional videogame interfaces, but simply that they depart from convention in different 
ways than tangible  interface videogames do. Having now considered the key elements  of 
tangible interfaces and tangible computing more generally, we can turn towards a more in-
depth analysis of videogames that do employ a tangible interface. In line with this movement, 
we will now turn our attention towards The Eye of Judgement, and consider how its use of a 
tangible interface may impact on the experience of those who play it.
Tangible Interfaces and The Eye of Judgement
At first  glance,  The Eye  of  Judgement seemingly  presents  a  good example  of  a  tangible 
interface videogame in that it uses physical cards as its primary set of controls, and these same 
cards are also representative of specific creatures that can be summoned by the player. The 
player  interacts  with the underlying videogame system through placing these cards, either 
faced down or face up, within defined squares on a three by three grid play mat, by moving 
previously placed cards to another square, or by turning over face down cards, with the goal 
of  occupying  a  majority  (five)  of  the  squares.  As  physical  representations  of  different 
summoned  creatures,  the  cards  are  coupled  to  a  digital  representations  of  these  same 
creatures, as the PlayStation 3 Eye camera reads specially encoded symbols on each card to 
track which cards have been played and where, and as such presenting a stylised version of 
the play field including animated digital representations of the creatures represented by the 
cards onscreen, as seen in Figure Five. Furthermore, the players can interact directly with the 
digital representations of the creatures through what is called the profile mode. In this mode a 
single card is held before the camera, and upon the card a digital representation of the creature 
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is displayed on-screen, which can be interacted with through hand gestures, such as poking 
the  on-screen  creature  with  the  player’s  on-screen  hand  to  trigger  the  creature’s  attack 
animation, as can be seen in Figure Six. This mode can also be used to display the various 
statistics  possessed  by  the  creature,  hence  its  being  named  the  profile  mode,  yet  this 
information  is  in  a  way redundant,  as  this  information  is  itself  presented  directly  on the 
physical card itself. 
This  use  of  the  physical  cards  as  both  representations  of,  and  control  over  the  in-game 
creatures accords with Ullmer and Ishii’s assertion that the physical artefacts employed in 
tangible interface systems can be read as they are in their physical state, not to mention that 
the  state  of  the  videogame  itself  is  partially  represented  by  the  physical  representations 
without recourse to the digital representation, as the positioning of each player’s cards on the 
play  field  and  their  status  as  either  being  face  up  or  face  down  provides  a  substantial 
indication of the current game state. While the physical representation may lack some of the 
dynamic information handled exclusively by the digital  representation,  such as the current 
health  of  battle  damaged creatures,  extra  physical  artefacts  created  by fans  of  battle  card 
games that either don’t wish to go to the expense of buying a PlayStation3 system, or perhaps 
to play the game even when mains electricity is not available, mean that the game can be 
played entirely without the need for the digital representations.29 Through the use of tokens, 
counters,  and two-sided tiles,  in addition to the provided cards and play mat,  The Eye of  
Judgement can be played as simply a physical card game, as opposed to a tangible interface 
videogame.
29 An example of these 3rd party efforts is Tyler Tinsley’s Eye Of Judgment Printable Tabletop Players 
kit, which contains physical representations for all the dynamically affected digital representations 
from the original game. See http://tylertinsley.com/2007/12/11/eye-of-judgment-printable-tabletop-
players-kit/#more-143  
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Figure  Five:  Digital  representation  of  the  play  field  of  The Eye  of  Judgement,  showing 
creatures summoned and their location. (source: Sony Computer Entertainment Inc.)
Figure  Six:  Interacting  with  the  digital  representation  in  the  profile  mode.  (source:  Sony 
Computer Entertainment Inc.)
What then does the digital representation component of The Eye of Judgement contribute to 
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the  experience  of  play  if  it  can  be so  easily  done away with?  Firstly,  and perhaps  most 
importantly,  is  the contribution  of what underlies the digital  representations,  which is  the 
dynamic processing of the course of the videogame state during play as we saw in Chapter 
Three. Though these automated processes could easily be accomplished by the players if they 
so desire, there is obviously an attraction to being able to get these tasks out of the way, and 
instead concentrate on the next possible move, rather than calculating the effects of the last, 
and thus speeding up the experience of play and making it more immediate. Secondly, and 
perhaps  more  complexly,  is  the  nature  of  the  digital  representations  themselves,  which 
presents a fictional world of fantasy battle as an overlay to the numerical and logical basis of 
the cards. This fictional context is to an extent present without the digital representations, as 
the cards feature illustrations of the creatures they represent, but the dynamically generated 
digital representations, particularly through the battle animations in which encounters between 
opposing creatures are resolved, arguably provides a richer, at least in terms of the audio-
visual representations if not experientially, presentation of The Eye of Judgement’s fictional 
world.  More  pragmatically,  perhaps  even cynically,  it  could  be argued that  the  graphical 
embellishments are necessary for The Eye of Judgement to be considered a videogame at all. 
In fact, due to its use of videogame conventions such as the aforementioned battle animations, 
The Eye of Judgement has much in common with the turn-based tactical battle mechanics and 
style of presentation found in some more conventional videogames. Indeed, it would not be 
difficult  to  imagine  The  Eye  of  Judgement as  a  more  conventional  videogame,  with  its 
physical  representations  done  away  with  entirely,  and  played  using  only  the  digital 
representations along with a more conventional physical interface.
In  short,  it  is  difficult  to  see  The Eye  of  Judgement as  simply  either  a  card  game  with 
graphical embellishments, or a videogame controlled through cards, when it seems to be a 
hybrid of the two – a video/card game that draws on the conventions of both. Interestingly, 
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The Eye of Judgement is at present one of the few mainstream tangible interface videogames 
commercially available, though as has been noted earlier there are a range of smaller scale 
tangible  projects  being  produced  in  various  research  laboratories  and  by  independent 
developers. This is reflective of one of Dourish’s observations about tangible computing more 
generally, namely that it has been developed in a largely ad-hoc fashion, “driven as much by 
the  availability  of  sensor  technology and  the  emergence  of  new control  devices  as  by a 
reasoned understanding of the role of physicality in interaction” (Dourish 52).30 What then is 
the role of this physicality of the interface, in the player’s experience of playing The Eye of  
Judgement? Most simply, it affords co-located two player games, for if the videogame relied 
only on digital representations, each player would be able to see what cards the other player 
held in their hand onscreen, decreasing the scope for tactical play based upon secrecy and 
surprise. In addition, it alters the nature of the relation between the players from what is the 
case in conventional videogames, for as Mandryk, Maranan, and Inkpen note “When players 
gather together around these consoles the players generally sit side-by-side and interact with 
the screen, not directly with each other”  (Mandryk, Maranan and Inkpen 640). Similarly to 
the players of [giantJoystick] in Chapter Two, players of The Eye of Judgement are orientated 
and organised around the physical play field, as shown in Figure Six, providing both the basis 
and the support for their experience of play, both with the videogame and with each other. 
However, the physical play field and the physical cards placed on it are not the only foci of 
the players’ attention and interaction, for while the physical aspect of the videogame provides 
partial information to the player about the game state, for a full understanding the players 
must  attend  to  the  information  that  appears  on-screen  through the  digital  representations, 
introducing a sense of ‘output’ that suggests that The Eye of Judgement does not necessarily 
achieve the elimination of the distinction between input and output that Ullmer and Ishii set so 
30 It is for this reason that we have included several more examples in this chapter than in previous 
ones.
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much  store by.  Unlike  the  Entertaible and  other  tangible  tables  mentioned  earlier,  which 
overlay  the  physical  and  digital  representations  onto  the  one  play  space,  The  Eye  of  
Judgement keeps  them  separated  spatially,  even  if  conceptually  the  physical  and  digital 
representations are coupled, and so a question arises about the nature of the conceptual space 
opened up between input and output in a videogame like The Eye of Judgement. This question 
arises not by the elimination of the distinction entirely, but by the unusual relation between 
them where the distinction seems to remain in a vestigial physical form.
Simply put,  a  videogame like  The Eye  of  Judgement elicits  the question  of  where is  the 
videogame actually taking place? This question should be distinguished from the seemingly 
similar question we asked of EyeToy: Play3 in Chapter Three, for it is no longer a question of 
simply where the interface in itself is located, but rather one concerning the activity through 
which the interface is accessed. If it is taking place within the physical play space through the 
physical representations, then how do we understand the digital representations and the role 
played by them? Conversely, if the videogame fundamentally takes place within the digital  
play space,  are  the physical  representations  little  more  than a gimmick,  or do they entail 
something more significant about the nature of the players’ relationship to the interface used 
to play? Given that it is possible to play The Eye of Judgement entirely outside of the digital 
play space it could be argued that it is not so much a videogame but rather a card game with 
an additional digital layer that does little more than relieve the players of the responsibility of 
keeping track of the rules and score whilst providing a graphical spectacle. Thus, to explore 
these issues we will examine another example of a tangible interface videogame that shares 
much in common with The Eye of Judgement, but which further complicates the point due to 
its  increased  reliance  on  the  dynamic  computation  that  is  embodied  in  the  digital 
representations of its function as a videogame. This art videogame, A Game of Marbles, will 
be explored in the next section to address the questions that have so far arisen concerning 
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videogames and the tangible.
Tangible Interfaces and A Game of Marbles
The digital videogame installation A Game of Marbles (Devine and Mason), exhibited at the 
Next Wave festival of 2006 in Melbourne Australia, presents an interesting case study into the 
dynamics of the videogame interface due to its design, in particular its novel use of physical 
objects as control surfaces. Like  The Eye of  Judgment and the videogames analysed in the 
preceding  chapters  A Game  of  Marbles,  through  making  the  familiar  conventions  of 
videogames  strange,  makes  them more  visible.  The installation  consists  of  two elements, 
firstly, the physical play space consisting of a roped off ring where players take turns flicking 
their marbles much like in a traditional game of marbles. The second element is that which is 
simultaneously displayed digitally on screen, where the position and movement of the marbles 
is  captured  by  a  video  camera  and  computationally  processed  similarly  to  The  Eye  of  
Judgement, then depicted as stylised soldier avatars within a rocky arena. When two or more 
marbles enter within a particular distance of each other in the physical play space, this is in 
turn represented on-screen through an exchange of fire between the avatars. In addition, there 
are a range of special moves, dependent on the movement of the player’s marble as shown in 
Figure Seven. These movements, such as passing between two other marbles, or completing a 
full circumnavigation around the interior limit of the rope ring, activate power-ups familiar to 
the average videogame player, such as restoring health, or causing other players to sustain 
extra  damage.  Thus,  as  the  players  take  turns  flicking  their  marbles  around the  ring  the 
movements  of these marbles  are  depicted  as  stylised  combat  onscreen,  their  avatars  deal, 
endure, and heal damage until one player has reached a winning score of ten kills.
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Figure  Seven:  Two different  ‘special  moves’  from  A Game of  Marbles (Image copyright 
Devine and Mason, reproduced with permission).
The installation problematises the question of where the videogame is taking place – is it in 
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the physical  ring,  or the digital  battlefield?  Which space is  of primary importance  to  the 
players? Where are the players’ attention and intention directed – are the players participants 
in the digital battlefield or only observers? A Game of Marbles raises these questions because 
it brings into focus an aspect of videogames that is often forgotten in the rhetoric of virtuality 
and the arrival of the ‘digital age’ – the essential physicality of videogames as both a medium 
and an experience. By foregrounding the tangibility of its interface A Game of Marbles brings 
the physicality of the experience of videogame play back to our attention, while also calling 
into question the relation of the virtual to the tangible in wider contexts. Similarly, artists such 
as Jonah Brucker-Cohen have interrogated the trend towards valorising the virtual with works 
such as Alerting Infrastructure which seeks “to amplify the concern that physical spaces are 
slowly losing ground to their virtual counterparts”  (Brucker-Cohen and Doyle 5). Alerting  
Infrastructures is an installation piece that uses a pneumatic drill suspended in the air but in 
contact  with  the  gallery  wall,  and  controlled  by  a  computer  that  tracks  ‘hits’  to  the 
exhibition’s website, so that “With each new virtual hit, the jackhammer slowly destroys the 
wall of the physical building” (Brucker-Cohen and Doyle 5). Though Brucker-Cohen makes 
the point in a playful manner, in the context of virtuality more generally we would do well to 
remember  the  inherent  physicality  of  the  technological  sub-structure  that  enables  our 
experience of videogame play. From the control surface to display monitor, including even 
the software that exists  as an array of magnetic  polarities  or plastic  peaks and troughs,  a 
videogame has an existence in physical reality. While, as players, we may not be particularly 
aware of these tangible factors during the course of play, they are none-the-less an important 
part of the experience as part of the technical support that enables that experience,  which 
becomes most apparent when one or more of these physical supports ceases to work it its 
intended manner, disrupting and even ceasing the course of play. 
While A Game of Marbles is quite obviously a very particular case, it shares many similarities 
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with other videogame genres and styles. Firstly, there is the turn-based, one player at a time 
interaction style  that  A Game of Marbles shares with many videogames,  particularly turn-
based strategy videogames, not to mention games more widely such as many card and board 
games, and of course games of marbles.  Secondly,  the players have discontinuous control 
during their turn, as they have no control of their marble after they have set it in motion, a  
characteristic shared by videogames such as the ballistics based Scorched Earth (Hicken) and 
Worms, as well as turn-based strategy videogames, and non-digital games such as snooker and 
lawn bowls. Finally,  A Game of Marbles is a physically co-located multiplayer videogame, 
meaning that it has a stronger connection to similarly co-located video- and non-video games 
than to  online videogames where players  are generally physically  distant.  What  primarily 
differentiates  A Game of Marbles from conventionally designed videogames is the way in 
which it makes its tangible interface a focus of attention separate from the output feedback 
being presented via the display screen and audio speakers. Like  The Eye of Judgement, the 
game-state  is  knowable not  only from these feedback channels,  but  also partially  via  the 
position  of  the  marbles  within  the  physical  play space,  and what  distinguishes  these two 
separate  presentations  are  the  extra  layers  of  representation  provided  by  the  onscreen 
representation,  namely  a  thematic  context  of  combat,  dynamic  score keeping through the 
dealing of damage, and spectacle through the audio-visual apparatus. 
Like The Eye of Judgement, these extra layers need not be digital, as it would be possible to 
implement the thematic context and score keeping in a set up akin to a table-top war game,  
though the process would admittedly be much more cumbersome. The final extra layer of 
spectacle  would be conceivably much harder  though not  impossible  to  accomplish  in  the 
physical play space in a similar manner as is achieved in the digital game-space of A Game of  
Marbles. I raise this rather unlikely situation of a completely non-digital version of A Game 
of  Marbles to  emphasise  that  “while  digital  and physical  media  might  be  informationally 
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equivalent,  they  are  not  interactionally equivalent”  (Dourish  44,  emphasis  in  original). 
Though the digital elements could be, at least hypothetically,  achieved within the physical 
play space, by contrast the digital representation presents no means for the player to control 
the movement of their avatar – A Game of Marbles is, after all, a game of marbles that takes 
place in the physical play space through the players taking action by flicking their marbles 
around the ring. The digital representation is just that, a representation of the computationally 
processed action and events of each turn of the game. Though the digital representation is 
doubtlessly  an  important  part  of  the  design  of  the  installation  as  an  artwork  and  of  its 
experience, as part of the ludic game it is secondary to the physical play space where the 
player  takes  action.  This  situation  is  seemingly  unlike  that  of  a  conventional  videogame 
where,  as the only source of feedback, the digital  representation regardless of its  form as 
visual,  audible,  or  haptic  information  appears  to  be  an  integral  and  crucial  part  of  the 
experience  of  videogame play.  The computer  may be running the videogame,  processing 
information about player input and presenting complex output through screens and speakers, 
but the videogame play itself takes place in our world, through the actions, intentions, and 
experiences  of  the players.31 Without  the players  there is  a  technological  system that  can 
support the playing of the videogame, but no experience of videogame play, as it is only when 
the technological system is taken up by the players in the course of play that the experience of 
actual videogame play can come into being in the individual experience of the players.
This is not to discount the general importance of the technological system, as the rules and the 
technical manner in which the videogame action is presented fulfils a vital role in helping to 
structure the actions and intentions of the players  (Järvinen 70). The rules of  A Game of  
Marbles give the players’ activities a teleological purpose, they are not merely rolling marbles 
31 This situation is reminiscent of Massumi’s argument that “The processing may be digital – but the 
analog is the process.” For example, digital sound which, though stored in digital code, only becomes 
audible when transformed into analogue sound waves Massumi, Parables for the Virtual 142, 38.
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around a ring, but doing so to gain advantage within a competitive context with the theme of 
to-the-death conflict. The particular details of the rules, such as the special moves shown in 
Figure Seven, suggest likely moves the player could make in any particular turn given the 
arrangement of the marbles. In this sense, the videogame does exist independently from the 
activity of play as a set of abstracted potentials, as a static state of what might be likely to  
happen  next  and  why,  resting  on  the  logical  structure  of  the  rules.  Though rules  give  a 
videogame its structure, if we are interested in videogame play as an activity undertaken by 
players the focus should be on how the players act within, and beyond, that structure – on play 
as a material, experienced activity.32 The raw potentialities presented by the rule structure thus 
become part of the experience of videogame play only when they are taken up and pursued by 
the player.
Ullmer  and  Ishii’s  description  of  tangible  interfaces  as  giving  “physical  form  to  digital 
information” (Ullmer and Ishii 581), offers one potential way of understanding the dynamics 
of A Game of Marbles by considering the installation in terms of Ullmer and Ishii’s model-
control-representation (physical and digital) interaction framework and how it understands the 
integration between representation and control within tangible interfaces. According to this 
model,  the  perceptual  coupling  between  the  physical  representations  and  the  digital 
representations  of  the interface  indirectly  relies  on a  computational  coupling  between the 
physical interface with the underlying software code that runs the videogame  (Ullmer and 
Ishii 585). In terms of  A Game of Marbles, the perceptual coupling between the coloured 
marbles  and  the  on-screen  avatars  relies  upon  the  computational  coupling  between  the 
32 Again, Massumi is helpful here, as he argues “structure is the place where nothing ever happens, the 
explanatory  heaven  in  which  all  eventual  permutations  are  prefigured  in  a  self-consistent  set  of 
invariant generative rules.” Massumi, Parables for the Virtual 27. For instance, using the rule structure 
of Noughts and Crosses (known in some regions as Tic Tac Toe), Juul is able to calculate the number 
of different ways in which any instance of the game could take. Jesper Juul, Half-Real: Video Games 
between Real Rules and Fictional Worlds (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2005) 38. Yet, this 
tells us very little about the actual experience of playing Noughts and Crosses, or why the players’  
make certain moves but not others.
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physical marbles and the installation’s software code. The digital representations are thus used 
to  dynamically  present  information  to  the  players  about  the  computational  process,  for 
instance the percentages that show the health level of individual avatars to indicate how much 
damage each has sustained so far. The marbles, though lacking some of the information that is 
handled digitally,  such as avatar health level, still partially indicate the game state through 
their position within the physical play space and importantly serve as the tangible interface of 
the videogame. Furthermore, A Game of Marbles employs what Ullmer and Ishii describe as a 
spatial approach, where “the spatial configurations of physical objects are directly interpreted 
and augmented by the underlying system”  (Ullmer and Ishii 585). Thus the initial position, 
movement,  and proximity to other marbles of the currently active marble during a turn is 
processed by the videogame software and represented digitally to the player as movement and 
conflict  between  the  onscreen  avatars.  Hence,  it  is  the  dynamic  changes  in  the  physical 
location and proximity of the marbles over the course of the videogame that determines the 
actual outcome of the videogame, rather than the representation and contextualisation of these 
changes that occurs on screen.
Though Ullmer and Ishii’s model allows us to address A Game of Marbles in terms of how 
physical objects can be employed to control and represent computational processes, we can go 
a step further and consider the inverse form of this relationship where computation, rather 
than being primary, takes a supporting role to the physical components. Dourish describes this 
approach to HCI as the augmented reality approach, where “The site of interaction is the 
world of the user, not that of the system” (Dourish 38). Such a view seems more fitting for a 
videogame-like system like A Game of Marbles where the activity is undertaken for its own 
sake, rather than to accomplish a particular task. From this perspective, the site of interaction 
is the game itself, rather than what is represented onscreen as the game-space. Such a tangible 
interaction understanding is suggested by the online festival listing for  A Game of Marbles, 
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which describes the marbles as representing the avatars (Next Wave Festival). Conversely, a 
newspaper  report  on  the  videogame  describes  the  avatars  as  representing  the  marbles 
(Karena), and though it may be no more than a trivial divergence of wording between the two 
differing descriptions, it does suggest that the question of primacy between the digital and 
physical  that  Dourish’s  notion  of  the  augmented  reality  approach  addresses  may  not 
necessarily tend towards the physical in the case of A Game of Marbles. The representational 
relationship between the physical marbles and the digital avatars is necessarily a bi-directional 
transformation,  and  as  such  the  physical  and  digital  representations  are  relatively 
informationally  equivalent,  as  mentioned  earlier.  However,  from  the  perspective  of  the 
players the case of the digital avatars representing the marbles would arguably be the most 
likely perspective taken, after all, in terms of the videogame, it is more interesting to watch 
computer animated avatars do battle rather than marbles rolling around in a ring, and it is also 
within the digital game-space that the winner is ultimately determined. 
A Game of  Marbles  complicates  this  likely preference  towards the digital  game-space by 
forcing an awareness of the disconnection between the stages of input and feedback that a 
conventional videogame seeks to conflate through a variety of measures, such as attempting 
to make the tangible interface relatively intuitive by using logical and physical constraints, or 
by utilising conventional layouts that many players may already be familiar with (Norman 82-
87) and  thus  easier  to  take  up  as  ready-to-hand.  A  sufficiently  competent  player  of  a 
conventional videogame would eventually pay little attention to the tangible interface, being 
engaged in the activity of playing the videogame rather than using the tangible interface, or as 
Dourish puts it, “as we act through technology that has become ready-to-hand, the technology 
itself disappears from our immediate concerns. We are caught up in the performance of the 
work; our mode of being is one of ‘absorbed coping’” (Dourish 109). The tangible interface 
becomes  incorporated  into  the  player’s  body schema,  as  the  player  becomes  increasingly 
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familiar with its workings, and as a result it must “withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite 
authentically”  (Heidegger  358).  As  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  Three  with  regards  to  the 
experience of playing EyeToy: Play 3, the result of this withdrawal of the immediate physical 
interface is the flow of the player’s intentional concern into the game-space, as the player 
becomes  directed  not  towards  the  movement  of  their  own  immediate  bodies,  but  rather 
towards their represented bodies onscreen that interact with the game-space.  
As the players of A Game of Marbles have to split their attention between the physical ring 
and onscreen battlefield,  it  is hard to see how their intentional concern could move in the 
manner described by Dourish for they must look away from the screen towards the tangible 
interface to take action within the game-space. To further elucidate this point, let us consider a 
hypothetical modified version of  A Game of Marbles that uses a billiards table as its play 
space, and a pool cue as the means of moving the balls and compare this to the Billiards mini-
game from the Wii Play compilation (Nintendo Wii Play), where the players use the WiiMote 
as if it were a cue. In the Wii Play version the players’ actions from moment to moment are 
captured by the accelerometers in the WiiMote and represented on screen as a moving pool 
cue and there is no need for the player to split their attention between the digital game-space 
and their own immediate physical space. The player does not need to focus their attention on 
the WiiMote, which rather, in much the same way as someone playing a real world game of 
billiards engages with their cue, becomes incorporated into the player’s bodily schema as a 
ready-to-hand extension. The situation is quite different in the adapted  A Game of Marbles 
version, where the players would need to focus on the physical play space whilst taking their 
move, before watching the action on the screen take place. Even those players that possess a 
high level of skill at either conventional marbles or billiards, such that the marbles or pool 
cues themselves are already ready-to-hand, would still be faced with this situation of a split or 
separation of their attention between the physical game-space and the digital game-space. 
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Figure Eight: Rules for A Game of Marbles (Image copyright Devine and Mason, reproduced 
with permission).
All  of  this  of  course assumes  that  the players  are  playing in  the manner  intended by its  
designers, following the rules and trying to win. Watching other gallery-goers using A Game 
of  Marbles,  one  observation  made  was  that  few  people  were  actually  playing  it  as  a 
videogame, but rather playing with it as an audio-visual installation, largely ignoring the rules 
such as ‘One Player  at  a Time’  as  shown in Figure Eight.  Players  would move multiple 
marbles simultaneously,  focusing most often on the screen displaying constant movement, 
violence, and gore with only momentary glances downwards to locate marbles that could be 
moved. The marbles were not moved tactically as ludic actions directed towards the game-
space, but simply set in motion. Though these observations were based only on one short visit 
one afternoon in a quite busy gallery, it is possible to identify this observed use of A Game of  
Marbles as  an example of what  Williams,  Kabisch,  and Dourish describe as instrumental 
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interaction, as the participants were “not focused on the physical objects themselves, but on 
the effects that they engender [. . .] using them as controllers of a digital system” (Williams, 
Kabisch and Dourish 10). In a way this point contradicts our earlier argument that videogames 
are generally not instrumental, in that the experience of videogame play is an end in itself 
rather than being directed towards some concern beyond the experience of videogame play. 
This would suggest that the observed use of A Game of Marbles indicates that those playing 
were  not  approaching  the  installation  as  a  videogame  at  all,  but  rather  as  an  interactive 
multimedia work, leading to expectations about its purpose and intended use outside of the 
ludic concerns of the experience of videogame play we have been focused upon. 
Of course,  this is not meant to suggest that the observed use of  A Game of Marbles was 
instrumental  in the sense of being directed towards some specific  utility.  For instance,  in 
explaining what they mean by instrumental interaction, Williams, Kabisch and Dourish refer 
to their own observations on another interactive digital media installation, SignalPlay, noting 
that  “users  took advantage  of  the ways  in  which  the  musical  sounds were influenced by 
manipulation of the object, treating it similarly to a musical instrument” (Williams, Kabisch 
and Dourish 9). This playful employment of the installation is similar to that observed with A 
Game of Marbles, perhaps as a result of their common social setting within a gallery space, 
for  as  Williams,  Kabisch  and Dourish note  in  relation  to  SignalPlay,  the  gallery  imbued 
“meaning to the technology, as something to be explored and understood, but not necessarily 
to be used as a tool” (Williams, Kabisch and Dourish 11). Along with these contextual cues, 
there are also the effects engendered by the two installations, namely responsive audio and/or 
visual outputs, which lend themselves to more playful, unstructured interaction than we might 
generally associate with the word ‘instrumental’. This instrumental use of A Game of Marbles 
relied on what Williams, Kabisch, and Dourish would describe as the iconic and intrinsic 
properties  of  the  marbles  (Williams,  Kabisch  and  Dourish  9).  Iconic,  as  the  marbles 
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represented the on screen avatars, whilst the intrinsic ability of the marbles to roll, and the 
delimitation  of  the  physical  play  space  with a  roped off  ring,  further  suggested  how the 
installation could be used – recalling Dourish’s third recurrent feature of tangible computing, 
which is the use of the physical properties of the interface to suggest its use. This in part may 
explain the particular use of A Game of Marbles described above, as while there were rules 
governing the taking of turns, these rules were not intrinsically part of the physical play space, 
nor enforced by the underlying software model, so giving the participants considerable scope 
to use the installation in unintended ways such as simply generating interesting events on 
screen to observe. Here again we see that the particular experience of videogame play that an 
individual player will experience arises not so much from the features of the way in which 
that videogame is designed, but rather in the way in which that player takes up the videogame 
within a particular intentional concern, even if that concern goes beyond or outside of the 
purported purpose that videogame was designed for.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have inquired into the role of the player’s embodied relation to the interface 
in the player’s experience of videogame play, focusing particularly on exploring the concepts 
of tangible  computing and tangible  interfaces within the context  of videogames through a 
consideration of an emergent trend of tangible interface videogames that seek to employ the 
physicality of their interfaces more firmly in their players’ experience of videogame play. It 
was argued that in relation to the examples analysed, notably  The Eye of Judgment and  A 
Game of Marbles, that this focus on the physical was at times problematic, with the relation 
between the physical and digital aspects of their respective interfaces existing in some tension 
as both vied for the attention of the player.  While  this  could be put down simply to the 
teething problems that could be expected at the relatively early stages of the use of tangible 
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interfaces in videogames, we also saw that this tension was not necessarily based upon direct 
conflict  between the physical and digital  aspects of the interface,  but rather a tension that 
arises  from a  more  fundamental  phenomenon  that  arises  from the  nature  of  the  player’s 
experience of videogame play, in particular their embodied relation to the interface. In taking 
up the interface as a ready-to-hand extension of their body the interface withdraws from the 
player’s immediate concern, and their intentionality flows into the game-space, leading to the 
player’s split attention between the physical and digital aspects of the interface.
The question we posed earlier in regards to The Eye of Judgement seems equally germane to 
A Game  of  Marbles  –  what  is  the  role  played  by  the  physical  interface  in  the  player’s 
experience of videogame play? Again, similar to  The Eye of Judgement, there is a tension 
between the physical and the digital aspects of the interface as the player’s concern is required 
to shift spatially during the course of play, firstly down at the ring and its marbles to take their 
turn, then up to view the results their actions have within the context of the game-space. This 
tension disrupts the sense of bodily extension arising from the interface being taken up as 
ready-to-hand  relied  upon  by  more  conventional  videogames  to  give  players  a  sense  of 
involvement in, and control over, the events unfolding onscreen. Perhaps this goes some way 
to explaining the observed use of the installation,  for if we understand the actions of the 
players as arising from not having had an experience of being invested with the events on 
screen due to their intentional concern not being extended into the game-space, and as a result 
no strong feelings of connection with the eventual outcome of the videogame taking place, the 
use of the installation of simply setting it in motion to enjoy the spectacle on-screen would 
seem entirely reasonable.
This possible lack of connection and its effects makes the question of whether  A Game of  
Marbles as a videogame takes place in the physical or digital game-space somewhat difficult. 
167
For, whilst the observed users were indeed playing with the installation in a broad sense, if 
that play was not experienced by our erstwhile players as videogame play, and here we are 
referring to the distinction made between free form paidia-style play and the more structured 
and  rule  bound sense  of  ludus  (Caillois  130),  pinning  down the  locus  of  the  videogame 
between the physical and the digital game-spaces would prove difficult.  In the end it may 
simply show that the question that prompted the investigation of  A Game of Marbles was 
mistaken  as  it  raises  a  more  significant  point  about  the  nature  of  the  player’s  embodied 
relation  to  the  interface.  In  an  interview about  the  installation  its  designer,  Tim Devine, 
ponders whether “marbles are as satisfying as the blood and guts (or) are people happy with 
marbles [. . .] Is it necessary to have all this other stuff?” (Karena). Some might contend that 
gallery-goers are unlikely to be satisfied with simply playing marbles, ostensibly a children’s 
game,33 and though we can only speculate it would be interesting to consider what the effect 
would be if those gallery-goers’ use of A Game of Marbles was more heavily constrained by 
the rules such that the consequence of their actions within the context of the game-space was 
more forceful to their concern, so that the ludic outcomes of their actions become significant 
to their experience of play, for example. 
This  is  to  suggest  that  the  players’  experience  of  where  the  videogame  takes  place  is 
influenced not only by the design and implementation of the physical and digital aspects of 
videogames  but  also by the  players’  intentional  orientation  towards  it,  for  after  all  many 
videogames afford their player’s the scope to act in a way that is not necessarily teleologically 
based but rather aimed towards the pleasures of creative chaos. This recalls the point made 
earlier with regards to the second of Dourish’s common features of tangible interface systems, 
where  we  saw  that  the  increased  openness  of  interaction  and  unpredictability  of  user 
behaviour  is  something  already  prevalent  in  videogames,  including  those  that  utilise 
33 Of course, children’s play is often intensely serious to those involved.
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conventional interfaces as well as tangible interfaces. It might seem a obvious point to make, 
but  it  is  something  that  needs  to  be  stressed  –  videogame  play  is  by  its  very nature  an 
inherently playful activity and experience,  and even if the player does have a fixed set of 
goals,  such as  winning,  the  moment  to  moment  task of  moving  towards  that  goal  is  not  
necessarily the linear structure that underlies more utilitarian interaction with computers but 
an open structure where the player fulfils their momentary fancy.
The importance of the player’s intentional orientation towards the activity of videogame play 
in affecting their  experience of where that  play takes place suggests that the question we 
should  be  asking  is  not  where  the  videogame  takes  place,  but  rather  where  the  player 
experiences their play as taking place. Given that videogame play is an embodied experience, 
we are faced with a situation similar to that encountered in Chapter Three’s consideration of 
EyeToy: Play 3,  namely how to reconcile the player’s experience of their  own immediate 
physical  environment  with  the  flow  of  the  player’s  intentionality  into  the  computational 
system that supports the videogame play,  and the extension of the player’s body into the 
game-space that accompanies this flow of intentionality as the interface is incorporated into 
their  bodily  schema.  Though  videogame  play  takes  place  in  the  immediate  physical 
environment of the player it is hard to deny that in some way it is experienced as also taking 
place on screen, or even that it is experienced as taking place primarily within the game-space 
depicted on screen.  As was argued in Chapter Three in regards to the player’s  embodied 
relation to the interface, part of the experience of taking up the interface as ready-to-hand is 
the withdrawal of the interface from the player’s immediate concern, and thus perhaps the 
significance  of  tangible  interface  videogames  in  relation  to  videogames  more  widely  is 
specifically  that  they  refocus  our  attention  on  the  interface,  highlighting  our  immediate 
experience  of  the  physicality  of  videogame play and embodiment  of  the interface  that  is 
usually subsumed by the wider experience of videogame play. 
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Given this subsumption, where the player’s experience of videogame play becomes focused 
on the action onscreen, it seems appropriate to move beyond the immediate physicality of the 
interface and the player’s relation to it that has so far be at the forefront of our concerns to 
consider the concept of the interface, and the player’s embodied relation to it, more widely, 
particularly  so  if  our  investigations  are  to  have  relevance  to  the  more  conventional 
experiences of videogame play. This would suggest a move into the game-space, much like 
that  of  the  player’s  intentionality,  through an  investigation  of  how the  phenomenological 
notion of embodiment affects the player’s relationship with the more abstracted layers of the 
interface through employing the understanding of the experience of videogame play that has 
been  developed  thus  far.  To  this  end,  the  next  chapter  will  consider  the  nature  of  the 
relationship between the player and their representative within the game-space, the avatar or 
character, in terms of embodiment.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
 CHARACTERS, AVATARS, AND PLAYERS
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In the preceding chapter we inquired into the role of the player’s embodied relation to the 
interface for the player’s experience of videogame play, focusing particularly on exploring the 
concepts of tangible computing, and tangible interfaces, within the context of videogames. 
This was done through a consideration of an emergent trend of tangible interface videogames 
that seek to employ the physicality of their interfaces more firmly in their players’ experience 
of videogame play. It was argued that in relation to the examples analysed, notably The Eye 
of Judgment and A Game of Marbles, that this focus on the physical was at times problematic, 
with  the  relation  between  the  physical  and  digital  aspects  of  their  respective  interfaces 
existing in some tension as both vied for the attention of the player. While this could be put 
down simply to the teething problems that could be expected at the relatively early stages of 
the use of tangible interfaces in videogames, it was further argued that this tension was not 
necessarily one of conflict, but rather an underlying and more fundamental phenomenon that 
arises from the nature of the player’s experience of videogame play, in particular the player’s 
embodied relation to the interface.  As we have seen in previous chapters,  the sufficiently 
competent player acts not so much upon the interface as through the interface, taking up the 
interface as a ready-to-hand extension of their body and their body’s potential to act within 
the world, resulting in the interface withdrawing from the immediate concern of the player. 
It  is  this  tension  within  tangible  interface  videogames,  the  tension  that  would  have  their 
players attend to the physical interface, yet also act through that interface in a way that draws 
their attention away from the physical interface towards what is done with that interface, that 
we  argued  was  the  insightful  aspect  about  the  experience  of  playing  tangible  interface 
videogames such as  The Eye of Judgment and  A Game of Marbles. As an art videogame A 
Game of Marbles is arguably an effort to explore this tension, however it could be that a 
tangible interface videogame that avoids this tension between Heidegger’s categories of the 
present-at-hand and ready-to-hand is impossible. Possibly, the two examples used were in a 
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way not ‘tangible enough’, but rather transitional videogame-tangible interface game hybrids 
that may lead to more advanced projects in the future. What they do demonstrate however is 
the process by which the flow of the player’s  intentional  concern into the game-space of 
videogames operates by making visible the importance of the player taking up the physical 
interface as a ready-to-hand extension of the body,  something subsumed within the wider 
experience of playing conventional videogames, and highlighting the importance of what we 
might term the ‘software’ layer of the interface to the player’s experience of videogame play.
In this chapter the terms avatar and character will be investigated to show how each refers to 
different aspects of the player’s embodied relationship to the ‘software’ layer of the interface, 
and consequently the  videogame they are playing. Drawing upon the understanding of how 
the  player  takes  up  the  physical  interface  as  a  ready-to-hand  extension  developed  over 
preceding chapters, it is argued that the player’s embodied relation to the ‘software’ layer of 
the interface is similarly based upon the incorporation of the interface into the player’s body 
schema. This focus on the player’s in-game presence is taken as a result of the conclusion of 
the previous chapter,  where it  was argued that  in moving beyond the immediate  physical 
interface  we  would  be  better  able  to  consider  the  deeper,  more  abstracted  layers  of  the 
interface  where  the  player’s  intentional  concern  begins  to  move  towards  the  activity  of 
videogame play in itself. The issue of the player’s intentional orientation towards the activity 
of  videogame  play  is  then  developed  from  this  discussion  to  capture  and  highlight  an 
important diversity in what the activity of videogame play is directed towards, the different 
concerns in which it is taken up as in-order-to. Finally, there is a discussion on the experience 
of being-in-the-game-world that questions the assumption that the experience of being-in-the-
game-world is a simple movement of immersion into the world of the videogame, but rather 
argues that  the experience is  not only mediated through particular  embodied relationships 
with the avatars and characters that are used to play, but also that the sense of involvement in 
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the action  taking place  in a videogame can take many divergent  forms depending on the 
attitude of the player towards the experience of videogame play.
Before starting on the main body of this chapter however there is a note on terminology that 
needs to be raised. The term ‘locus of manipulation’ is used here to describe the in-game 
position of the player’s ability to assert control over the game-space, whether this is a visible 
character, an implied avatar, or a graphical user interface cursor  (Game Ontology Project). 
This term is used in preference to the more usual nomenclature of either avatars or characters 
for  three  main  reasons.  Firstly,  as  part  of  this  chapter  aims  at  establishing  a  meaningful 
difference between what the terms ‘avatar’ and ‘character’ refer to, it is deemed necessary to 
have a third term that encapsulates both and thus reduce confusion. Secondly, the term locus 
of manipulation has a wider scope and more inclusive nature than either character or avatar, 
recognising that “at any given moment of play,  the player exerts control over some game 
entity or entities, but not over others” (Game Ontology Project). The flexibility of the wording 
‘entities or entities’ means that it can cover modes of player control within the game-space 
such as cursors, non-anthropomorphic objects, and text based interfaces that are not so easily 
described as either a character or avatar in the sense in which these terms are often used – 
simply put “A games [sic] locus of manipulation is where the players [sic] ability to control 
and influence the game is located” (Game Ontology Project). Finally, the literal focus on the 
player’s point of control implied in the term locus of manipulation reduces some of the loaded 
meanings often implicit in the general use of the terms character and avatar, though as will be 
addressed below, these additional  meanings  can provide insights when acknowledged and 
considered.  Articulating  the different  connotations  of the implicit  meanings  of  avatar  and 
character  while  at  the  same  time  keeping  them  somewhat  unified  within  the  broader 
'container' term of the locus of manipulation thus allows us to address the complex nature of 
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the player's relation to their locus of manipulation within the game-space.34
It should also be noted that both the avatar and the character have been addressed in previous 
research within the field of videogame studies in ways that bear some resonance with the 
approach  taken  within  this  thesis,  though  building  from  somewhat  different  theoretical 
underpinnings,  which  leads  the  nature  of  the  arguments  and  conclusions  arrived  at  in  a 
somewhat  divergent  direction  to  the  concerns  of  this  thesis.  For  example,  Wilhelmsson 
articulates what he describes as the 'Game Ego' as an alternative to the concept of the avatar, 35 
which includes acknowledgement of the importance of bodily experience, as he argues that 
“The tactile motor/kinesthetic link between a game player and a Game Ego is the primary 
basis for identification with the Game Ego” (Wilhelmsson 251). While this position is largely 
in  keeping  with  the  argument  developed  in  this  chapter,  Wilhelmsson's  key  theoretical 
grounding of cognitive theory leads him to different kinds of concerns and terminology, such 
as the notion of 'identification', that approach the issues raised in this chapter from different 
direction than that taken here. Similarly, Klevjer's treatment of the relationship between the 
player  and their locus of manipulation has an even stronger resonance with the arguments 
raised in this chapter, as he makes use of some of the same points from Merleau-Ponty to 
describes  how  “the  body-subject  learns  to  perceive  and  act  as  the  avatar,  directly  into 
projected space, via the invisible hardware interface of screen, speakers and control devices” 
(Klevjer 125). Despite this strong similarity however, Klevjer's broader project also moves in 
a different direction from that taken within this thesis, as Klevjer seems to focus more on the 
task  of  identifying  and  defining  different  'versions'  of  the  avatar  and  thus  'genres'  of 
videogames, whereas the approach taken in this chapter is focused more on articulating the 
34 Klevjer makes a similar point, noting that for the purposes of analysis that there is “a lot to gain from 
keeping‘character’ and ‘avatar’ distinct” (Klevjer 116). 
35 Interestingly, part of Wilhelmsson's reason for replacing the term 'avatar' (167) is the wider 
implications of the word that this chapter makes use of in articulating the simultaneous yet different 
kinds of relation the player has with their locus of manipulation during the course of play. 
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experience of the relation between the player and their locus of manipulation, and as such the 
notion of the avatar is employed here as part of this broader notion of the player's point of 
agency or presence within the game-space 
Characters and Avatars 
The terms  avatar  and character  are  often used interchangeably  in  the  field  of  videogame 
studies to describe the player’s locus of manipulation, but if we take into account their wider 
or everyday connotations each term can be used to articulate a different type of relationship 
between the player  and their  locus of manipulation that arises from the interplay between 
embodiment  as  a  state  of  being  and  embodying  as  an  act.  To  consider  the  locus  of 
manipulation as a character is to conceive it as a entity in its own right with a back story and 
persona, an entity constituted separately from the player (Klevjer 116). The character has a 
status that in a way is analogous to the player’s state of embodiment, as for the character like 
the player, meaning is constituted in a world where meaning is always-already present in the 
sense of an immanent meaning which as Dourish puts it “is to be found in the world in which 
we act, and which acts upon us” (Dourish 116). Like the player, the character is intrinsically 
embedded within its world, in this case the game-space, and it is the character’s potential to 
act within that game-space that constitutes the meaning of that space for the character. For the 
player this immanent meaning arises from their embodied state, for as Merleau-Ponty argues 
“Bodily experiences forces us to acknowledge an imposition of meaning which is not the 
work  of  a  universal  constituting  consciousness,  [nor]  a  meaning  which  clings  to  certain 
contents”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of  Perception 170),  but  rather  an  emergent 
meaning  that  arises  out  of  lived  experience  and  actions  in  the  world.  That  is  to  say  a 
phenomenological understanding of meaning, where: 
The body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is 
restricted  to  the  actions  necessary for  the conservation  of  life,  and 
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accordingly  it  posits  around  us  a  biological  world;  at  other  times, 
elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from their literal 
to  a  figurative  meaning,  it  manifests  through  them a  core  of  new 
significance: this is true of motor habits such as dancing. Sometimes, 
finally, the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body’s natural 
means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby 
around  itself  a  cultural  world.  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of 
Perception 169)
In the case of the character this relation between action and meaning in the world is more 
explicit than it is for the player controlling them, as both the character and the game-space 
that they inhabit are explicitly designed as parts of a greater integrated system, which limits 
the extent to which we can regard them as embodied entities as it is not capable of positing 
worlds around itself beyond one open to the potential for particular actions. Simply put, both 
the character  and the game-space  in  which  they operate  are  deliberately designed things, 
created to fulfil  the specific purpose of affording an experience of videogame play to the 
player, and it is through the character’s potential for particular actions in their world that the 
parameters of that design are established. From an evaluative standpoint we could ask how 
well integrated the design of these two objects are – does the character perform in a way that 
is  consistent  with  the  environment  in  which  they  operate,  and  conversely  does  the 
environment present a consistent space for the character to act within? Such consistency or its 
lack will affect the player’s ability to understand the videogame and thus their ability to take 
meaningful actions in the course of their experience of play. Poole’s example of doors that 
don’t open, but look identical to doors that do is a good example of poor integration between 
the character and the game-world,36 while his example of the relationship between Lara Croft 
and the functionally consistent, albeit blocky, cookie cutter style game-world of Tomb Raider 
(Core  Design),  is  one  of  effective  integration  as  the  game-space  of  Tomb  Raider is 
36 Aarseth, observing the same lack of visual distinction between functional and decorative doors, 
argues that this is instead a conscious design choice, as “For every virtual
door, an additional room must be created behind it” (Aarseth “Doors and Perception” 3). Furthermore, 
he notes that Half Life 2 successfully negotiates this trade of between consistency and development 
resources, as these inconsistencies are hardly noticed by the player. While this is definitely an 
appropriate point, it is a level of analysis (i.e. player focused rather than character focused) above our 
focus at this particular point. 
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constructed  in  ‘Lara  Units’,  where  gaps  between  platforms  are  either  standing  jump  or 
running jump distances,  or  otherwise impassable  (Poole 223).  To put it  another  way,  the 
game-space of  Tomb Raider is designed so as to offer affordances that fit the locomotive 
abilities  of  Lara  Croft,  and  therefore  provides  a  spatially  meaningful  game-space  that 
highlights Gibson’s sense of an affordance as a relationship which “is equally a fact of the 
environment and a fact of behaviour” (Gibson 129). 
Furthermore, the idea of character necessarily entails a sense of characterisation, even if this 
is as simple as a back story that combines the title River Raid (Activision) of the Atari 2600 
videogame with an in-game airplane icon that operates as the player’s locus of manipulation, 
in a game-space that depicts a two dimensional, overhead view of a river environment. In this 
case the character is implied, a pilot who is raiding a river for some reason or other that is not 
deemed particularly important enough to warrant further exposition for the understanding of 
the player. In other videogames characterisation is much more complex, particularly in cases 
like those noted by Newman where characters such as Mario or Lara Croft transcend their 
originating  medium into intertextuality (Newman  Videogames 128),  but  more  commonly 
through  cut  scenes  and  other  techniques  of  narrative  presentation  within  the  videogames 
themselves.  These  non-interactive,  or  off-line  sequences,37  present  the  player’s  locus  of 
manipulation as fully independent beings that “can run around, engage in action, and even 
speak with autonomy from the audience”  (Newman  Videogames 130).38 Some videogames 
intentionally highlight the relative independence and individuality of their characters, even if 
only for humorous effect. For instance in Earthworm Jim (Shiny Entertainment), if no player 
input  is  provided  after  a  length  of  time,  the  titular  character  will  perform  a  variety  of 
37 Newman uses the terms off-line and on-line to distinguish between non-interactive and interactive 
sections of videogames respectively. Though the terms could cause confusion, they are used at this 
point as the argument raised is following Newman. Newman, J. 2004. The Myth of the Ergodic 
Videogame. Game Studies, 2 (1) (July 2002).
38 Newman’s use of ‘audience’, as opposed to ‘player’, is perhaps telling.
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animations that display impatience – playing with a yo-yo, tapping its feet with arms crossed, 
and so on. Such elements may have little to no effect on the experience of videogame play 
from a strictly ludic perspective, yet their inclusion none-the-less reinforces that the character 
is a thing in its own right, rather than simply a conduit for direct action by the player within 
the game-space. 
Despite  this  limited  independence,  during  interactive  or  on-line  sequences  the  locus  of 
manipulation  is  controlled  by  the  player,  which  is  to  say  that  the  locus  of  manipulation 
embodies the intentions of the player at least to the degree that the character affords. In this 
inflection,  the  term  avatar  better  describes  the  way  in  which  the  locus  of  manipulation 
operates as a tool that extends the player’s ability to realise potentials within the game-space 
(Hirose 291). In its original meaning, the term avatar refers to “The descent of a deity to the 
earth in an incarnate  form”  (OED), and despite the fact that this suggests that videogame 
players have a rather inflated sense of self importance (and chat logs of multiplayer  first-
person shooter videogames would suggest that in some cases this is true, not to mention the 
genre of ‘god games’)  the important  implication is that  it  suggests an intrusion from one 
dimension into a subordinate one. While this emphasises the control the player wields over 
their  videogame  avatar,  it  also  makes  prominent  the  limitations  that  this  relationship  of 
surrogacy imposes on the player. As Polaine points out, Lara Croft is not able to “stop and 
negotiate  with  her  enemies  instead  of  shooting  them”  (Polaine  152).  These  limitations 
highlight that the avatar is also a character, that is, an entity constituted separately from the 
player. In a way, the character has its own limited agency and intentionality, in that its suite of 
potential  actions proscribe a certain type of directedness towards the game-space onto the 
player,  not  to  mention  the  fictional  personality  that  can  reinforce  that  suite  of  potential 
actions, as well as providing sources of contextualisation and motivation for the player’s with 
which to make sense of the game-space and their actions in it. On the other hand, it is through 
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the locus of manipulation as avatar that the player is able to take those actions, and through 
those actions make sense of the game-space. Given the proscription entailed by the locus of 
manipulation as character, to understand how the locus of manipulation as avatar can embody 
the  intentions  of  the player  we need to  move  away from thinking about  player  intention 
simply  flowing through the  avatar  into  the  game-space  towards  how these  intentions  are 
mediated by what the avatar can do in the game-space.
 
This is to consider the avatar, as Newman puts it, as a type of vehicle (Newman "The Myth of 
the Ergodic Videogame" 9). Such a perspective focuses on how the locus of manipulation is 
functionally embodied as a set of capabilities and limitations, rather than as a personality or 
through a narrative back story, is of primary importance to the player. For example, “Lara 
Croft  is  defined less by appearance than by the fact that ‘she’ allows the player  to jump 
distance  x”  (Newman "The Myth  of  the  Ergodic  Videogame"  9,  emphasis  in  orignal).  A 
similar point is made by Aarseth, as he observes that the bodily dimensions of Lara Croft “are 
irrelevant  to  me  as  a  player,  because  a  different  looking body would  not  make  me  play 
differently.”  (Aarseth  “Genre  Trouble”  46)  This  does  not  preclude  the  relevance  of 
representational  or  characterisation  elements  to  the  locus  of  manipulation,  for  Newman’s 
arguments  not  only  relate  to  what  he  describes  as  the  ‘on-line’  character,  but  also  that 
representational  and  other  character  traits  are  often  used  to  communicate  to  players  the 
abilities of their avatars  (Newman "The Myth of the Ergodic Videogame" 9-10), after all a 
sports  car  announces  its  capacity  to  reach high  speeds  through its  shape  long before  the 
ignition key is turned. However, whilst various traits of the character may communicate the 
capacities and limitations of the locus of manipulation to an extent, this tells us little about 
how the player takes up and employs the locus of manipulation. For instance, whilst driving a 
car approaching a corner we know that we need to slow down to negotiate the corner safely, 
and we also know that we need to begin braking at a certain distance from the corner to attain  
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a suitable speed. Yet for the experienced driver these actions, and the evaluations from which 
they flow, are seemingly natural largely because they have internalised the limitations of the 
vehicle they are driving, or in terms of embodiment, that the vehicle as a tool has become a 
functional extension of the driver’s body (Hirose 291). The various control surfaces, whether 
steering wheel or brake pedal, have become ready-to-hand. For the novice driver however, 
such concerns are constantly present, and the vehicle’s controls thus present-at-hand – even 
changing into first gear from neutral entails the harrowing experience of negotiating with the 
clutch pedal. As Richardson argues “Within the material shape and capacities of the car, we 
adjust our physical deportment, spatial orientation, and our entire physical relationship with 
the  world”  (Richardson  206).  Even  when  this  novice  driver  becomes  fairly  proficient,  a 
change to an unfamiliar vehicle, particularly one that has significantly different characteristics 
such as increased weight or a different type of drive-train is likely to again require a conscious 
focus on the specific details of the activity of driving that particular car, rather than on the 
activity of driving itself. 
A way to further develop the relationship between the player and their locus of manipulation 
is  to  return  to  Heidegger’s  notion  of  equipment  that  we  employed  in  Chapter  Three, 
equipment  as  “something  in-order-to”  (Heidegger  356).  Within  Heidegger’s 
conceptualisation, the equipment itself is not central to our intentional concern for when we 
use equipment “our concern subordinates itself to the ‘in-order-to’ which is constitutive for 
the equipment  we are employing at  the time”  (Heidegger  357),  thus  the equipment  itself 
becomes ready-to-hand and withdrawn. Yet this subordination of equipment to the task at 
hand would seem to contradict our insistence on considering the locus of manipulation as in 
some way a character that proscribes or limits the potential actions the player can employ 
them for.  For  if  the  locus  of  manipulation  is  an  avatar  conceived  of  as  Heidegger  does 
equipment, then the locus of manipulation logically should disappear from the awareness of 
181
the player, for if the locus of manipulation is to operate as a ready-to-hand avatar, it must 
“withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically” (Heidegger 358). We seem to find 
ourselves in a situation where the locus of manipulation, in its aspect as an avatar, should be 
withdrawn from the immediate concern of the player that has taken it up as ready-to-hand, yet 
somehow still present, in its aspect as a character, and influencing the way in which the player 
acts within the game-space.
Indeed,  Newman  makes  a  similar  claim  when  he  argues  that  “The  ‘characterisation’, 
individuality and distinctiveness of Snake39 comes not from his appearance On-Line [sic] [. . .] 
but rather in the Off-Line [sic] cut-scenes and contextualizing narratives of the introductory 
sequences. On-Line, there is no Snake” (Newman "The Myth of the Ergodic Videogame" 10). 
However,  we  have  defined  characters  as  possessing  not  only  a  narrative  back  story  and 
personality, but also as that set of capabilities and limitations, the way in which the character 
is embodied as an entity separate from the player. This part of our definition of the character 
is essentially identical to Newman’s own definition of the On-Line characters, so when the 
player  takes up the locus of manipulation as a ready-to-hand avatar these capabilities and 
limitations of the character should withdraw from the awareness of the player as fully as the 
narrative context of characterization does. 
Yet these capabilities and limitations none the less limit what the player can and can’t do 
within the game-space, and as such it could be argued that they must in some form remain  
present, yet internalised, to the awareness of the player for the player to have any effective  
sense of agency. Here Hirose’s distinction between the state of embodiment and the act of 
embodying becomes useful, as it explains how in the dynamic taking up of the equipment 
towards a particular end equipment becomes incorporated into the player’s body, recognising 
39 The central protagonist of the Metal Gear series.
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“that the boundary of the body is [not] fixed at the surface of the skin. The boundary is, in 
fact, changeable and can be extended by tools” (Hirose 291). This is to say that the player’s 
awareness of the capabilities and limitations of the locus of manipulation is not a kind of 
knowledge based on conscious content, but rather what we referred to in Chapter Three as 
“praktognosia”, or practical knowledge (Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 163), a 
“knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, [.  .  .]  a 
knowledge  bred  of  familiarity”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of  Perception 166).  It  is 
through this familiarity that the player can experience an effective sense of agency, through 
being at a bodily and immediate level aware of the capabilities and limitations of the locus of 
manipulation as a character and thus able to take up the locus of manipulation as an avatar 
with which to act within the game-space. This notion of familiarity is important to keep in 
mind, as it invokes the personal history of the player’s experience of videogame play, with the 
implicit implication that the type of ‘practical knowledge’ we are arguing for has an inherent 
temporal quality, it is learnt. The question is then how this practical knowledge of the locus of 
manipulation,  the player’s bodily familiarity with the character’s  limited suite of potential 
actions that restricts their freedom to act through the avatar within the game-space, is learnt, 
as  establishing  this  sense  of  familiarity  is  no  less  a  part  of  the  player’s  experience  of 
videogame play.  As Leino notes in  relation to the unique possibilities  of Fire Engines  in 
Grand Theft  Auto: San Andreas,  “The vehicle  as a virtual  fire  engine is important  to my 
emotions only to the extent I experience it as a virtual fire engine” (Leino "Emotions About 
the Deniable/Undeniable: Sketch for a Classification of Game Content as Experienced" 115). 
It is important to keep in mind that the player is not primarily concerned with the suite of 
potential  actions  embodied  by  the  character  in  the  abstract,  for  as  Hirose  argues,  citing 
Smitsman, the tool: 
plays  a  central  role  in  extending  the  user’s  effectivities  to  realize 
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affordances of the environment. Consequently,  tool use involves the 
task  to  detect  affordances  not  of  the  tool  itself,  but  of  functional 
relations between the tool and the environment (Hirose 291). 
This is in keeping with thinking about the locus of manipulation in terms of Heidegger’s 
notion of equipment, given the central role played by intentionality in Heidegger’s notion of 
equipment as something ‘in-order-to’. Even in taking up equipment as something ‘in-order-to’ 
we can discover it as an object present-at-hand, “as something unusable, not properly adapted 
for the use we have decided upon” (Heidegger 359). In terms of the locus of manipulation, 
this is to say that we can take it up as an avatar towards a particular intentional concern within 
the game-space,  only to find that  the suite  of potential  actions  embodied  by the locus of 
manipulation as character does not afford us a way of pursuing that intentional concern. For 
example, returning to Polaine’s observation that there is no way to use Lara Croft to negotiate 
with her enemies, the player that attempts to employ Lara Croft as an avatar in such a manner 
finds that Lara Croft as a character becomes apparent as a present-at-hand entity which cannot 
be used ‘in-order-to’ negotiate. Importantly, the player becomes aware of the unusability of a 
particular  avatar  for  a  particular  ‘in-order-to’  “not  by  looking  at  it  and  establishing  its 
properties,  but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it.  When its  
unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous” (Heidegger 359). This is to 
say that our experience of and understanding of equipment in-itself is not only reflexive in 
nature rather than proactive, but that also what we attend to is not the equipment itself but 
rather the end to which we are employing it towards. When the player realises that Lara Croft  
cannot negotiate with her enemies, she becomes not a ‘character that cannot do this’ but rather 
a  ‘character  with  who  I  cannot  do  this’  –  she  is  unusable  for  that  concern.  The  player 
approaches Lara as character not simply as an object with certain abstract properties such as 
‘can jump x units’ but rather one that always extends to the player a range of possible actions 
that derive from those properties with which to act in the game-space towards a particular 
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intentional concern. It is not so much a question of how far she can jump as it is a question of 
why the player wants to be able to jump that far – even as a present-at-hand character Lara 
continues to be equipment, and the player’s interest will be her potential to be taken up as 
ready-to-hand for a particular ‘in-order-to’.
It  is  arguably  through  the  player’s  negotiation  of  this  dynamic  between  the  locus  of 
manipulation as ready-to-hand equipment, and as present-at-hand object that the player comes 
to learn of the particular things their avatar can be used ‘in-order-to’, particularly by learning 
what  it  is  unusable  for.  This  is  not to  suggest  a  simple  process  of  trial  and error,  for as 
Heidegger argues: 
When  equipment  cannot  be  used,  this  implies  that  the  constitutive 
assignment of the ‘in-order-to’ to a ‘towards-this’ has been disturbed. 
The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather ‘there’ 
when  we  concernfully  submit  ourselves  to  them.  But  when  an 
assignment  has  been  disturbed—when  something  is  unusable  for 
some  purpose—then  the  assignment  becomes  explicit.  (Heidegger 
360, emphasis in original)
If we return to the example of Lara Croft, we can see that the reason why she cannot resolve 
conflict  through negotiation is that it  is not possible for the player  to constitute her as an 
assignment  between  an  ‘in-order-to’  negotiate  with  to  a  ‘towards-this’  of  an  enemy.  To 
paraphrase from the quote above, the negotiating concern has come up against something 
unusable, and thus the assignment has been disturbed, which is to say that the intention that 
the player had towards the videogame has been thwarted. As Lara Croft is the only equipment 
the player has available within the bounds of the  Tomb Raider game-space the player must 
employ her capabilities as best they can, and Lara Croft cannot be taken up for the concern of 
negotiating with her enemies, she is ‘un-ready-to-hand’ for such a concern. It could even be 
argued that effective or successful play on the part of the player derives from their ability to 
get the best out of Lara, so to speak, by aligning their intentionality with the full range of what 
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she  is  most  effectively  ‘in-order-to’  through  developing  a  deep  familiarity  with  the 
capabilities and limitations of Lara as a character. But if the learning process by which the 
competent player arrives at this mastery is not simply a question of trial and error as we are 
arguing, how then does the player acquire this more holistic practical knowledge of Lara as 
character that is ready-to-hand?
If  we consider  the  nature  of  the  negotiating  intention  more  deeply,  we can  see  that  the 
intention to negotiate is merely the proximal appearance of a deeper concern, namely, that of 
progressing through the game, of which the enemy presents as simply the immediate obstacle 
to that concern. And it is this failure of the attempt to have Lara negotiate with her enemies 
that opens up the nature of this deeper assignment of the ‘in-order-to’ to the player. With the 
disturbance  of  the  assignment  between the  ‘in-order-to’  and the  ‘towards-this’  the  player 
becomes  aware  not  only  of  the  assignment  itself  but  the  greater  context  in  which  that 
assignment operates, as “When an assignment to some particular ‘towards-this’ has been thus 
circumspectively  aroused,  we  catch  sight  of  the  ‘towards-this’  itself,  and  along  with  it 
everything connected with the work—the whole ‘workshop’—as that wherein concern always 
dwells”  (Heidegger 360). Though the workshop metaphor Heidegger employs may confuse 
the point, simply the context within which the assignment and the concern it serves dwells is 
not simply a conceptual or geographic space, but rather a context of equipment, for “Taken 
strictly, there ‘is’ no such thing as an equipment. To the being of any equipment there always 
belongs a totality of equipment, in which it can be this equipment that it is” (Heidegger 356, 
emphasis in original). Lara Croft as equipment ‘in-order-to’ play within the game-space of 
Tomb Raider, is in a sense composed or constituted by more specific types of equipment, 
equipment ‘in-order-to’ climb onto ledges, equipment ‘in-order-to’ jump across chasms, and 
equipment ‘in-order-to’ negotiate the obstacles that appear as enemies, only not in the literal 
sense of the word. And again it is not within the equipment in itself, not even within Lara as a 
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totality of equipment, where the player’s intentional concern dwells but rather the ‘workshop’ 
within which the ‘in-order-to’ of Lara as equipment has meaning – the game-space.
With the disturbance of the player’s initial assignment “The context of equipment is lit up, not 
as  something  never  seen  before,  but  as  a  totality  constantly  sighted  beforehand  in 
circumspection” (Heidegger 360). The second part of this statement should give us pause, for 
if the totality of the context of equipment is not something new to the player, indeed already 
something known to the player before the disturbance of the assignment that putatively put it 
into their view, then we have something of a paradox of circular reasoning. However, this 
paradox occurs only if we consider the player and their actions in playing  Tomb Raider as 
occurring in some sort of vacuum devoid of previous experience and context, rather than a 
situated player, for as Heidegger argues “Any concern is already as it is, because of some 
familiarity with the world”  (Heidegger 361). In the case of Lara Croft, though it is easy to 
agree that she cannot negotiate with her enemies, it is unlikely that many of us would have 
learnt  this  through  the  process  just  described,  as  we  would  have  drawn  on  cultural 
conventions about the action-adventure genre to which Tomb Raider belongs, not to mention 
the connotations  raised by the word ‘raider’,  and as such would not expect to be able to 
negotiate in the first place. However, perhaps our hypothetical player has been exposed only 
to certain types of role playing games, such as Baldur’s Gate (BioWare), where negotiating 
with NPC characters is a common way of interacting with them. Perhaps they’ve not even 
played  any videogames  before,  nor  been exposed to  breathless  media  reports  about  their 
overly violent nature, and has simply transposed from their real life experience, where talking 
to, and co-operating with, other people encountered in remote or dangerous situations is a 
much more common, not to mention sensible, behaviour than shooting at them. 
If we continue with the workshop metaphor employed by Heidegger, we can see that there are 
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different  kinds  of  workshops,  for  instance  carpenter’s  workshops,  metalwork  shops,  or 
automotive mechanics,  which each have a particular  equipment  context  within the greater 
totality  of  equipment,  but  each  also  has  its  own  totality  of  equipment  within  its  own 
equipment context,  which limits  the kinds of concerns for which it is usable. If I go to a 
blacksmith’s with a collection of timber beams I would be able to very easily reduce them to 
ash, but I would have a hard time building a wardrobe. Similarly, videogames each have their  
own equipment context at the specific game level, as well as a more general context at a genre 
level, and perhaps even at the level of the medium of the videogame itself. We could even say 
that  Malaby’s  criticism of  the  normative  bias  inherent  in  the  play  concept  we  raised  in 
Chapter One is at basis a criticism of the equipment context of videogame, those uses that are 
conventionally  determined  to  be  ‘in-order-to’.  However,  with  each  of  these  shrinking 
‘workshop’ contexts  of  medium,  genre,  and specific  videogame the  totality  of  equipment 
within that context also shrinks, there are things the equipment can’t be used for that we might 
expect in a less constrained environment. And so Lara Croft, at least the version from the 
videogame, cannot negotiate, she also cannot build structures, give orders to troops, or kick a 
soccer  ball.  She can however run,  jump,  climb up ledges,  and fire  weapons – this  is  the 
totality of her equipment context.
Thus, as the intentions of the player are mediated by the restrictions implicit with the use of 
an avatarial stand-in, over time these restrictions in turn become embodied in the intentions 
and actions of the player who has come to realise the limits to their agency via the avatar. The 
result is a feedback loop between the embodied player embodying the avatar whose perceived 
limitations and capabilities are then embodied in the conduct of the player,  a process that 
could be posited as one basis  of the learning that  the  player  undertakes  to improve their 
performance in the videogame.40 Over time the player will become better aware of what the 
40 It should be noted that the feedback the player incorporates into their conduct raises the question of 
the extent of the influence or even control of the player's intentional concerns by the character. 
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capabilities and limitations of their avatar are, and thus have a better understanding of the 
possibilities offered by their avatar as a ready-to-hand extension of their body to act within the 
game-space. Thus the avatarial relationship “disregards representational traits in favour of the 
constitution  of  characters  as  sets  of  capabilities,  potentials  and  techniques  offered  to  the 
player.  The player utilises and embodies the character in the game-world”  (Newman "The 
Myth of the Ergodic Videogame" 8). Rather than the player internalising the logic and rules of 
the game, in Friedman’s well known terms, coming to “think like a computer” (Friedman 2), 
the player  through their experience of the process of embodying their avatar as a form of 
equipment establishes an immediate and phenomenological understanding of the potential of 
locus of manipulation to act in its environment, which is then reflected in their conduct during 
the  course  of  play.  This  incorporation  of  the  locus  of  manipulation  as  a  ready-to-hand 
extension of the player’s body facilitates the flow of the player’s intentionality into the game-
space, and it is now towards that game-space that we turn to consider, at a wider level, the 
particular intentional concerns the player may be directed towards within that game-space, or 
in other words what the locus of manipulation is employed ‘in-order-to’.
Playing Through/With/As
The relationship between the player  and their  locus of manipulation becomes increasingly 
complex if we acknowledge that for each player the experience of videogame play will be 
different as a result of individual preferences for styles of play and videogame activities, for 
as Flynn puts it “it is a mistake to think that there is only one type of player experience or 
form of engagement”  (Flynn 52). Though it is difficult to do justice to this wide range of 
Giddings and Kennedy approach this question from quite a different direction than is generally held 
within the field of videogame studies, critiquing the notion of player's gaining 'mastery' over the 
videogame to argue instead that player's must conform to the logic and requirements of the 
videogame they are playing, i.e. that in the end it is the game that controls the player (Giddings & 
Kennedy). While this is indeed an interesting perspective, I would argue that the playing with position 
developed in this chapter would suggest that the unexpected and unanticipated uses that players 
make of videogames demonstrates the primacy of the player's agency over that of the game's.
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experience  it  is  none-the-less  possible  to  establish  some  broad  categories  to  describe 
prominent points of difference by conceiving of model players that are suggested by particular 
qualities of the videogames they are playing “created by certain features of the game such as 
the  level  of  difficulty”  (Kücklich  "Perspectives  of  Computer  Game Philology"  7).  Perron 
provides a useful starting point by identifying three broad types of users of movie games41 – 
gamers,  players,  and  gameplayers  –  based  upon  different  attitudes  towards  the  kind  of 
experiences that are provided  (Perron 240). “The gamer goes for the challenge,” that is the 
gamer engages in ludic activities such as puzzle solving and exploration of the game-world 
towards the purpose of solving or completing the movie-game (Perron 242-44). By contrast, 
the player of the movie game is an observer disengaged from the game-space – “The role of 
the player is to react to story episodes, not to enact them” (Perron 246). Perron’s final type, 
the gameplayer, engages in a kind of metaplay that seeks to take the movie game to its limits  
and to uncover and exploit  its  inner workings, “to win a challenge that they have set  for 
themselves  of  their  own  free  will”  (Perron  253).  Though  Perron’s  types  are  derived 
specifically from a consideration of movie games, it is clear through his reference to specific 
videogames, such as  Grand Theft Auto III  (DMA Design Limited), that the distinctions he 
introduces between different attitudes and activities during the course of gameplay could be 
extended to videogames more generally.  In fact, we can take Perron’s types further, using 
them as a basis for considering how each relates to a particular relation between the player  
and their locus of manipulation in terms of embodiment and embodying as described above, 
based  around  the  intentional  concerns  a  particular  player  may  take  up  the  locus  of 
manipulation ‘in-order-to’. What follows is a discussion of these different positions of playing 
through, playing as, and playing with the locus of manipulation.
The  position  of  playing  through the  locus  of  manipulation  highlights  the  player’s  own 
41 Perron uses the term in preference to the more common terminology of interactive movies.
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embodiment outside of the game-space and indicates a pragmatic attitude towards the locus of 
manipulation, and by extension, the game-space more generally. The locus of manipulation is 
figured more as an avatar than a character, since the player has little interest in it apart from 
being the transducer with which their intentions and actions can be implemented within the 
game-space. This position of playing through the locus of manipulation is similar to Perron’s 
gamer  type,  as  the  player  is  primarily  engaged with  the  ludic  activities  such as  problem 
solving, exploration and competition. Juul would describe this in terms of the game contract,  
where the player’s behaviour is relatively shaped or influenced by the necessity of completing 
or  beating  the  game  (Juul  "The  Open  and  Closed:  Games  of  Emergence  and  Games  of 
Progression").  Recalling  Newman,  the  locus  of  manipulation  is  employed  simply  as 
equipment  with which to play the videogame,  which of course still  entails  the process of 
embodying the avatar.
Playing as the locus of manipulation represents quite a different type of engagement with a 
videogame which focuses more on the narrative and fictional possibilities presented by the 
character,  rather  than the ludic activities  and interests  that  occupy the position of playing 
through the locus of manipulation. Here the relationship between the player and their locus of 
manipulation becomes more complex, as depending on a range of factors, such as the visual 
perspective the videogame is presented in, the genre of the videogame being played, and the 
social context in which it is played, the locus of manipulation can tend towards functioning as 
either avatar or character – although more correctly both aspects will be involved to some 
degree. For example,  first person shooter videogames may tend more towards an avatarial 
relationship  between the  player  and their  locus  of  manipulation,  in  part  because  the first 
person perspective eliminates many of the visual cues often used in characterisation, and in 
part because narrative and characterisation are often secondary to the ludic aspects of the 
genre. Consequently,  an avatar based playing  as relationship relies on the player to play a 
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secondary  game of  make-believe  in  the  form of  role-play.   In  contrast,  party  based  role 
playing videogames such as the Final Fantasy series more strongly supports a character based 
playing as relationship, due to the focus on characterisation and narrative in such videogames. 
Finally,  there  is  the  situation  where  the  relationship  between  the  player  and  locus  of 
manipulation could be conceived of as being both avatarial and character-based. For example, 
many role playing videogames give their players considerable scope to create and develop 
their  locus  of  manipulation,  in  effect  making characterisation a  central  aspect  in  the 
experience of videogame play. The process of developing the locus of manipulation during 
such videogames could be considered as a process of the player developing the character that 
they then embody as an avatar, in effect “answering the question ‘who am I?’ as a character  
within the game world”  (Lindley 12). Of course,  the player  could also simply utilise this 
process  of characterisation for  the  completely  functional  end  of  making  their  locus  of 
manipulation as powerful as possible, playing through, rather than playing as.42 
Playing with the locus of manipulation is similar to Perron’s notion of the gameplayer, where 
the  player  engages  with  the  videogame  more  systematically  by  using  the  locus  of 
manipulation as an explicit point of access to play with the space and rules of the videogame 
in a more free form manner. Whereas playing through or as the locus of manipulation could 
be described as playing the videogame, playing with the locus of manipulation is in a sense 
playing with the videogame – of engaging with a videogame as “an irreducible complex of 
locations,  scenarios  and types  of  action”  (Newman  Videogames 138),  similar  to  the  way 
players of A Game of Marbles used it not so much as a videogame but as an interactive audio-
visual work. An example of playing with the locus of manipulation is given by Jakobsson and 
Pargman’s  case study on subversive player  strategies  in  the  massively  multiplayer  online 
42 In fact there is even a term for this approach ‘min-maxing’, where the player tries to maximise their 
avatar’s skills in the areas they think are important by strongly cutting back on skills considered not 
relevant.
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videogame (MMO)  Project Entropia. These  strategies  attempt  to  subvert  the  developer’s 
‘pay-to-play’ micropayment income model, where any in-game currency earned by a player 
will fall short of the costs of maintaining the tools that afford that income  (Jakobsson and 
Pargman 3). The player’s strategies identified by Jakobsson and Pargman to circumvent this 
business  model  range  from  simple  tactics  exploiting  programming  flaws  in  enemy  AI, 
through to complex undertakings which they describe as research projects that seek to “open 
the blackbox” and understand the algorithms running the game (Jakobsson and Pargman 4). 
An extreme example of such research projects is provided by an external simulation program 
that  estimates,  much like  an economic  model,  the best  return on investment  for  different 
player strategies (Jakobsson and Pargman),43 that player’s can use to maximise their returns.  
A different style of playing with the locus of manipulation arises in what are often described 
as sandbox videogames,  where there are  no prescribed winning conditions,  or at  least  no 
requirement to attend to them. This style of free-play, or paidia as it is often described, can 
take many forms, and can occur even within videogames that were not designed specifically 
with this type of activity in mind. Warthog jumping, the activity of using grenades and other 
explosive devices on the indestructible warthog vehicles from Halo: Combat Evolved (Bungie 
Studios) to launch them high into the air is one example, as is the actions of the player of 
Gran Turismo (Polyphony Digital), who, becoming bored with racing, decides rather to do 
burnouts or drive the wrong way around the racetrack to cause accidents. Though these two 
examples might seem quite dissimilar, at their core both demonstrate common dynamic – the 
player's intentional orientation has moved beyond the ludic sphere of winning or progressing 
within the game to instead make use of the potential of the locus of manipulation for their  
own purposes.  Such free  use  of  a  videogame as  a manipulable system strongly suggests 
43 Another MMO, Eve Online, is sometimes jokingly referred to as ‘spreadsheet’ or ‘excel’ online, due 
to the extensive logistical efforts required of committed players of the game to build and maintain 
multi-group alliances.
193
Eskelinen’s  description  of  playing  videogames  as  a  configurative  practice  (Eskelinen),  a 
practice that arguably extends to related, but non game playing activities, such as amateur 
level  design  and  game  modification.  Though  there  is  a  clear  relationship  between  the 
positions of playing through and with, as both rely on the use of a locus of manipulation as 
equipment that supports a particular activity, the difference is primarily one of degree. Playing 
with the locus of manipulation entails a wider view of what a particular videogame can be 
used for, in effect a more sophisticated understanding of the affordances of that videogame 
beyond  its  ludic  potentials  and  employing  the  locus  of  manipulation  towards  intentional 
concerns beyond simply ‘playing the game’.
These distinctions are presented here not to claim that these attitudes are mutually exclusive 
nor that  each individual  player  could be categorised as one type  or another,  but rather  to 
articulate  how  differences  in  the  relationship  between  the  player  and  their  locus  of 
manipulation can underpin different attitudes to the activity of playing a videogame, and how 
different intentional concerns underpin varying experiences of videogame play. The particular 
nature of the relationship between the player and their locus of manipulation is decided by the 
player themselves, according to their particular attitudes, intentions, and motivations at the 
time. Take, for instance, the analysis of avatar relations by Linderoth that identified a complex 
relationship between the players observed in his study and their loci of manipulation. These 
relationships frequently shifted between that of the player taking on the character as a role to 
play, as a tool that extends the players’ agency, and as a prop for self presentation (Linderoth 
9). Though taking on the character as role is quite similar to what is described here as playing 
as, and the use of the character as a tool is similarly comparable to playing through, the use of 
the  locus  of  manipulation  for  self  presentation  could  be  associated  with  both  positions 
dependent on the particular nature of presentation,  for instance presentations of skill or of 
fictional personas. Social context can be an important determinate of the choice between an 
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avatarial  or  character-based  relationship,  as  evidenced  by  the  existence  of  both  standard 
servers  and  ‘role-playing’  servers  for  online  games  such  a  World  of  Warcraft (Blizzard 
Entertainment), where the former is primarily focused on ludic activities,  whilst the latter 
focuses more on role-playing in a more literal sense. Both types of servers ‘serve’ different, 
though not entirely unrelated, intentional concerns, and similarly the way in which player’s 
embody their locus of manipulations by incorporating them as a ready-to-hand extension of 
their bodily schema would also be different.
Being-in-the-Game-World
Given  the  relationship  between  the  embodied  player  and  their  locus  of  manipulation  – 
considered to be co-temporously a character embodied by its own constitution as  well as an 
avatar that embodies the intentions and actions of the player – and the consideration of the 
player’s  intentional  concerns  and the  fluidity  with  which  they  can  shift,  it  is  possible  to 
describe how the player of a videogame can experience a sense of being-in-the-game-world. 
This  is  “a  phenomenological  impression  of  immersion  in  the  gamescape”  (King  and 
Krzywinska  114),  or  sense  of  being  present  within  the  game-space.  To consider  to  what 
degree an ‘impression’ of immersion is experienced by the player requires a reflection of what 
is meant  by the term ‘immersion’,  particularly with reference to associated terms such as 
presence and engagement.  The concept  of  immersion  has  had a  problematic  employment 
within the field of videogame studies, in part because different researchers have used the word 
to describe similar but distinct phenomena, and in part due to the wider connotations the word 
brings into play, as Calleja argues the notion of immersion “places a hard division between 
the represented environment on one side of the screen and the human operator on the other, 
which  gives  rise  to  an  equally  problematic  implication  of  the  operator's  plunge  into  the 
environment” (Calleja 254). In consequence Calleja proposes that the metaphor of immersion 
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be  replaced  with  what  he  describes  as  that  of  incorporation,  “a  double  metaphor: 
incorporating  (in  the  sense  of  assimilation  or  internalization)  the  environment  while 
reincorporating (in the sense of corporeal embodiment) the player through the avatar in that 
environment”  (Calleja  255).  While  Calleja's  notion  of  'incorporation'  successfully 
acknowledges  the  importance  of  both  the  bodily  dimensions  of  the  phenomena  of 
experiencing  a  sense of  presence  within  the  game-space  and of  the  role  of  the  avatar  or 
character as providing a locus for that sense of presence, the word incorporation itself has 
some limitations for the phenomenological approach being developed here. Specifically,  it 
lacks a sense of communicating the nature of experience itself, the feeling of presence within 
the game-space, such that while being insightful as a analytical tool it lacks the descriptive 
power to invoke the experience itself.
A common shortcoming with the notion of immersion is the tendency to understand it  as 
emerging from or contingent upon the properties of particular videogames in themselves. For 
example, for King and Kryzwinska, immersion seems to be simply associated with sensation, 
leading to conclusions that are ostensibly commonsense, yet fail to stand up to scrutiny. Their 
example  of virtual  reality,  where the experience  is  thought to be more immersive simply 
because the user’s visual field is surrounded by computer generated images, is perhaps the 
clearest case of such sense based assumptions. As Ermi and Mäyrä point out “It is often taken 
for granted that a bigger screen and better quality audio equal greater immersion” (Ermi and 
Mäyrä 4). Similar assumptions, based upon degrees of visual realism, underwrite King and 
Krzywinska’s claims that first person perspective videogames are inherently more immersive 
than third person perspective videogames, or that three dimensions are always superior to two 
in terms of immersion  (King and Krzywinska 114-17). For instance, King and Krzywinska 
argue that “Distinctions between degrees of presence are closely correlated with differences in 
the visual  perspective  provided on the game-world”  (King and Krzywinska 113),  without 
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actually providing any evidence which verifies the claim. King and Krzywinska’s claims are 
qualified to an extent by their recognition that three dimensional first person games with a 
high degree of visual reality still contain non-immersive features such as health bars and the 
like,  or  that  there  are  other  factors  such  as  “Compelling  and  well  balanced  gameplay 
activities, [. . .] the degree of consistency with which the game-world is constructed and how 
the player can act in and act on the virtual environment” that also contribute to an impression 
of immersion  (King and Krzywinska 116-17). However, the time and detail they spend in 
discussing  impressions  of  immersion  based on sensation  alone  as  opposed to  the  limited 
treatment given to arising from other sources suggests an underlying tendency to assume a 
primacy  of  sensation,  particularly  visual  sensation,  suggesting  again  an  overly  occularist 
understanding of the experience of videogame play in terms of immersion. 
As King and Krzywinska do not explicitly state what they mean by ‘sensation’, we can only 
assume that they are using the term in the everyday sense where it  describes the process 
through which we become passively aware of the basic qualities of things in the world, and 
this is perhaps where the shortcoming of their approach to the phenomenon of experiencing a 
sense of presence in the game-space arises from. By separating sense experience from the 
wider phenomenological experience of videogame play as a whole, King and Krzywinska 
overlook the constituting role played by the player in establishing a sense of presence in the 
game-world. As Merleau-Ponty argues, “Sense experience, [. . .] invests the quality with vital 
value, grasping it first in its meaning for us, for that heavy mass which is our body, whence it  
comes about that it always involves a reference to the body” (Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology 
of Perception 61). Thus the player’s sense experience in their experience of videogame play is 
more than simply a reception of higher or lower levels of visual realism presented on screen 
but something that projects the player into an active relation to that which is sensed and what 
it  means  for  the  player  in  the  context  of  their  experience  of  videogame  play,  “It  is  the 
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intentional  tissue  which  the  effort  to  know  will  try  to  take  apart”  (Merleau-Ponty 
Phenomenology  of  Perception 61).  It  is  this  sense  of  active  engagement  through  sense 
experience  in  the  unfolding  course  of  videogame  play  that  is  lacking  in  King  and 
Krzywinska’s approach, for "Sense experience, thus detached from the affective and motor 
functions,  became  the  mere  reception  of  a  quality”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of 
Perception 64). This approach assumes a player  who uncritically experiences  the depicted 
game-space  as  in  some  way  real  and  unmediated  purely  on  the  extent  of  its  visual 
verisimilitude, and presumes that the primary value of playing a videogame arises from an 
impression of being transported into the world of the videogame. King and Krzywinska seem 
to  adhere  to  a  vague  model  of  ‘suspension  of  disbelief’  of  players’  experience  within 
videogame play,  further suggested by their description of the phenomenon they discuss as 
“The illusion of presence or immersion” (King and Krzywinska 117), an approach that Salen 
and Zimmerman have rightly criticised as the ‘immersive fallacy’ of garden variety escapism 
(Salen and Zimmerman Rules of Play 450). While there is no doubt that many players play as 
a diversion from the stresses and worries of everyday life, it seems unlikely that the departure  
sought  from  their  everyday  concerns  is  realised  simply  through  a  type  of  immersive 
experience based primarily on the visual qualities of the videogame being played, and very 
little  on  their  ability  to  act  towards  the  intentional  concerns  within  the  space  of  that 
videogame with which they have taken it up ‘in-order-to’.
To demonstrate the shortcomings of focusing too heavily on visual verisimilitude let us take 
as an example the videogame Command Aces of the Deep (Dynamix), a submarine warfare 
simulator set in the North Atlantic area during World War Two. Various visual perspectives 
are used within the videogame for particular tasks, for example the periscope quite obviously 
employs  a  first  person  perspective,  while  what  could  be  interpreted  as  a  first  person 
perspective is used to portray the strangely empty control room where players can click on 
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different areas to access different tasks. An overhead nautical-style map view is also used to 
provide the player information on their location and the location of nearby ships in real-time, 
whilst schematics and other non-diegetic views are used to operate systems such as damage 
control and torpedo loading. In my own experience of playing the videogame, sailing along 
looking through the periscope is definitely an engaging experience, but the moments of most 
intensive engagement occur when my access to the game-space is restricted purely to the 
interior of the ship, particularly the map, all of which is presented in a two-dimensional and 
often non-first person perspective – the very situation that King and Krzywinska argue should 
be the most distancing, as it should fall far “short of being truly immersive in terms of sensory 
perceptions”  (King and Krzywinska 117). This situation arises when immersed deep below 
the surface to try and escape pursuing warships, and thus deprived of use of the periscope, the 
player’s only sources of dynamic information on the likely death about to rain down on them 
is the map screen and the insistent sonar pings with which the enemy ships are trying to locate 
them.  In this situation the player is at a disadvantage in many ways, for instance they are 
often outnumbered, the pursuing warships are much faster than the player’s submarine, and 
the warships are more powerfully armed. Thus the situation is something like a cat and mouse 
game where the player must manoeuvre carefully and astutely to survive. 
Though the inherent difficulty of such moments accounts for some of the intense sense of 
presence it engenders, there is also an eerie sense of being-there, in that what is provided by 
the  videogame  is  not  dissimilar  to  what  would  have  been  available  to  an  actual  U-boat 
commander, not withstanding a map that updates itself in real-time.44 However, in the moment 
to  moment  unfolding  of  experience  in  such situations,  it  is  the  whole-hearted  attempt  to 
escape the pursuing warships through the actions taken that is at the core of the experience of 
‘being-there’,  despite  the  low level  of  visual  verisimilitude  even with  its  vague sense  of 
44 It could be argued perhaps that the real-time map is an abstraction or approximation of what a sonar 
operator and navigator could have provided, but that is beyond the point being made here.
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accordance  between  the  situation  present  in  the  videogame  and the  historical  situation  it 
simulates.  The  player’s  sensory  experiences  involved  in  their  experience  of  playing 
Command Aces of the Deep is significant not simply for the reception of the qualities of the 
game-space they make present to the player but rather for the way in which they make the 
game-space available to the player as a space in which to take action towards their intentional 
concerns,  making  those  qualities  meaningful  for  the  player  within  the  context  of  the 
experience of videogame play. The relatively limited amount of visual information available 
to the player combined with the complex tactical manoeuvres during their attempt to escape 
the pursuing warship requires a focused engagement on the part of the player where sensory 
experience is but a part of the wider experience of play.
This  is  not to  argue the relative  merits  of  different  kinds  of ‘realism’,  whether  based on 
sensory perception or historically consistent situations,  but merely to demonstrate  that the 
heavy  emphasis  on  visual  perception  that  imbues  King  and  Krzywinska’s  approach  to 
understanding the experience of feeling present within the game-space does not stand up to 
scrutiny,  and  thus  falls  short  of  accounting  for  the  experience  of  a  videogame  as  it  is 
experienced. Whilst it seems commonsense to assume that higher levels of visual acuity that 
more closely resemble our natural perception of the world would naturally lead to a higher 
degree of that feeling of being-there, what we have uncovered is a more complicated nexus 
between  player  and  videogame  that  relies  on  the  player  being  willing,  or  even  feeling 
compelled, to take up the experience of videogame play as something more than something 
simply happening on screen that they are watching but rather an activity with which they are 
fully engaged in. In other words, it requires the player to take up the locus of manipulation as 
something ‘in-order-to’ experience a sense of being present in the game-space.45 It is precisely 
45 Despite the criticism of King and Krzywinska's focus on visual sensation as the basis of the 
experience of being-in-the-game-world, the slightly more nuanced position that increased visual 
verisimilitude might increase the likelihood of a player taking up the locus of manipulation as 
something in-order-to have that experience, may have some merit. 
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the lack of detailed or ‘realistic’ visual information that makes the experience, in my own case 
at least, of the situation in Command Aces of the Deep described above imbued with a strong 
sense  of  presence,  of  being-in-the-game-world,  “a  phenomenological  impression  of 
immersion  in  the  gamescape”  (King  and  Krzywinska  114).  It  may  not  be  a  fully  three 
dimensional  first  person perspective videogame at all  times,  yet  it  provides a first-person 
experience. However, I would not expect everyone to experience the same sense of being-in-
the-game-world  for  the  intricate  tactics  needed  to  escape  the  pursuing  warships  may  not 
engage other players as it engages me. Nor for that matter are other aspects of Command Aces  
of the Deep as compelling – after all the North Atlantic Ocean is a rather large place, and 
spending half an hour of my real time, though that may translate into hours if not days within 
the game-space, fruitlessly searching for convoys can be rather boring and disappointing.
Given that sensory experience alone cannot account for the experience of being-in-the-game-
world we must turn to conceptualisations of the experience that take a more holistic approach. 
McMahan’s definition of immersion presents a more robust understanding that identifies three 
key features of an impression of immersion – “(1) the user’s expectations of the game or 
environment must match the environment’s conventions fairly closely; (2) the user’s actions 
must have a non-trivial impact on the environment; and (3) The conventions of the world 
must be consistent” (McMahan 68-69). The conditions that McMahan establishes suggest that 
the type of immersion she is describing generally accords to the position of playing  as the 
locus of manipulation described earlier, that is, of regarding the environment in which the 
videogame is played as a internally consistent world, regardless of the technical manner in 
which it  is presented. Whilst  McMahan’s conditions explicitly relate  to virtual reality and 
three dimensional video games  (McMahan 68), the conditions themselves suggest that the 
scope is in fact much broader, for example they could be applied to a child’s game of make 
believe, or even to the many institutions and rituals that Huizinga identified as having a play-
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like  basis,  where  the  restrictions  imposed  upon  the  activity  are  accepted  as  part  of  its 
experience  (Huizinga).  Importantly,  McMahan  identifies  immersion  as  a  narrative 
phenomenon, associated with the player’s involvement with the diegetic level of a videogame. 
In fact there is very little in McMahan’s conditions to give a sense of gameness, of challenge 
and competition, at all. Rather, she accords these element to the experience of engagement, 
which is “the level of gaining points, devising winning (or at least spectacular) strategy, and 
showing off their  [the player’s]  prowess to other players  during the game and afterward” 
(McMahan 69). There is clearly a link here to what has been described above as playing 
through the locus of manipulation, as the player is concerned primarily with the ludic qualities 
of the videogame being played, rather than with the narrative content or the possibility of 
taking up a role in a world of make believe.
McMahan describes these experiences of immersion and engagement as aspects of a third 
term, presence, which she defines as the sense of experiencing mediated space as unmediated 
(McMahan 79, 72). A more detailed definition is given by Steuer, who distinguishes between 
presence and telepresence (Steuer 75-76).46 Presence describes the sense of the experience of 
one’s environment, based on the perception of that environment rather than the environment 
as  it  objectively  exists,  while  telepresence  refers  to  “the  experience  of  presence  in  an 
environment by means of a communication medium” (Steuer 75-76). McMahan discards this 
differentiation  between  the  perceptually  and  communicatively  mediated  senses  of  being 
within an environment  due to the latter  being used mostly in discussions of teleoperation 
applications  such as  endoscopic  surgery and other  contexts  of  utility  (McMahan 72,  77). 
While there is some merit  to this position, for our purpose here, addressing as we are the 
46 It should be noted that in some contexts 'telepresence' is used to refer to situations where human 
communication is mediated, such as in the case of a telephone conversation, which is one of the 
examples used by Steuer. In the context of this thesis however focuses on the usage of the term that 
causes McMahan to reject the differentiation between the presence and telepresence, specifically the 
use of the later in contexts regarding teleoperation applications.
202
communicatively  mediated  experience  of  presence  within  the  game-space,  discarding  the 
distinction that articulates the difference between two related but clearly distinct experiences 
may lead to unnecessary confusion. As such, both terms will be retained here to differentiate 
between the player’s sense of being within their own world, and any sense of their being-in-
the-game-world. It is considered particularly important, given that telepresence is described 
by Steuer in terms that suggest that is a sort of perceptual illusion (Steuer 76), to retain the 
term to emphasize that a sense of presence in general is a subjective,  perceptually and/or 
communicatively mediated experience – reinforcing the distinction made earlier between the 
player’s own embodiment and their act of embodying the character, and being embodied by 
the avatar, in their relation to the locus of manipulation.
What then determines the player’s experience of being-in-the-game-world, or of experiencing 
a sense of telepresence? Steuer describes three main factors that may affect the experience of 
telepresence – vividness, and interactivity,  which refer to properties of the communication 
medium, and the personality of individual users of that communication medium (Steuer 80). 
Vividness refers to the sensory quality,  both in terms of the quality and variety of sensory 
stimuli, while interactivity “refers to the degree to which users of a medium can influence the 
form or content of the mediated environment” (Steuer 81,84). Though the formal properties of 
a particular videogame and its underlying technological platform doubtlessly has some effect 
on the player’s experience, as the earlier discussion on how the player’s conduct comes to 
embody, over time, the limitations of their locus of manipulation, it is arguably the player’s 
own preferences and attitudes that are the most prominent determinate of their experience of 
videogame play, including any sense of telepresence. As Leino argues, “The acceptance of the 
existence of these structures as something delineating a subjective experience, does not force 
one to accept that they all are identical to all players of the same game or to one player’s each 
separate playing of one game”  (Leino "Feeling So Real - a Phenomenological Exploration 
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into the Realities of Emotions in Play" 7). Given that different players can have different 
value  judgments  about  the  same  videogame,  or  even enjoy different  types  of  experience 
during play of the same videogame, this would suggest that all else being equal, in the end it  
is the player’s particular preferences that will determine whether they experience a sense of 
telepresence,  of  being-in-the-game-world,  during  the  course  of  their  play  of  a  particular 
videogame.  As it  is the player’s experience of play that we are primarily focused on, we 
should  now turn  to  investigating  the  role  played  by the  preferences  and  personalities  of 
different  players  on their  experience  of  videogame play.  Importantly,  the preferences  and 
personality  of a  particular  player  will  have implications  for the intentional  concerns  with 
which they take up the experience of videogame play, in the terminology of Heidegger what 
they take up the videogame as ‘in-order-to’.
If the player’s own preferences are important as contended here, it is valid to ask the nature of 
these  preferences,  specifically,  whether  these  preferences  are  fixed  or  dynamic,  and  if 
dynamic  how they may be affected by a range of different factors acting on the player’s 
motivations. Bartle was perhaps the earliest researcher to consider what motivates players, 
distinguishing four types, and though such a broad typology cannot completely account for 
the  range of  individual  player  preferences,  for  our  purposes  they can serve as  categories 
suggesting the different intentional concerns that underlie these motivations. The four types 
Bartle describes are those that play for achievement within the ludic context (achievers), those 
that explore the game (explorers),47 those that play for the social aspect (socialisers), and those 
that  play  to  prey  on  other  players  (killers)  (Bartle).  Though  his  thoughts  arose  out  of 
observation of and discussion with players  of multi-user dungeon,  as Aarseth argues “his 
model works well with other types of games, and even beyond, with phenomena such as web 
47 It should be noted that this doesn’t just mean the geography of the game-world, but also those who 
search for bugs, exploits, and interesting rule interactions, congruent with what we earlier described as 
playing with the locus of manipulation.
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portals”  (Aarseth "Playing Research:  Methodological  Approaches  to  Game Analysis"  4).48 
According to Bartle: 
Naturally, these areas cross over, and players will often drift between 
all four, depending on their mood or current playing style. However, 
my experience having observed players in the light of this research 
suggests that many (if not most) players do have a primary style, and 
will  only  switch  to  other  styles  as  a  (deliberate  or  subconscious) 
means to advance their main interest. (Bartle)
Though it would seem commonsense that players have a general primary motivation to play 
videogames, it does not necessarily follow that recourse to other styles is in fact subordinate 
to their primary motivation at a deeper level – perhaps a explorer just wants to hang out and 
chat,  or has had a bad day and feels like letting off some steam by attacking some other 
players, or perhaps they have just gotten bored of freeform exploration and want to undertake 
some more structured achievement type activities? Furthermore, there is no underlying reason 
for there to be only four types, for as Yee points out “There is no reason why people would 
fall naturally into 4, 8 or even 16 buckets, and there is no reason why someone should be 
excluded from the Achiever bucket just because they fall into the Socializer bucket” (Yee). In 
fact,  after  performing  quantitative  research  into  player  motivation,  Yee  arrived  at  six 
statistically significant factors, or clusters of statements on motivation,  which interestingly 
didn’t include the exploration motivations of Bartle’s original model (Yee).
However, Yee’s results are only of limited relevance to the model developed by this thesis, in 
part  because  of  Yee’s  focus  on  massively  multiplayer  online  games  (MMOs).  MMOs, 
arguably, tend to emphasise different types of motivations than single player or smaller scale 
multiplayer  videogames due to their more complex social  dynamics,  but more importantly 
Yee’s study was focused more on the link between motivation and demographics than the 
48 Indeed, Bartle’s model has been influential enough to spawn its own online personality test, The 
Bartle Test of Gamer Psychology - http://www.gamerdna.com/quizzes/bartle-test-of-gamer-
psychology. 
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relation  between  player  and  their  locus  of  manipulation  that  we  have  focused  on  here. 
Linderoth’s  insights,  which we have already mentioned briefly in discussing the different 
ways  in  which players  relate  to  their  locus  of manipulation,  provides  a  perspective  more 
relevant to our interests here, relying as it does on the different ways in which players frame 
their relation to their locus of manipulation. Importantly, these frames were not fixed over the 
entire course of the play sessions Linderoth observed, but rather changed from moment to 
moment to deal with and express different kinds of experience that arose during the course of 
play. Indeed, Linderoth notes that certain statements made by the observed players “can only 
be understood if we have parallel frames at work” (Linderoth 7). This is particularly clear in 
one passage noted by Linderoth where one of the players “makes the statement that she is 
dead and when she realize [sic] that it is not possible to make a comment about your own 
death when you are dead, the situation becomes comical” (Linderoth 7). In this example we 
find a player who is, through the phenomena of telepresence, experiencing a sense of being-
in-the-game-world  only  to  realise  this  in  retrospect  when  she  becomes  aware  of  the 
ontological paradox her statement has created. 
However,  as  with  Yee’s  study  of  player  motivations,  the  usefulness  of  Linderoth’s 
observations for our purposes are limited by his particular focus, namely showing that the 
relationship between player and locus of manipulation is more complex than simply a process 
of identification, that “Avatars can have a role in identity formation, not in the mystified sense 
of being ‘alternate’ personalities, but rather as a potential resource for the child’s presentation 
of the self in the social context at hand” (Linderoth 1).  As this concern diverges to a degree 
from our interest here in the experience of being-in-the-game-world, though there is some 
useful points we can take from it, we must draw upon research that is more closely aligned to 
our  present  concerns,  in  other  words  the  relation  between  the  player  and  their  locus  of 
manipulation.  Carr  et  al  note  that  in  their  research  into  the  activities  of  players  of  the 
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Oddworld:
Broad  examples  of  ‘personal  agency’  were  found  in  users’  non-
instrumental practices that, rather than being goal-orientated, focus on 
embodying,  ‘being’  and  acting  out  the  repertoires  of  behaviours 
attached to primal, alien characters. Personal agency was also found in 
examples of how users pause and take full advantage of the interactive 
environment created by developers, rather than seeing it as a means to 
an end — choosing to exist within it. (Carr et al. 28)
There is a strong resonance in the above quote to the positions of playing as and playing with, 
respectively,  that  we  put  forward  earlier.  This  resonance  is  only  emphasised  by  their 
observations of different player responses to Final Fantasy VII, describing how “each player 
tended  to  ‘make  sense’  of  the  game  world  according  to  their  own  competencies  and 
preferences, and the ‘affordances’ of the game-as-text”  (Carr et al. 22). This included such 
contrasting sense making as strong narrative immersion, a disregard for the story presumably 
in favour of ludic activities, as an interesting environment to be explored, and of a custodial 
relationship with the characters that make up the party that the player has control over (Carr et 
al. 22). This range of responses touches on the three relationships between the player and their 
locus of manipulation mentioned earlier, from playing  through to enjoying the combat and 
exploration activities provided by the particular game, playing as the locus of manipulation to 
experience the videogame as a narrative, or playing with by using the videogame as simply a 
space to be explored regardless of other ludic or narrative activities. What is striking about 
these comments by Carr et al is the multitude of ways in which players of each videogame 
responded to  them and took  them up as  different  types  of  activities.  These  observations 
strongly support the argument made here that any sense of being-in-the-game-world relies 
primarily not on the videogame being played, but rather on the attitudes and the expectations 
of the player. Hence, it would seem that more powerful than a first person perspective is a 
feeling of first hand participation, where the sense of being-in-the-game-world arises from the 
player’s  ability  to control  the locus of manipulation  (Newman "The Myth of the Ergodic 
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Videogame" 6), and by extension their experience of the game, rather than the emphasis on 
sensory immersion within the game-world that King and Krzywinska focus on. 
Conclusion
In this chapter we have argued that a phenomenological experience of presence in the game-
space experienced by the player during the course of videogame play is not simply a case of 
‘suspension  of  disbelief’  style  immersion,  but  rather  a  multi-faceted  phenomenon  that  is 
affected  not  only  by  the  formal  properties  of  the  videogame  being  played,  such  as  its 
representational  quality  or  degree  of  interactivity,  but  also  on  the  particular  attitude  and 
personality of the player. Importantly, it was argued that the player’s attitude was not fixed 
but  varied,  therefore  the  experience  of  being-in-the-game-world  for  any particular  player 
depends  predominately  on  the  intentional  orientation  they  take  towards  the  activities  a 
specific videogame affords, and from how that intentional orientation is influenced, in turn, 
by the limitations of the locus of manipulation. Furthermore, though the sense of ‘being there’ 
may seem to be a direct experience of the game-space for the sufficiently competent player, it 
is intrinsically mediated by the complex relationship between the player and their locus of 
manipulation,  a  relationship  that  can  be  articulated  through  the  distinction  between 
embodiment as a state of being and embodying as an act, as it applies to both player and their 
locus  of  manipulation.  The  locus  of  manipulation  concurrently  embodies  the  player’s 
intentions as their avatar within the game-space, and limits the possible actions to the suite of 
characteristics,  functions,  and  narrative  background  that  constitutes  them as  a  separately 
embodied  character.  This  is  to  say  that  the  player’s  experience  of  ‘being  there’  is  an 
experience of telepresence, a communicatively mediated sense of being present in the game-
space, that is mediated not only through the technical apparatus, but also through the abilities 
and limitations of their locus of manipulation which the player embodies within the game-
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space. The reason the sufficiently competent player is not consciously aware of this mediation 
during the course of play is due to the locus of manipulation being taken up as a ready-to-
hand extension of the player’s body schema, and thus withdrawn from the player’s immediate 
concern,  through  a  learning  process  that  negotiates  the  two  aspects  of  the  locus  of 
manipulation, namely the avatar and the character.
Thus, the player’s relationship with their locus of manipulation cannot be characterized as 
simply the unidirectional flow of the player’s intentionality into the game-space with the locus 
of manipulation acting as a mute conduit, but rather as a process of feedback, adjustment, and 
adaptation  between  the  player’s  intentional  concern  and  the  limitations  of  the  locus  of 
manipulation,  where  the  player  internalises  the  restriction  of  the  character  into  their  own 
conduct. To put it another way, as they begin to embody the limitations of the character in 
their own conduct they refine their intentional concern. Yet, crucial  to this process, is the 
intent with which the player  takes up the locus of manipulation,  or in the terminology of 
Heidegger, what does the player take up the locus of manipulation ‘in-order-to’? The player’s 
embodied relationship with their locus of manipulation expressed by this assignment of an 
‘in-order-to’ to a ‘towards-this’ thus suggests the direction in which their videogame play 
experience will tend. An orientation towards the avatar aspect of the locus of manipulation, an 
assignment of the locus of manipulation as ‘in-order-to’ play the game, would tend towards a 
ludic focus on goals and achievement, whereas an orientation towards character, where the 
locus of manipulation is assigned as ‘in-order-to’ experience the game-world’s story, would 
tend towards a fictive focus on narrative and character development, whether this is by taking 
up a prefigured character  or by developing one.  Of course,  these tendencies  shouldn’t  be 
thought of as an either/or polarity, as the experience of videogame play for many players is 
likely to draw upon both, at least at different times, if not to differing degrees, concurrently. 
In fact, they are interdependent to a degree, as the videogame must be played to access the 
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story, whilst the story provides a supporting context to make sense of the action that occurs 
during the playing of the videogame – a particular player may have an overriding individual  
preference for one or the other, but neither can be completely eluded, and so the locus of 
manipulation maintains its complex nature as part avatar, part character. A third tendency, 
disengaged  from either  the  fictive  or  ludic  aspects  of  a  videogame,  is  engaged  with  the 
videogame as an interactive object that can be exploited for a range of possible uses. This 
suggests a more pragmatic attitude on behalf of the player, one that approaches the videogame 
as an open scenario. This third tendency seems to be intentionally aimed towards the game-
space itself as much as the locus of manipulation, and concerns itself with how the locus of 
manipulation can be used to push the bounds of the game-world, to discover the game-world 
by discovering what can be done within it. 
In this chapter we have considered the player’s relation to the locus of manipulation as an 
interface as it operates within the game-space. We have examined how the player’s relation to 
their locus of manipulation, in particular the different types of relation between the figures of 
the  avatar  and the  character,  as  well  as  the  broad intentional  concerns  the  player  adopts 
towards the locus of manipulation ‘in-order-to’ within the game-space, can be employed to 
describe and articulate the experience of videogame play. The next chapter aims to take these 
insights, along with those that arose with regards to the tangible interface in Chapter Four and 
interfaces more generally in Chapter Three, to consider the experience of videogame play as 
an experiential whole, rather than focusing upon particular aspects of that experience as we 
have done.  Of particular  concern is  the process of embodiment  through which the player 
incorporates the interface as a ready-to-hand extension of their bodily schema, extending their 
body and intentionality into the game-space, and as a consequence experiencing a sense of 
being present within the game-world. To examine this we turn towards a phenomenon of the 
experience of videogame not yet addressed, though we have mentioned it in passing – that 
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strange  sensation  of  actual  bodily  movement  that  can  arise  as  part  of  the  experience  of 
videogame play.
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CHAPTER SIX:
 MOVEMENT, MOTILITY, AND PRESENCE
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Over the last several chapters we have sought to investigate the player’s phenomenological 
experience of videogame play through a close examination of their relation to the interface. In 
Chapter Three we asked the questions of what and where is the interface, and in exploring 
these questions developed an understanding which goes beyond the common and limited view 
of  the  interface  as  simply  the  physical  devices  such  as  keyboards  and  screens  and  the 
representational elements of the graphical user interface, such as onscreen menus or buttons. 
Instead, we developed a deeper understanding of the concept of the interface as the site of a 
complex embodied relation between player and videogame, and thus central to the player’s 
experience of videogame play.  We argued that  the location and nature of the interface  is 
ambiguous, in that the player’s bodily incorporation of the interface, by taking it up as ready-
to-hand, blurs the boundary between player and interface to the extent that it becomes difficult 
to posit a separation between them during the course of play, as experientially the interface 
withdraws from the player’s  immediate  concern and becomes something they act through 
rather  than  upon.  Furthermore,  the  incorporation  of  the  interface  into  the  player’s  bodily 
schema and its resultant withdrawal from the player’s immediate concern necessarily leads to 
the extension of the player’s body through the interface into the world of the videogame.  
Chapters Four and Five explored the implications of this alternative concept of the interface, 
the former demonstrating that though central to the player’s experience the physical aspects of 
the interface withdraws from the player’s immediate concern as it becomes ready-to-hand, 
and that the consequence of this withdrawal is the flow of the player’s intentional concern into 
the  game-world  through  the  interface  such  that  the  player  experiences  a  sense  of  direct 
interaction with the action on-screen, even though it is mediated by the physical aspects of the 
interface.  Chapter  Five  argued that  the flow of  the player’s  intentional  concerns  into  the 
game-space that accompanies the withdrawal of the physical aspects of the interface becomes 
centred in, and thus further mediated by, a deeper level of the interface which was described 
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as the player’s locus of manipulation, which, like the physical interface, can be taken up by 
the player as equipment that is ready-to-hand. That is to say, that the player embodies the 
locus of manipulation in that it becomes an extension of the player’s body, while concurrently 
the player also comes to embody the limitations of the locus of manipulation in their own 
conduct as the locus of manipulation is taken up as equipment as something ‘in-order-to’. 
Thus, the player’s intentional concern flows into the game-space, and the interaction of the 
player’s intentional concerns with the potentials and limitations of action that the locus of 
manipulation affords the player in the game-space leads to the embodiment of those potentials 
and limitations in the intentional concern of the player as they learn, over time, the range of 
uses the locus of manipulation can be used ‘in-order-to’. This process of adjustment of the 
player’s intentional concern was described as making up part of what we termed a process of 
mutual embodiment between the player, and the locus of manipulation, as it operates largely 
at  a  preconscious  corporeal  level,  which  furthermore  makes  it  possible  for  the  player  to 
experience a sense of directly acting within the game-space, and as such experiencing a sense 
of presence within the game-space.
Our concern in this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, whether this process of mutual embodiment of 
the interface into the body, and the extension of the body into the game-space through the 
locus of manipulation, can account for the experience of play in all its richness and variety, 
that is, as an experiential whole? In a sense this question is intended not merely to set up an 
activity of verifying our conclusions so far, but rather to bring these conclusions together to 
help account for the richness of the experience of videogame play, to broaden the discussion 
beyond the physical and software elements of the interface we have previously focused upon 
towards the wider experience in which the interface is involved. Our second concern extends 
from this and deals with the implications of the conclusions developed over the previous two 
chapters.  If  the  player  experiences  a  sense  of  presence  within  the  game-space,  in  a  way 
214
experiencing a sense of actually being there, how does this affect the player’s experience of 
videogame play, or in other words what are the implications of this experience of being-in-
the-game-world for the player’s experience of videogame play as a whole? In dealing with 
this concern our first task is to establish the nature of the player’s relation to the game-space 
at the immediate level, a task the following section addresses.
The Experience of Game-Space
Given that  the  experience  of  presence  in  the  game-space  arises  through the  player’s  co-
embodiment  of  their  locus  of  manipulation  through  the  incorporation  of  that  locus  of 
manipulation into the player’s bodily schema and the resultant extension of the player’s body 
into  the  game-space,  a  logical  starting  point  for  understanding the  nature  of  the  player’s 
experience of presence in the game-space is in how the locus of manipulation mediates the 
player’s experience of the game-space. As we have seen in Chapter Five, the limited suite of 
particular actions and abilities with which the locus of manipulation is granted to act within 
the game-space becomes embodied in the player’s intentions as the player begins to take up 
the locus of manipulation as ready-to-hand equipment in-order-to play the videogame. This 
incorporation of the locus of manipulation into the bodily schema of the player affords the 
player an experience of presence in the game-space as their intentional concern moves beyond 
the now withdrawn locus of manipulation to focus upon the game-world itself. The question 
thus becomes one of considering the nature of the relation the player has to the game-space, 
mediated as it is through the locus of manipulation, or to put it another way, towards what is 
the  player’s  intentional  concern  directed  towards  within  the  game-space  at  the  most 
immediate level of the player’s experience of the space of the videogame?
The importance of the game-space to videogame play has long been recognised by the field of 
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game studies, for instance Aarseth argues that “The defining element in computer games is 
spatiality.  Computer  games  are  essentially  concerned  with  spatial  representation  and 
negotiation,  and therefore  a  classification  of  computer  games  can  be  based on how they 
represent - or, perhaps, implement –space” (Aarseth "Allegories of Space" 154, emphasis in 
original). Generally speaking, the most common approach within the field to understanding 
the implementation of space in a particular videogame’s is to consider it in terms of how it  
may  support  a  particular  type  of  videogame  play  experience  for  the  player  (cf.  Aarseth 
"Allegories of Space", Adams, Van Looy). One recent and representative example of such an 
approach is McGregor’s work on recurring patterns of spatial use, such as what she labels 
‘challenge space’ “where the environment directly challenges the player” (McGregor 539), or 
‘codified space’ which is not 'space' in the normal sense of the word but rather something that 
“explicitly represents something other than itself,” such as a barracks building in a real-time 
strategy which “is not a place to house soldiers but an object that creates soldiers” (McGregor 
542). What is interesting about McGregor’s approach is her explicit  statement of the link 
between our real everyday spaces and the spaces of videogames, noting that “screen mediated 
game  space  is  dependent  on  the  conventions  of  real  space  and  our  experiences  in  it” 
(McGregor  538).  There  is  an  implicit  acknowledgement  of  the  importance  of  the 
phenomenological aspect of the experience of videogame play in McGregor’s argument, in 
that the conventionalised spaces of videogames are familiar  and habituated spaces for the 
player because they draw upon the player’s experience of everyday spaces. Thus, the pattern 
of  challenge  space  is  based  upon  our  already  existing  understandings  of  “playgrounds, 
obstacle  courses  and  racetracks  [which  are]  specifically  designed  for  physical  challenge” 
(McGregor 539), whilst contested spaces find their basis in “war zones, disputes over water 
rights to rivers, football fields and cricket pitches” (McGregor 540). Unsurprisingly, this link 
between real spatial situations and their virtual counterparts can be easily seen in the vast 
number  of  videogames  explicitly  based  around  real-life  competitions  or  historical  war 
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scenarios, yet, as we will see, the dependence of videogame space on the phenomenological 
experiences of the player go beyond the conventions of spatial configurations to the player’s 
more immediate embodied experience of being in space.
Apart  from McGregor,  several  other  scholars  within  the  field  of  videogame studies  have 
similarly  identified  the  link  between  real  spaces  and game-spaces,  though generally  with 
slight differences in emphasis. For instance, Aarseth focuses on questions of how space is 
represented  in  videogames,  arguing  that  game-spaces  “are  constituted  of  signs  and  are 
therefore  already  dependent  on  our  bodily  experience  in,  and  of,  real  space  to  be 
‘hallucinated’  as  space”  (Aarseth "Allegories  of  Space" 162).  On the  other  hand,  Adams 
compares  virtual  architecture  to  real-world  architecture,  arguing  that  despite  practical 
differences both “are based in a profound aesthetic instinct: the urge to create dramatic and 
meaningful  spaces”  (Adams  18) –  though  it  is  arguably  because  such  spaces  evoke  our 
familiar experiences in a phenomenological sense that they become dramatic and meaningful. 
Similarly, Van Looy’s analysis of the videogame Head over Heels provides a useful example 
for  how  these  approaches  can  enrich  our  understanding  of  game-spaces  as  objects,  for 
instance in noting how the videogame employs various types of spatial puzzles along with 
adversarial non-player characters to establish a combined challenge and contest based pattern 
of spatial use, or that the bright colours of the visual design of the videogame’s space create a 
certain aesthetic effect, and how the use of familiar features such as rooms with doors makes 
the represented space understandable to the player (van Looy 4,6,2). 
However, where these approaches fall short in their consideration of game-space is their focus 
on them as objects. For instance, Aarseth’s argument that “the fact that they [game-spaces] 
are not real space but objects and places is the only reason we can perceive them at all. If they 
had not been objects, but real space, (somehow) computer mediated, then we would not have 
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been able to tell them apart from real space unmediated” (Aarseth "Allegories of Space" 162), 
tells us little about the player’s phenomenological experience of the game-space – not as an 
objective  thing  in  the  world  but  as  something  experienced  as  part  of  the  world.  This 
movement marks a substantial departure away Aarseth's position of objective space being a 
central  aspect  of  videogames,  and from the third-person perspective  on game-space more 
generally.  From a phenomenological  perspective,  the objective space of the videogame is 
important  to  the player  only in  so far  as  it  is  constituted  through their  experience  as  the 
subjective world in which the unfolding of their experience of videogame play takes place, 
and towards which their intentional concern is directed. It is such an understanding of the 
first-person experience of game-worlds that we are aiming for here.
We have already noted the importance of the locus of manipulation in mediating the player’s 
experience of videogame play and thus their experience of the game-space, and as such the 
relation between the locus of manipulation and game-space enters our concern. To understand 
the nature of the relation between the locus of manipulation and the game-space we must 
recognise that it is not only that the locus of manipulation is constituted as a particular suite of 
possible actions within the game-space, but that those actions are intrinsically related to the 
spatiality of the game-space with which they are intended to take place, such as how Poole 
describes the game-space of  Tomb Raider to be constructed in ‘Lara Units’, based on her 
ability to jump certain distances (Poole 223).49 Another example, where the relation between 
the locus of manipulation and the game-space is evident, is the example of Head over Heels, 
where  an  important  part  of  the  videogame  design  is  the  employment  of  two  separate 
characters, each having a distinct suite of action potentials  (van Looy 3). Importantly, these 
49 Though it could be argued that 'Lara Units' are a concious or self-reflexive description of the player's 
immediate experience of play, as was argued previously in Chapter Five, the process of mutual 
embodiment between the player and their locus of manipulation leads to the player incorporating the 
limitations of the character into their intentional orientation and embodied conduct. In a way, this is an 
example of the issue raised in footnote 8 on page 51 regarding the inherent addition of some level of 
abstraction or reflection in the attempt to fix experience in language through description.
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differentiations  between  the  characters  primarily  relate  to  the  spatial  potentials  of  each 
character, for instance in how far they can jump or how quickly they can move, illustrating 
the importance of the spatiality of the game-space in the experience of playing  Head Over 
Heels. We can extend this observation to the experience of videogame play more generally. 
The player’s experience of the spatiality of the game-space is based not so much simply on 
how a particular videogame represents or implements space in its design, but rather on how 
the player’s  embodied  and experiential  understandings  of  the game-space and its  specific 
spatiality interacts  with the particular spatial  configuration implemented within that game-
space  during  the  unfolding  of  the  experience  of  videogame  play.  In  other  words,  what 
concerns us in understanding the player’s experience of the game-space is less of a question 
of how space is represented than it is one of how it becomes experienced by the player as 
spatial. 
To understand the player’s experience of the spatiality of a videogame we need to foreground 
the player that experiences those game-spaces in our approach, rather than focusing on the 
game-space itself as a thing or object, or even how the locus of manipulation is constituted as 
a suite of potential actions. As Flynn argues “the spatial cannot be reduced only to questions 
of  representation,  narrative  models  or  configurative  interventions,  but  needs  to  include  a 
broader notion of spatiality that takes into account the participatory and embodied positions of 
the  player”  (Flynn  52),  which  is  to  say  that  understanding  the  spatiality  of  videogames 
intrinsically  requires  an  exploration  of  the  phenomenological  aspect  of  how  the  player 
experiences that spatiality.50 In recovering this sense of the player as an embodied participant 
in  the  spatiality  of  the  videogame  we  implicitly  move  our  focus  towards  the  player’s  
50 Klevjer addresses this issue at length, though at times in a slightly divergent direction than that 
developed in this chapter. In broad terms however there is deep resonances with the argument 
developed here due to their common starting point in the work of Merleau-Ponty. For instance, Klevjer 
similarly notes the important ways in which the experience of game-space relies upon our pre-existing 
habituated experiences of real space (147), and the fundamental significance of the interrelation 
between perception and action, as he notes: “Vicarious action follows from vicarious perception, and 
vice versa; the ‘I’ that acts is the ‘I’ that perceives” (148).
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phenomenological experience of the game-space, and in this move we discover that the link 
between ‘real’ space and game-space is not simply incidental or arbitrary, but rather that the 
link arises from the player’s embodied relation to both videogame spaces and real worlds. For 
instance,  Flynn  draws  upon  Merleau-Ponty’s  notion  of  an  experience  of  space  based  in 
intentionality,  that  is  an understanding of  space  “not  as  a  spatiality  of  position,  but  as  a 
spatiality of situation” (Flynn 57), to build an understanding of the player’s spatial experience 
of the game-space. This moves beyond thinking of the game-space as a set of discrete spatial 
points that the player finds themselves located within towards a lived experience of the space 
of  the  game-space  based on the  player’s  embodied  relation  to  it.  This  is  to  say that  the 
player’s body is actively involved in their experience of the virtual spatiality of game-spaces, 
and  it  is  particularly  the  role  played  by  the  player’s  experience  of  movement  in  their 
engagement with the videogame that has important implications for their experience of the 
spatiality of the game-space, for as Flynn argues: 
Merleau-Ponty’s  descriptions of spatial  engagement were written to 
describe the body’s perception of physical space, [but] they also speak 
clearly  to  the  body’s  position  in  computer  games.  In  game  space, 
bodily motility reflects physical bodily experience, histories of being 
in the world and subjective points of view. So playing the game is 
conditioned by the player’s lived in bodily experience as well as the 
player’s subjective viewpoint. (Flynn 57)
There are two important points in this quote from Flynn that have direct relevance to our 
concern of understanding the player’s experience of the spatiality of game-spaces, the first 
being her focus on the bodily motility of the player, and the second on what bodily motility 
reflects  in  game-space,  namely  the  player’s  physical  bodily  experience,  their  histories  of 
being-in-the-world, and their subjective points of view. Given our focus on the immediate and 
corporeal experience of embodied being and the importance of embodiment to the experience 
of videogame play, the player’s own immediate phenomenological experience of their body 
and the movement of that body obviously becomes our primary interest in dealing with their 
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experience of the spatiality of the game-space. However, this is not to discount the importance 
of the other two reflections Flynn notes, for the player’s histories of being-in-the-world relate 
to their experience of the socialised and cultural patterns of spatiality, which remain important 
to the player’s experience of game-space, whilst their subjective points of view reminds us to 
consider the variability and diversity of the experience of videogame play. 
In regards to the player’s bodily motility,  Flynn notes the importance of movement to the 
experience of videogame space and of videogame play more generally, as “games are not only 
watched but also moved in, between and around” (Flynn 55). Thus the player’s experience of 
the game-space via their  movement within it  becomes an important  consideration,  for the 
player does not merely survey the game-space as a static landscape but actively experiences it 
through  a  “bodily  kinaesthetic  engagement”  (Flynn  57),  and  the  trajectory  of  these 
movements “from one stable point in space to another create a particular type of aesthetic 
immersion that generates individualised styles of agency” (Flynn 55). Though the use of the 
term ‘trajectory’ may imply a sense of a pre-determined path through the game-space, it is 
clear that such a meaning is not meant by Flynn, who adapts the term from de Certeau. In the 
moment to moment unfolding of the experience of videogame play the player's movement 
proceeds in accordance with their intentionality, which Merleau-Ponty describes as “a vector 
mobile in all directions like a searchlight, one through which we can direct ourselves towards 
anything, in or outside ourselves” (Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 156-7). This 
concept of the vector does not imply an already established and determinate course, for whilst  
at any particular point in time the vector will have to be at such and such a position and face 
such and such a heading and be moving at such and such a velocity what is more important is 
that there is the possibility and potential for change. It’s possible trajectory is implied by a 
particular heading at a particular point of time, but it is not fixed, and the sense of the moment 
by moment dynamic  unfolding of the passage or movement through space remains  at  the 
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forefront of our concern.
Thus we can retain a sense of the agency and the intentionality of the player, who at any time 
can change their direction, both in a specifically literal sense related to their actual movement, 
but also in the sense of what that movement is directed towards – their intentional ends. By 
considering the player’s movements within the game-space in this way we also emphasise 
both the moment to moment unfolding of the experience of that movement, and the sense of a 
spatiality of situation, a spatiality that takes into account “the situation of the body in the face 
of its tasks” (Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 115), in other words “an attitude 
directed towards a certain existing or possible task” (Flynn 57), a spatiality that foregrounds 
the way in which the player can engage with the game-space not as a Cartesian space but as  
an experienced space. The importance of including both a sense of intentionality and of the 
dynamic  unfolding  of  the  experience  of  videogame  play  can  be  seen  if  we  consider  a 
particular moment in time of the player’s experience of the game-space. For instance, even if 
the player remains still, in both their immediate physical body and in the avatar they embody 
within the game-space,  observing the game-space without  apparent  movement,  movement 
still resides in the forefront of the player’s experience of the spatiality of the game-space. This 
is due to the intentional nature of the player’s being-in-the-world, as the player’s intentional 
concerns  must  always  project  a  potential  movement  through  the  game-space  in  order  to 
accomplish those concerns. The player’s interest in the game-space can only ever be realised 
via the potential actions that they can take, and whilst the player can consciously sit back and 
weigh up their options, at some point these thoughts must be translated into actual action 
within the videogame and thus such thoughts concerning potential movement must always be 
realised through action. For example, for the player the game-space of Tomb Raider presents 
many spatial puzzles that the player must negotiate through moving Lara Croft in particular 
ways such as various types of jumps. When remaining stationary and observing the game-
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space, the player views it not as simply a representation of space but rather as a space for 
potential  action,  in  particular  the  specific  movements  required  to  traverse  the  terrain  and 
advance through the videogame. This process of consideration of the required movements is 
not some form of abstract pure logic discrete from actual movement, as it is embedded within 
the potential for movement within the game-space – it is a potential movement which at a 
later moment will be enacted through actual movement.
In this way the movement of the player, both actual and potential, through the space of the 
game comes to be the basis of their overall experience of that game-space, and as such this 
movement presents itself as a key factor with which to explore the player’s wider experience 
of videogame play.  The following section seeks to further this exploration of the player’s 
experience of movement within the game-space and its wider implications for the experience 
of  videogame  play  by  turning  to  a  reflection  and  articulation  on  my own experience  of 
movement within videogames, my subjective viewpoint as Flynn would put it, drawing upon 
and employing the conclusions  reached over the last  several  chapters.  Of course,  Leino’s 
observation that “phenomenology is not interested in the idiosyncratic experience, but in the 
experience’s  ‘invariant  structures’”  (Leino "Understanding Games as Played:  Sketch for a 
First-Person Perspective for Computer Game Analysis" 6), should be kept in mind, as it is 
what is common across ‘idiosyncratic experience’ that we have been concerned with, and that 
will continue to be investigated in the remainder of this chapter through the experience of 
movement within the game-space.
The Experience of Movement in the Game-World
When I move in videogame worlds I often experience a sense of actual movement, in that the 
game-world seems to move around me as I move through it. How can this be? For physically 
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I barely move at all except for the movement of my hands and fingers through actions upon 
the physical interface, or occasionally leaning forward to get a closer look. Yet, still there is a 
sense of movement. I press the appropriate button or key to walk forward and I experience 
walking forward, moving into the depth of the game-world. Or perhaps I push the duck button 
to drop behind some form of cover and it feels like I have ducked, in that my vantage point is 
lower and my view of the game-world changed, and furthermore with this action there is also 
the feeling that I'm somewhat more protected, that I present less of a target. In my experience 
of videogame play this sense of movement within the game-world comprises a substantial 
element of the experience of the game-space as it is through this movement that I come to 
experience the game-world. This is not simply in the sense of exploration, though that can be 
an  important  part  of  the  experience  in-itself,  but  more  widely  in  the  way  in  which  my 
movements in the game-world opens it up to my experience of videogame play. In the most 
basic sense this is perhaps due to the need to move through the game-world to progress in the 
videogame, and even at this very immediate level we see that my movement in the game-
world is imbued with and directed by my intentional concern within that game-world. For 
instance, that I need a particular item from a particular location which is then used somewhere 
else to move into a new area or level of the videogame. Yet, in a wider sense this experience  
of moving through the game-world seems more fundamental to the experience of play, in that 
it  constitutes  a  large  part  of  what  I  actually  do  in  the  course  of  play,  not  merely  as  a 
requirement  of  playing  the  videogame,  but  rather  in  the  sense  that  as  one  of  its  central 
elements it perhaps constitutes videogame play. Finally, this experience of a sense of actual 
movement within the game-world brings with it  the sense that I am in some way present 
within the environment of the game-world, not merely looking at it on-screen but inhabiting 
it.  I experience it as a three dimensional space (certainly in the case of three dimensional  
game-worlds) though as we shall later see an experience of movement and presence in two 
dimensional game-worlds remains possible. In the case of three dimensional game-worlds, 
224
whilst the screen may only show me my forward view, there is a sense of the game-world 
continuing beyond the borders of the screen to my left and right and even behind me – when a 
shot flies by from over my shoulder there is a definite and immediate impulse to look back 
and identify the source of danger. In one sense I follow this impulse, yet in another I do not, I 
look around but I do not turn my head.
We should be clear here that the experience of actual movement which I am discussing is that  
which most often arises during videogames that utilise three dimensional space. Thus, during 
the course of this chapter ‘game-worlds’ refers specifically to three-dimensional game-space, 
rather than the environments of two-dimensional videogames, which do not possess the same 
sense  of  ‘world-ness’,51 and  which  are  often  referred  to  as  videogame  levels  or  stages. 
Following Klevjer, this distinction is due not to the dimensionality of these game-spaces in 
themselves, but rather as he argues how the player is positioned as a bodily subject through 
the limitations  and possibilities  of their  locus of manipulation,  in particular  how what he 
describes as subjective avatar which “appropriates a navigable point of view as an apparatus 
of prosthetic perception, giving the player not just an extended fictional body, but also a re-
centred  perceptual  subject-position”  (Klevjer  146).  This  is  not  to  argue  that  even  two 
dimensional  videogames,  such as  classic  platformers  Super  Mario  Bros. (Nintendo  Super 
Mario Bros.) or  Sonic the Hedgehog (Sonic Team), don’t involve some sense of movement 
within  their  game-spaces,  just  that  their  simplified  spatiality  and  third-person,  side-on 
perspective, seems to work against such an experience of actual movement. After all, a central 
attraction of the experience of playing Sonic the Hedgehog is the rapid movement through its 
particular  game-space  that  it  affords,  a  highly  affective  experience  of  movement  which 
51 It should be noted that Leino (Emotions in Play) makes an extensive critique of the way in which the 
term 'game-world' has been used within the field of videogame studies, in particular the notion that 
they can somehow 'exist' objectively outside of the experience of players (cf 189). It should also be 
noted that while 'worldness' here is being used in a somewhat intuitive sense, Leino extensively 
unpacks the term, in particular drawing upon the notion of 'facticity' (cf Chapter 5, Emotions in Play)
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requires a focus and intensity on the part of the player if they are to avoid the obstacles within 
the  game-space  towards  which  they hurtle  at  high speeds.  Indeed,  the  pace  at  which  the 
videogame is played indicates that the player would need to have incorporated the locus of 
manipulation into their bodily schema and the immediacy of their movement within the game-
space to have any chance of keeping up. And, whilst the limitation of only two dimensions 
would entail that that sense of depth of three dimensional videogames, that sense of moving 
into the game-world and of being enveloped by it,  would be unlikely,  the same types  of 
physical bodily experiences of movement are involved, for instance in that there is a sense of 
up and down and left and right, but more importantly this experience remains one of moving 
directly within the game-space, I do not instruct or direct Sonic or Mario to move to a certain 
point within the game-space but move there ‘myself’.
Clearly, there is a lot going on in this experience of movement in the game-world, so let us 
further  examine  my  initial  statement,  that  when  I  move  in  videogame  worlds  I  often 
experience  a sense of actual  movement.  In a closer  reading there is  an assumption that  I 
actually move in the game-world, and given this assumption, it is not surprising then that 
there is an experience of movement. I move, therefore I experience movement. Yet by ‘I’, am 
I in fact inferring the locus of that movement not directly to myself but rather to my locus of 
manipulation, that is the character or avatar, through which I interact with the game-world? 
For surely it is my proxy within the game-world that in fact moves within the game-world, 
albeit  under  my  direction?  Objectively,  this  may  be  true,  for  indeed  it  is  my  locus  of 
manipulation, whether it is a human character, a vehicle, or even a mouse cursor which moves 
onscreen,  but  phenomenologically  speaking  this  answer  falls  short  in  describing  the 
experience of actual movement within the game-world as my experience, rather than that of 
moving an object separate  from me from one point  to another  within the game-world,  is 
experienced  as  my  own  movement.  It  should  be  stressed  that  this  experience  of  actual 
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movement is not that sense of flow that has been discussed by several scholars in relation to 
the experience of videogame play, for whilst there is a similar sense of effortless engagement 
or of “being ‘in the zone’”  (Järvinen, Heliö and Mäyrä 22), it is not primarily a conscious 
experience but a bodily one – it is an experience of movement.
For instance, when playing a first person shooter such as SWAT 4 (Irrational Games), there is 
a definite character through which I act, the leader of a SWAT assault team, who functions as 
my proxy within the game-world. As I move this character through the game-world of SWAT 
4, a game-world broken up into discrete levels, I do not experience a sense of ordering or 
directing the character to move to certain locations, but of directly moving through the game-
world. In contrast, the more tactical aspects of playing SWAT 4, involving leading the squad 
of characters that follow and support my own locus of manipulation,  can provide such an 
experience of ordering the characters to move to certain locations and carry out certain actions 
as the videogame includes as part of its on-screen element a system for issuing commands to 
other squad members. Given that this command system already exists within the game it is 
interesting to speculate about how its application to my own locus of manipulation would 
change my experience of movement in the game-world. Most obviously, it would introduce a 
sense of distance between myself and my locus of manipulation, for no longer am I directly 
moving through the world, pushing buttons for forward or backwards movement, or turning 
left or right through moving the mouse, but rather simply pointing with the mouse at a certain 
location and using an on-screen menu saying ‘go there’. My character thus becomes semi-
autonomous, in that once given the order they would move to that location, finding their own 
path through the game-world, much like the other squad members do in the actual version of 
SWAT 4, and whilst I direct that movement, the movement itself I would not experience as my 
own movement.
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At  this  point  it  is  arguable  whether  this  semi-autonomous  character  is  my  locus  of 
manipulation, after all I would not consider the other squad members as part of my locus of 
manipulation, and the relation I have with my character in this speculative version of SWAT 4 
is similar to my relation with the other characters in the actual version, namely that they are 
under my control to an extent yet separate and discrete from my own sense of moving in the 
game-world. Presumably, I would still have some sort of locus of manipulation in the game-
world, perhaps as a disembodied point of view that is not centred in any particular character, 
but free to move in the game-world, focused around the mouse cursor and menu system that 
comprises  the  order  system  of  the  actual  game,  and  it  would  be  the  movement  of  this  
disembodied locus of manipulation that I would experience as my own movement within the 
game-world of this hypothetical adaptation of SWAT 4. Thus, it is the locus of manipulation, 
rather than the character in which it is embedded, that forms the core of my experience of 
moving within the game-world.
Therefore, there must be some relation between the movement of the locus of manipulation in 
the game-world and my own experience of movement in the game-world. What then is the 
nature of this relation? Returning to my original statement,  the use of ‘I’ to describe who 
moves in the game-world suggests that the nature of the relation is such that the locus of 
manipulation becomes, in a sense, part of my own sense of phenomenal self, or rather that it, 
much like the example of the ready-to-hand hammer employed by Heidegger, is taken up and 
incorporated into my own sense of bodily being due to my embodied relation to my locus of 
manipulation which thus becomes an extension of my bodily schema. This begins to account 
for my experience of movement within the game-world, for in some way I identify with my 
locus of manipulation’s movement in the game-world – they are moving and I am moving 
them, so in that sense it is also my movement. But this still suggests a detached engagement 
where  I  perceive  my  locus  of  manipulation  as  a  separate  entity,  hardly  conducive  to 
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articulating the sense of movement in the game-world that I experience. My actions in moving 
the locus of manipulation do not possess a conscious or self-aware nature, it is not a case of  
consciously thinking of moving my character to one location or another, “Movement is not 
thought about movement”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology of Perception 159), as Merleau-
Ponty argues, but something rather more fluid, an experience characterised by its immediacy, 
and similar  to  the experience  of moving my own body unconsciously.  As Merleau-Ponty 
argues, “my body itself I move directly, I do not find it in one point of objective space and 
transfer it to another, I have no need to look for it, it is already with me - I do not need to lead 
it towards the movement's completion, it is in contact with it from the start and propels itself 
towards that end" (Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 108). 
This immediacy of the experience of movement within the game-world is aided by the way in 
which the locus of manipulation’s movements are abstracted in a manner that accords to our 
experience of moving our own bodies. This can be demonstrated by comparing a hypothetical 
control system for a first person shooter such as SWAT 4, where each limb of the avatar's body 
is  controlled  separately  through  the  interface  controller,  to  the  more  conventional 
circumstance where the movement of the legs is abstracted into locomotive movement. In the 
conventional system the player simply moves the body of the avatar directly, whereas in the 
hypothetical scheme the player would need to attend to the mechanics of moving the avatar's 
body. Such a system would seem strange to interact with, as it would require a focus on the 
intricacies of the moment to moment movement of the body that, as Merleau-Ponty argues, 
are generally outside of our own experience of moving our bodies, and its unusualness both in 
this sense, and in the sense that it would be an unconventional and thus unfamiliar control 
system, would lead to the avatar's body becoming an object in the experience of the player. 
This is  not to  say that  such an unconventional  control scheme could not in time become 
sufficiently familiar and thus ready-to-hand for the player, as videogames have more often 
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than not employed controls systems unfamiliar to the bodily experience of novice players - 
these abstractions must be learnt  and habituated by the player  before the interface can be 
taken up as  ready-to-hand.  Yet  the  focus  on the minutiae  of  movement  from moment  to 
moment that would be required for the hypothetical control system for SWAT 4 would likely 
alter the nature of the experience of play in that it would require more effort, both in terms of 
practice and use, to become habituated to the scheme and thus able to take up the locus of 
manipulation as ready-to-hand. 
Whilst  this system of controlling the avatar’s individual limbs remains hypothetical as we 
have  discussed  it  so  far,  in  another  sense  we have  already considered  the  experience  of 
playing a particular videogame which does in fact involve the player controlling each limb of 
the avatar in our examination of the interface of  EyeToy: Play 3 system in Chapter 3. By 
employing a representation of the player’s own body onscreen as their locus of manipulation, 
in a manner not dissimilar to a mirror reflection the player’s movement of the individual limbs 
of their body, both their immediate physical body and that represented back to them onscreen 
explicitly serves as the manner in which the player interacts with the videogame. Yet, in the 
general  course  of  playing  EyeToy:  Play  3 I  do  not  experience  controlling  my  locus  of 
manipulation as one of interacting with a discrete and disjointed object, its movement within 
the game-world and that of my own immediate  body share the same sense of immediacy 
which  Merleau-Ponty describes.  Beyond  the  surface  of  the  onscreen  representation  lies  a 
deeper, bodily connection that goes further than what is objectively visible. It is not a case of 
me consciously associating the visible image of myself, and my movements on screen, with 
the sense of movement of my immediate body by some kind of reflexive accordance that 
compares the two bodies and thus identifies a similarity after the fact, but rather an immediate 
and pervasive familiarity – it could be stated that my represented body is not so much ‘seen’ 
as it is ‘felt’. And whilst this is my general experience of playing EyeToy: Play 3, there does 
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arise moments when this sense of close connection is lost, specifically when the movement of 
my body fails to have its intended effect within the game-world.  Instructively, in such cases it 
is not the movement of the body onscreen on which I reflect and make myself aware of as 
objective  movement,  but rather  that  of my immediate  physical  body,  which is  adapted to 
conform to the requirements of the game.
This  would  suggest  that  the  relation  of  mutual  embodiment  I  have  with  my  locus  of 
manipulation  has  bearing  on  my  experience  of  moving  in  game-worlds,  for 
phenomenologically that experience of movement is characterised by its bodily nature. Flynn 
notes  that  the  player’s  movement  in  the game-world reflects  the  player’s  physical  bodily 
experience, the experience of having and being a body embedded in the physical world. This 
physical  experience  of  embodiment  spills  over  into the player’s  experience  of videogame 
play, for as Flynn notes during the course of play “there is an embodied self manifested in 
breath, body, fingers and visceral sensations as players attempt to weave, dodge and attack 
opponents” (Flynn 57). Thus, in a very real sense, there is an aspect of bodily involvement in 
my experience of movement in the game-world. It is not only my locus of manipulation that 
weaves  and  ducks,  but  also  my  own  body,  through  my  incorporation  of  the  locus  of 
manipulation into my bodily schema, as it registers the affective dimensions of movement 
within the game-world. At the most basic level of affective experience we find that it becomes 
pointless  to  insist  on  a  sense  of  separation  between  the  movement  of  the  locus  of 
manipulation, and the movement of the player, for in the experience of the player they form 
part of a greater experiential whole, they are experienced as the same movement, for they are 
both the movement of the one combined gestalt of the phenomenological body based on the 
mutual embodiment of the player and their locus of manipulation.
It is within these affective dimensions that arise out of moving in the game-world that we find 
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the  first  glimmer  of  the  wider  experience  of  videogame  play,  an  instance  of  those 
“phenomenological or  affective dimensions which cannot be programmed into a game, but 
which are nonetheless vital for gameplay” (Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 22, emphasis in 
original). In other words, those aspects of the experience of videogame play which arise out of 
the player’s engagement with the videogame through the act of play, both through the way in 
which the player moves within the game-world and the way in which that game-world affords 
that  movement,  or  otherwise.  The  importance  of  the  player’s  own  engagement  to  the 
experience of videogame play would suggest that the player’s experience of movement within 
the game-world to an extent derives from the way in which they take up the videogame, that 
is to say their intentional orientation towards it, much like we demonstrated in relation to the 
player’s  intentional  orientation  towards  their  locus  of  manipulation  in  Chapter  Five.  Yet 
Flynn’s description of the affective dimensions of videogame play that we have employed 
arises out of her consideration of a particular game, Half-Life, where the player’s movement is 
characterised by what Flynn describes as “An accelerated form of spatial engagement [which] 
is evident in first-person shooters”  (Flynn 57). Though Flynn explicitly recognises that the 
player’s movement in the game-world “is always an individualised engagement in the game-
world”  (Flynn 57), the implication that there is something about the genre of first-person 
shooters generally, and Half-Life in particular, that tends to lead towards a particular kind of 
engagement and thus phenomenological experience for the player would seem to contradict 
the  approach  we  have  generally  adopted  in  this  thesis.  So  far  we  have  understood  and 
attempted to articulate the experience of play as being not determined simply by the particular 
features of a specific videogame, but rather arising out of the way in which the intentional 
orientation  the player  takes  towards the videogame interacts  with the ways  in  which that 
videogame,  through  its  interface,  including  the  locus  of  manipulation,  either  affords  or 
frustrates the player’s intentional concern. A process of negotiation within which we find the 
moment to moment unfolding of the experience of videogame play.
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Furthermore, the resemblance of the player’s intentional orientation towards the videogame to 
their intentional orientation towards the locus of manipulation we described in Chapter Five is 
not incidental but a continuation and extension of the same intentional concern into the game-
world. Similarly, it is also through the locus of manipulation that the videogame asserts in 
part  its  contribution  to  the  experience  of  play  through  the  limitations  the  locus  of 
manipulation puts upon the player’s agency, and as such we need to consider how the locus of 
manipulation relates to the player’s experience of movement within the game-world.  In my 
own  experience,  moving  through  the  game-world  of  a  first-person  shooter  such  as 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R. (GSC Game  World),  invokes  not  so  much  an  accelerated  form of  spatial 
engagement,  but  rather  one  that  generally  takes  on  a  much  more  cautious  and measured 
aspect, largely as an attempt to negotiate the hostile nature of the game-world. This is not to 
say  that  the  game-worlds  of  other  first-person  shooters  aren’t  themselves  also  hostile 
environments, but rather that the vulnerability of the locus of manipulation requires the player 
to take a more cautious approach, or, to go further, that the locus of manipulation and its  
relation to the game-world encourages a particular affective response from the player  that 
could be described as bordering on a sense of constant unease. Unlike many other first-person 
shooters, the locus of manipulation’s bodily being in S.T.A.L.K.E.R. is simulated to a degree 
beyond simply the abstracted notion of ‘health’, the locus of manipulation being constituted 
by several kinds of ‘measures’ of bodily health, including physical injury, hunger, exhaustion, 
and radiation exposure, and even rate of blood loss. Furthermore, the locus of manipulation 
possesses a somewhat more realistic set of attributes, such as weight restrictions and a sense 
of encumbrance when carrying excessive weight,  though what concerns us here is  not so 
much whether S.T.A.L.K.E.R. employs a more ‘realistic’ sense of bodily being than other first-
person shooters, but rather how the particular suite of potential actions that the player will 
come to embody in their conduct effects the player’s experience of moving within the game-
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world. Arguably,  the experience of playing  S.T.A.L.K.E.R. revolves to a significant  extent 
around the player’s management of the limitations of their locus of manipulation.
For example, the player will often find themselves having to back track over long distances, 
whether  to return to a safe area to  trade for supplies  for the requirements  of a particular 
mission,  or just in the course of their  general  exploration of the game-world. In my own 
experience,  the moment  of realisation that  such a  long distance will  need to be traversed 
arouses a sense of reluctance or aversion, sometimes to the point of a bodily reaction of dread. 
Such a reaction arises not so much out of the distance to be covered itself, for if it were only a  
question of distance then mere annoyance would be a more likely response, but rather the 
realisation that to actually cover that distance will involve a tense and cautious movement 
through the game-world, constantly scanning ahead so as not to be ambushed by enemies, and 
attempting to negotiate my way through environmental hazards, including invisible hazards 
such as pockets of high radiation. If I am carrying too much weight, and this is often the case 
if  I  am returning  to  a  safe  area  to  sell  equipment  scavenged  from the  game-world,  my 
movement becomes even more cautious, for if I do encounter substantial trouble, perhaps the 
situation  when  S.T.A.L.K.E.R. is  most  likely  to  engender  a  sense  of  accelerated  spatial 
engagement, my ability to run away is curtailed through my locus of manipulation becoming 
fatigued much more rapidly.
Yet,  despite  these  limitations  of  the  locus  of  manipulation  and  the  way  in  which  those 
limitations influence the player’s experience of movement within the game-world, there is no 
need for the player to stay within these particular parameters of action, for indeed, at other 
times  when  playing  S.T.A.L.K.E.R. I  abandon  this  sense  of  apprehension  and the  careful 
movement it engenders, throwing caution to wind so to speak, and impulsively move myself 
into danger. For example,  consider a situation which arose in the course of my own play 
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where I came across a heavily guarded strong point that restricted access to the game-world 
beyond it which previously had engendered a sense of aversion due to the probability of my 
locus of manipulation being killed or at least badly wounded if directly assaulted. My only 
other option to gaining access to the game-world beyond involved the prospect of taking the 
long way around which involved many more, though admittedly less dangerous, obstacles of 
the environmental hazard sort. Feeling impatient, I attacked the guard post head on despite 
being out-numbered and out-gunned, not really expecting to be successful but desiring the 
experience of intensity and immediacy that the fire-fight would bring, and as such exposed 
my locus of manipulation to significant danger. Surprisingly, in this particular case what was 
essentially  something  of  a  diversion  from  my  more  committed  engagement  with  the 
videogame payed off, and apart from opening a path to an area to which I wished to move, I 
had  also  significantly  upgraded  my arsenal  of  weapons  and other  equipment.  While  this 
improvement  in  my  locus  of  manipulation’s  potential  to  act  in  the  game-world,  in  the 
immediate sense, inherently changed my experience of movement through the game-world as 
I was better  equipped to defend myself,  in a subtler and more pervasive sense the overall 
experience of unease and tension lifted to a degree, the game-world of S.T.A.L.K.E.R. just felt 
generally less dangerous. As such my movement through the game-world became somewhat 
more unfettered and accelerated, at least until I encountered another group of enemies not so 
much further into the game-world that demonstrated the potential folly of my new cavalier 
attitude.
The important point here is that the player’s experience of movement within the game-world 
is variable and dynamic, it is not just that each particular player experiences an individualised 
sense of movement but more fundamentally their experience of movement can have different 
qualities  over  the course of  play,  the implications  of which go beyond the experience  of 
movement in itself to the experience of play more generally.  Returning to the example of 
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Half-Life,  though  it  could  be  generally  said  that  it  does  tend  towards  experiences  of 
accelerated movement, in such a generalisation we lose sight of the nuance and richness of the 
player’s overall experience of movement, for  Half-Life can also afford other experiences of 
movement. For instance, during the course of play when I encounter a particularly difficult 
obstacle, my sense of movement within the game-world slows down, particularly if several 
attempts  are  required  through  reloading  a  saved  game  before  that  obstacle  is  overcome. 
Whilst  in  an  immediate  sense  my  experience  of  movement  remains  one  that  could  be 
characterised as accelerated, as my locus of manipulation retains the suite of potential actions 
and still  moves at the same speed, in a wider sense my movement within the game-world 
begins  to  slow down and even stall,  as  I  repeatedly attempt  to  move past  that  particular 
obstacle. 
Thus,  the  relation  between the  locus  of  manipulation,  specifically  the  way in which it  is 
constituted as a suite of potential actions, and the game-world, as a space for those potential 
actions, impacts upon our experience of movement within that game-world. But given that the 
locus of manipulation is taken up as an extension and incorporated into the player’s bodily 
schema, we need to also consider the impact of the player’s physical bodily experience at a 
deeper level. Our first point arises from the observation made earlier about the intentional 
nature of the player’s movement, and concerns the relation between the player’s motility and 
their perception, which should not be considered as discrete moments in the experience of the 
player but as an experiential  whole, for as Merleau-Ponty notes “there is not a perception 
followed by a movement, for both form a system which varies as a whole"  (Merleau-Ponty 
Phenomenology of Perception 127). Or indeed as Massumi argues “perceptions  are its [the 
individual’s]  actions–in  their  latent  state.  Perceptions  are  possible  actions”  (Massumi 
Parables for the Virtual 91, emphasis in original), hence the importance of this link between 
perception and movement, or perception and action more generally. This can be demonstrated 
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through the art games Second Person Shooter (Oliver Second Person Shooter) and its sequel 
2ndPS2 (Oliver 2ndps2) by Julian Oliver, which as their names implies places the player in a 
second-person perspective rather than the first-person perspective with which we are used to. 
The first is a prototype of the premise and similar to a regular first person shooter except that 
the player’s point of view is switched with the artificial intelligence bot that is their enemy, 
whilst  2ndPS2 is a further development of this idea for two players, where the two players 
swap their point of view with each other. As a result there is a mismatch of perception and 
movement,  the  players  cannot  see  where  they  are  going  unless  their  enemy’s  locus  of 
manipulation can see them, and also likely shoot at them, so in effect the player is watching 
themselves  be  hunted  down.  Whilst  some commentators  on  Second Person Shooter have 
framed it in terms of an existential crisis that arises out of this confusion of agency and vision 
(Cannon), what interests us here is the difficulty the player faces in trying to play when the 
close connection between perception and movement of their  physical bodily experience is 
broken through the design of the game. As Oliver notes “Naturally this makes action difficult 
when you aren't within the bot's field of view” (Oliver "Adventures in the Second Person"). 
Interestingly, for the two player 2ndPS2, Oliver has to a degree sought to avert this difficultly 
through employing several measures. At first an on-screen map which indicated the location 
of the players’ locus of manipulation, and the direction in which their opponent was directing 
their point of view, was implemented to make it more playable by reducing confusion about 
the  relative  position  of  the  two  players  in  the  game-world.  However,  Oliver  found  this 
problematic  as  it  meant  the players  could “avoid  engaging with  a  primary  dislocation  of 
perspective as an active part of the interface”, and eventually removed the map feature (Oliver 
"2ndps2: Second Person Shooter for Two Players."). Thus this early version of  2ndPs2 re-
established a  connection  between the  player’s  motility  and perception  through the  use of 
another type of spatial experience, one beyond the player’s physical bodily experience but not 
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necessarily their experience of space – the representation of space in the form of a map. That 
the addition of a map can avoid the ‘dislocation of perspective’ effected by the second person 
perspective through the employment of a type of third person perspective that makes available 
to the player both the location of their locus of manipulation, and the direction of their point 
of view, is in itself noteworthy, as it demonstrates that the player’s motility and perception 
within the game-world does not need to be situated within a singular entity, such as a specific  
character, to be effectively connected. In the case of some players this may be aided by a pre-
existing familiarity with overhead 2D perspectives from other videogames,52 yet  even so it 
shows the flexibility of the player’s bodily schema, in that it is possible to incorporate into it a 
locus of manipulation whose motility and perception is dislocated in space when provided 
with  the  means  to  overcome  this  spatial  dislocation  and  reintroduce  for  the  player  an 
intentional agency.
In place of the map a sound based system was later implemented in 2ndPS2 which indicated 
to the player where their locus of manipulation was in relation to their perspective though 
different audio cues that made use of the body’s ability to localise sounds (Oliver "2ndps2: 
Second  Person  Shooter  for  Two  Players.").  This  suggests  a  second  implication  for  the 
reflection of the player’s physical bodily experience in their movement in the game world, 
namely  that  it  brings  into  play  our  everyday  ways  of  orientating  ourselves  based on our 
individual relation to things in the world and articulated through distinctions such as front or 
back and left or right. As Merleau-Ponty notes, “the self-evidence of top and bottom, right 
and  left,  for  the  person who  has  his  being  in  space,  prevents  us  from treating  all  these 
distinctions as nonsense, and suggests to us that we should look beneath the explicit meanings 
of  definitions  for  the  latent  meaning  of  experience”  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of 
52 Indeed, game designer Jean Paul LeBreton argues that many of the qualities of the experience of 
playing Doom has more in common with earlier 2D shooting games than later first person-shooters, to 
the point that it can be played in an overhead ‘map mode’. Jean Paul LeBreton, "Coelacanth: Lessons 
from Doom," Vector Poem  (2010), 23 March 2010 <http://vectorpoem.com/news/?p=74>.
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Perception 116).  For  example,  Mylov,  in  discussing  the  role  of  bodily  orientation  in 
immersive virtual reality,  notes that not only are there asymmetries in the body, such that 
“Head and feet unite to form one of the principal dimensions or body-axes while the face and 
the attachment and functioning of the limbs define the other,” but also that there are “certain 
regularities in the physical world”, such as gravity with which we orientate ourselves in the 
world  (Mylov  48).  Thus  our  understanding  and  perception  of  space  and  our  movement 
through  it  is  based  upon our  bodily  being  even  in  the  most  basic  senses  of  distinctions 
between  top  and  bottom,  front  and  back,  or  left  and  right,  and  it  is  these  orientating 
distinctions that the sound based system of the revised version of 2ndPS2 draws upon to aid 
the players’ ability to meaningfully move through its game-world. 
The importance of these orientating distinctions  to our bodily experience of space carries 
across into the player’s experience of movement within game-worlds, such that their sense of 
orientation within the game-world is based in these bodily scales of up and down, front and 
back, and left or right. To demonstrate we can return to the specific example of Head Over 
Heels, where we can quite clearly see these distinctions of direction in operation, from the 
isometric viewpoint that is understood by the player as looking down into the game-world, 
that the locus of manipulation walks along the floor rather than falling through it, or walks up 
the walls, and also that they walk in the direction they are facing. It can further be illustrated 
through a comparison between first person shooters where the player controls a human locus 
of manipulation such as Half-Life, and another first person shooter such as Descent (Parallax 
Software), whose unique feature is that the player controls a type of flying craft in a zero 
gravity environment. Whilst the game-worlds of both videogames feature complex mazes in 
which the player  can experience a sense of becoming lost or disorientated,  in the case of 
Descent this sense of disorientation is felt more affectively, as it can become a bodily sense of 
disorientation.  The  player  not  only  becomes  lost  with  regards  to  where  they  are 
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geographically located within the game-world, but also to their sense of physical orientation 
within the game-world which becomes dislocated, an experience that could be characterised 
as  feeling  upside  down or  rather  not  knowing which  way  is up.  Without  the  orientating 
distinction of top and bottom that arises phenomenologically out of the player’s own vertical 
orientation, which is simulated in first-person shooters such as Half-Life, the player must rely 
on other environmental features to regain a sense of orientation, either a familiar part of the 
game-world or some object in the game world that is orientated in the ‘correct’ way.
Thus, it is the combination of the player’s incorporation of the locus of manipulation into their 
bodily schema and, as Flynn argues, the way that movement within the game-world accords 
to previous physical bodily experiences of movement that contributes to a sense of actual 
movement  within  the  game-world.  However,  in  many  ways  this  accordance  between  the 
players physical bodily experience of movement and their experience of movement within the 
game-world is incomplete, for instance it does not involve the same level of physical exertion 
(Adams  4),  and  in  some  cases  could  even  be  discordant,  such  as  when  a  third  person 
perspective is used and the player can see their own movement within the game-world. That 
these ‘shortcomings’ can exist yet  the player still  experiences a sense of actual movement 
suggests  that  we  examine  them  to  ascertain  what  implications  they  can  yield  to  our 
understanding of the player’s experience of movement within the game-world. In a general 
sense what these shortcomings suggest is that the affective experience of the player is in a 
way a response to these shortcomings, a way of bridging the gap between those aspects of 
physical bodily experience that are simulated by the videogame and those that are not. This is  
implied by Shinkle’s argument that these affective dimensions cannot be directly programmed 
into  the  videogame  (Shinkle  "Corporealis  Ergo  Sum"  22).  In  this  way  it  is  within  the 
inadequacy of the relation between the perception and the action of the player, specifically 
between  their  intentional  concern  within  the  game-world  and  potential  for  fulfilling  that 
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concern, that we see the affective dimensions of the experience of videogame play arise to 
bridge this gap, fleshing out the difference between the player’s physical bodily experience 
and their experience of embodying the locus of manipulation by engaging their proprioceptive 
sense of their body in the experience of videogame play.
The question then is whether these shortcomings play a role in the player’s experience of 
movement within the game-world, for instance the difference between the physical exertion 
that accompanies movement of the player’s physical body and the lack of similar physical 
effort required when moving within the game-world. Recalling the earlier  example of my 
experience of traversing large distances when playing S.T.A.L.K.E.R. it was noted that outside 
of the dangers within the game-world to be moved through, that the distance in itself elicits 
only a sense of annoyance. This is perhaps not surprising as traversing that distance requires 
no significant physical exertion on my part, for the movement required of my own physical 
body is minute, simply pressing down a single button on the keyboard causes my locus of 
manipulation  to  move  forward  within  the  game-world.  Yet  my  own  physical  bodily 
experience of moving in the world generally contains  some element  of physical  exertion, 
definitely so when carrying a substantial weight of equipment often at a jogging or faster pace 
as the locus of manipulation does in  S.T.A.L.K.E.R.. Despite this lack of correspondence of 
my  physical  bodily  experience  of  the  exertion  required  of  movement,  my  experience  of 
movement within the game-world still arises. How then do I experience a sense of movement 
within the game-world when my experience of my physical body diverges in this way from 
the movement of my locus of manipulation, which I experience as my own movement? 
Clearly the issue here is with the nature of the players bodily relation to the physical interface 
that is taken up as a ready-to-hand extension of the player’s body, which as a result becomes 
withdrawn from the player’s  immediate  awareness. If we consider the implications  of the 
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introduction  of  a  sense  of  actual  physical  exertion  into  the  experience  of  playing  while 
moving  within  the  game-world  of  S.T.A.L.K.E.R.,  though  by  what  hypothetical  technical 
means is neither obviously clear nor particularly important for our purposes here,53 we can see 
that  the  inclusion  of  this  particular  aspect  of  physical  bodily  experience  into  the  overall 
experience of play may in fact lead to a differing experience of actually moving within the 
game-world. We noted in Chapter Two that the increased size of [giantJoystick] necessarily 
introduces  a  sense of  physical  exertion  into  the  experience  of  playing  classic  Atari  2600 
videogames that would make them more difficult  to play simply because of the increased 
level of effort required. In Chapter Three we demonstrated however that it was not just that 
physical effort required in some of EyeToy: Play 3's mini-games alone that would change the 
nature of the experience, but rather the way in which that effort changes the nature of the 
player’s embodied relation to the interface, because in the course of the player taking up of 
the physical interface as ready-to-hand the physical interfaces “must, as it were, withdraw in 
order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically” (Heidegger 358). Yet the fatigue of continued 
physical exertion of playing  EyeToy: Play 3,  even though in general the level of physical 
exertion required was not overly onerous, we argued would lead to the reassertion of the 
player’s own physical body during the course of play, and with this reassertion of the player's  
immediate  body the relation  between the player  and the  interface  of  being  ready-to-hand 
would become strained. The physical interface, comprised in part of the player’s own body, 
would not be entirely withdrawn from their immediate intentional concern and thus the flow 
of the player’s intentionality into the game-world through their locus of manipulation would 
be inhibited.   
53 Perhaps the most basic setup would be to require the player to stand up whilst playing, don a 
backpack containing a similar amount of weight to what their locus of manipulation, and requiring 
them to run on the spot when they move their locus of manipulation, perhaps by having the move 
forward key trigger a treadmill upon which the player stands, or conversely having the players rate of 
movement on the treadmill trigger the appropriate speed of movement within the game-world.
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Of  course  this  is  not  to  discount  the  possibility  that  our  hypothetical  interface  for 
S.T.A.L.K.E.R., which introduces physical exertion and fatigue into the player’s experience of 
videogame play, would simply lead to the player changing the way they played in order to 
avoid reaching a level of exhaustion and thus disturbing their ready-to-hand relationship to the 
interface, and consequently the locus of manipulation. Indeed, it is possible that it might lead 
to an experience of videogame play where the experience of physical exertion and movement 
is an integral part, such as is evidenced by Dance Dance Revolution or the emerging genre of 
exergames, without completely breaking the player’s sense of immediate engagement with the 
events within the game-world, for as we saw in Chapter Four even videogames that explicitly 
employ the tangible nature of their interface as an important part of their experience of play 
there is still  a sense of that play as taking part  within the game-world.  Yet arguably,  the 
experience  of  videogame play  would  be  different,  particularly  in  relation  to  our  topic  of 
movement,  for  after  all,  whilst  Dance  Dance  Revolution is  heavily  centred  within  the 
experience of movement this movement takes place within the player’s immediate physical 
environment  and no type  of  movement  within the game-world  is  present.  Much like  our 
earlier hypothetical example of an individual limb movement interface system for  SWAT 4, 
this  exertion  system  for  S.T.A.L.K.E.R. would  bring  some  level  of  attention  back  to  the 
player’s  own bodily movements  in  the  course of  play.  By contrast,  the  minimal  exertion 
required of conventional interfaces means that once they are habituated, and incorporated into 
the body as ready-to-hand, less effort is required by the player to maintain the extension of 
their  body and intentional  concern  into  the  game-world.  The affective  dimensions  of  the 
experience of videogame play bridges the gap between the exertion present in the player’s 
physical bodily experience of movement and its lack in their experience of their movement 
within the game-world through engaging the player’s preconscious proprioceptive experience 
of movement and exertion.
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Of course, bodily exertion is not the only aspect of the experience of the physical  bodily 
experience of movement that is absent in the experience of moving within the game-world. 
For instance, as Adams notes, though many videogames simulate elements of physical reality, 
such as gravity, this simulation is often imperfect, such as in videogames where “the player’s 
avatar  can  change  its  direction  of  motion  while  flying  though  [sic]  mid-air,  violating 
Newton’s law of the conservation of momentum”  (Adams 5).54 Whilst the divergence from 
realistic momentum is in some genres of videogames, particularly platform games,  a long 
established  convention  of  game  design  what  concerns  us  here  is  the  physical  bodily 
experience  of  momentum  which  is  absent  in  simulation  videogames.  For  instance,  IL-2 
Sturmovik (1C:Maddox Games), a flight simulator set during the Second World War, involves 
tight manoeuvring of a range of different aircraft in which an actual pilot would experience 
high  g-forces,  or  the  experience  of  inertial  forces  during  the  course  of  rapid  changes  in 
direction,  for example when pulling out of a steep dive or banking sharply.  Obviously,  to 
replicate  such  a  bodily  experience  during  the  course  of  play  would  require  a  substantial 
apparatus which would more than likely make involving this aspect of bodily experience in 
videogame play infeasible, yet IL-2 Sturmovik, like many other flight simulators, attempts to 
simulate the experience of g-force loadings on the body via graphical means so that they have 
an effect on the experience of play.
For instance, g-force loadings when pulling out of a steep dive in real flight drives blood away 
from the head and brain of those on board, leading to an experience of tunnel vision, gradual 
loss of sight,  and eventually loss of consciousness.  IL-2 Sturmovik simulates  this  through 
gradually darkening the screen until it is more or less opaquely black. In my own experience 
of playing IL-2 Sturmovik, this visual simulation of bodily experience of g-force loading does 
54 Presumably Adams is using ‘avatar’ here in the very narrow sense of a humanoid character, and by 
‘flying through mid-air’ means in the course of jumping, as our next example pertains to a type of 
avatar that quite realistically changes direction mid-air – an aeroplane.
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not engender any great degree of bodily experience of the effects of inertia and momentum, 
though it certainly has an effect on the experience of play, as blacking out is not particularly 
conducive  to  avoiding  being  shot  down  or  crashing  into  the  ground.  Yet,  despite  this 
shortcoming,  in  the  general  course  of  playing  IL-2  Sturmovik an  experience  of  actual 
movement remains, I fly past another aircraft and there is a sense of them being behind me,55 
whilst steep high speed dives prompt an experience of visceral thrill, despite the lack of a 
physical bodily experience of momentum that it should entail. That is not to say that there is 
not  an  affective  experience  of  momentum to  some  degree,  particularly  in  cases  where  I 
narrowly avoid colliding with another aircraft  or crashing into the ground, simply that the 
experience is not as intense as it could perhaps be, more akin to the more mundane experience 
of  momentum when driving  a  car  than  the  more  analogous  experience  of  riding  a  roller 
coaster.  Tellingly,  these  experiences  of  a  limited  sense  of  momentum  arise  during  an 
experience of movement in the game-world where that movement is movement relative to 
other entities in the game-world, movement relative to another aircraft or to the ground, which 
indicates  that  these  experiences  of  momentum derive  from my bodily  ability  to  perceive 
changes in the relative position between my locus of manipulation and other entities in the 
game-world rather than movement in itself. Again, we find the affective dimensions of the 
experience  of  videogame  play  bridging  this  gap,  engaging  the  player’s  proprioceptive 
experience of momentum from their experience of physical movement and bringing it into the 
experience of movement within the game-world.
One  aspect  of  the  physical  bodily  experience  of  movement  so  far  not  mentioned  is  that 
associated with our visual experience, for as we move in the world other objects around us 
become closer or change in shape as we view them from a slightly different vantage point – 
an experience simulated by some first-person shooters through the addition of head bob as the 
55 Particularly when they open fire and tracer rounds pass just overhead.
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locus  of manipulation  moves.  Tellingly,  in  the above example  of visual  blackout  in  IL-2 
Sturmovik, once the screen reaches its maximum opacity my experience of movement within 
the game-world is curiously suspended, replaced with a sort of floating sensation. Without the 
physical sensation of momentum that characterises actual flight my experience of movement 
in  IL-2  Sturmovik seems  to  rely  to  a  substantial  degree  on  my  visual  perception  of 
movement,56 and when this is removed through my locus of manipulation blacking out I no 
longer experience a sense of movement within the game-world, even though my locus of 
manipulation continues on. And it is not only at the level of the visual representation of the 
software that  visual  perception can have an effect  on my experience  of movement in the 
game-world, for substantial pieces of stationary dust on the surface of the monitor similarly 
affect my sense of immediate and unconscious movement within the game-world to the extent 
that fine control of the aircraft becomes more difficult and less intuitive, as if the dust was 
functioning as a form of visual static to my experience of movement, drawing my attention 
away from the actions  depicted  within  the  game-world to  the screen as  a  surface  of  my 
attention. 
Thus, clearly there is a visual aspect to the experience of movement within the game-world, 
and arguably we are privileging the visual to an extent when we make the argument that the 
visual aspects of movement are vital for the experience of movement, as our example above 
regarding  IL-2 Sturmovik could  be  interpreted.  Yet  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  by 
convention the experience of playing videogames is generally regarded as focusing primarily 
on the visual, they are called videogames rather than audiogames for a reason after all. Given 
that we have repeatedly criticised the bias within the field of videogame studies, that gives 
primacy to the experience of visual perception in isolation from phenomenological experience 
56 Sound plays a part as well, for through the changing amplitude of other aircrafts’ engines as they 
move closer or farther away. Though again this draws upon relative differences in position, rather than 
an experience of movement in itself, and in any case can be difficult to hear over the player’s aircraft’s 
own engine.
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more  widely,  we need to  articulate  the  difference  between  this  position  and the  one  put 
forward here that recognises the importance of visual perception to the phenomenological 
experience of movement in the course of videogame play. In essence, this position follows the 
argument of Shinkle that the images perceived on screen are not simply visual content, in that 
“We do not simply ‘see’ images” (Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 25), but rather that what 
we perceive visually is experienced phenomenologically as only part of our broader embodied 
experience of the world, where “Embodiment and hapticity, [. . .] are crucial in generating 
what appears to be an exclusively visual experience”  (Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 25). 
The  visual  cues  that  aid  the  phenomenological  experience  of  movement  find  their 
effectiveness  through  the  way  they  draw  upon  and  incorporate  bodily  experience,  an 
experience that registers visual experience not in isolation but as part of a wider synaesthesic 
experience of the world that interlaces the visual with the other senses, including the haptic 
and the proprioceptive.57  
This can be demonstrated by returning to the issue of visual perspective and its effect on the 
experience of play that we considered in Chapter Five in relation to the experience of feeling 
present  within  the  game-world.  So  far  in  this  chapter  we  have  employed  as  examples 
videogames which employ a first-person perspective in our examination of the experience of 
movement within the game-world, but does having the locus of manipulation visible onscreen 
change  the  nature  of  that  experience?  The  roleplaying  videogame  Morrowind (Bethesda 
Softworks) defaults to first-person perspective, but it is also possible to play using a third-
person perspective, and as such it presents a useful example for answering this question. In 
my experience playing in either mode involves an experience of movement within the game-
world, yet, as we saw in Chapter Five, King and Krzywinska argue that the experience should 
57 There is some resonance here with Giddings and Kennedy's notion of 'recombinatory aesthesis', 
which describes the “The cybernetic processes allow moments for amplification of affect and effect 
within the game – generating extraordinary moments of visual and kinaesthetic pleasure” (Giddings 
and Kennedy 20).
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be different in the case of third-person perspective videogames for while: 
At times, players might experience a strong sense of being invested in, 
bound to or in synch with the character, but they never fully step into 
the character’s shoes, entirely present in the gamescape. The player is 
not positioned as the direct agent of action in the game-world, a key 
factor distinguishing the degree to which an impression of presence is 
created in third- and first-person games. (King and Krzywinska 115)
It follows that this lesser degree of presence that King and Krzywinska accord to third-person 
perspective videogames would also entail a lesser degree of an experience of movement in the 
game-world,  for  if  I  cannot  fully  take  up  the  locus  of  manipulation  as  a  ready-to-hand 
extension of my bodily schema I cannot experience a sense of movement within the game-
world. However, I would contend that whilst there are some qualitative differences in the 
experience of movement in the game-world between first- and third-person perspectives, the 
framing of differences in the stark terms of direct agency not only overlooks the point that 
either  perspective  can  involve  an  experience  of  movement  within  the  game-world,  and 
therefore the involvement of some sense of direct agency, but more importantly it denies the 
role  played  by  the  player’s  intentional  concern  towards  the  videogame  in  their  own 
engagement with the videogame and thus their experience of play. 
Though  King  and  Krzywinska  acknowledge  that  the  experience  of  playing  third-person 
perspective  videogames  can  involve  “an  impression  of  continuous  movement  through 
navigable space”  (King and Krzywinska 114), and that this use of perspective can facilitate 
the ease of movement, for example providing a better view of the “landscape to perform a 
precise jumping maneuver [sic]” (King and Krzywinska 114), both of these acknowledgments 
seemingly arise out of the same reason that they argue for a lesser sense of presence or direct  
agency for the player  of the third person videogame.  This reason relates  generally to the 
visual aspect of the videogame, namely what can be seen on screen, for the apparent problem 
with third-person perspectives for the player's direct sense of involvement is that “the player-
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character can be seen, as an entity clearly separate from the player”  (King and Krzywinska 
14). In Chapter Three we addressed a situation in the experience of playing EyeToy: Play 3 
where an image of the player’s own body is presented on-screen, finding that the represented 
body  was  not  experienced  as  a  separate  entity  but  as  an  extension  of  the  players 
phenomenological  body,  even  though  visible  to  the  player.  Though  we  have  already 
demonstrated the importance of visual perception to the player’s experience of movement in 
the game-world more generally,  visual perception is but one aspect that contributes to the 
experience in its entirety,  for we have also demonstrated,  in Chapter Five, that the player 
takes up the locus of manipulation as a ready-to-hand extension of their bodily schema such 
that they are no longer separate entities. Furthermore, if the locus of manipulation has become 
ready-to-hand  for  the  player,  then  it  must  “withdraw  in  order  to  be  ready-to-hand  quite 
authentically.  That  with  which  our  everyday  dealings  proximally  dwell  is  not  the  tools 
themselves.  On  the  contrary,  that  which  we  concern  ourselves  primarily  is  the  work” 
(Heidegger 358). Thus, with the locus of manipulation being in a relation of ready-to-hand the 
player's  intentional  concern rests  not upon the control  of their  locus  of manipulation,  but 
rather  flows  through  the  locus  of  manipulation  into  the  game-world.  The  locus  of 
manipulation may well be present on screen and visible for those who care to see, but the 
player who has taken it up as ready-to-hand in effect sees past it as their intentional concerns 
lies  within  the  game-world,  and  it  is  used  as  a  tool  in-order-to  enact  those  intentional 
concerns.
Yet,  this  is  not  to  argue  that  there  isn't  some qualitative  difference  in  the  experience  of 
movement  within the game-world between first  person and third person perspectives,  but 
rather that such difference does not simply arise from the visual perspective itself but from the 
way in which the different visual perspectives entail different potentials for movement within 
the  game-world.  For  instance,  though  I  primarily  use  the  first-person  perspective  when 
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playing Morrowind, in part simply because it is the default setting and as such that which I am 
more  accustomed,  and  in  part  because  it  is  more  useful  at  most  moments  and  for  most 
purposes, there does arise during the course of play times where the third-person perspective 
is preferable.  Such incidents generally concern attempts to negotiate  more difficult  terrain 
where my locus of manipulation tends to get ‘stuck’, and as such my focus becomes more 
concentrated on the ground immediately around my locus of manipulation, such that I end up 
looking more or less straight down, which becomes problematic. As Adams notes, the visual 
field  of  a  standard  computer  monitor  is  significantly  less  than  that  of  visual  perception 
(Adams 3), therefore my view onto the game-world becomes limited to only the small space 
in front of me and I become disorientated. This is in contrast to my immediate physical body 
where I can simply lower my eyes  slightly to ascertain the terrain around me whilst  still 
retaining some forward vision of where I am actually headed, however in Morrowind I must 
in effect look directly down at my feet constantly, whilst moving forward blind to the wider 
environment around me. Furthermore, this situation is not helped by fact that the only part of 
my locus of manipulation’s body represented on screen are the arms and hands, a situation 
Hutchison notes is not uncommon in first-person perspective videogames  (Hutchison 105). 
Knowing where you stand, so to speak, can often be important during the course of play, and 
whereas “In the real world,  with our real bodies,  [.  .  .]  We could feel the edge with our 
toes/feet,  or just  look down to see our feet’s  position”  (Hutchison 105),  neither  option is 
possible  in  the  first-person  perspective  of  Morrowind.  Conversely,  as  the  third-person 
perspective makes visible the entirety of my locus of manipulation’s body, this view is more 
conducive  to  moving  freely  within  the  game-world,  and  thus  experiencing  a  sense  of 
movement  within the  game-world in  such circumstances.  When my concern is  traversing 
difficult terrain, the third person perspective becomes more conducive to incorporating my 
locus of manipulation as ready-to-hand and thus extending both my body and my intentional 
concern into the game-world,  as the potentials  for movement the third person perspective 
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provides accords more closely with the nature of the intentional concern with which I am 
dealing with through my locus of interaction
The over emphasis on visual mimesis, and the wider bias about the primacy of the visual in 
the experience of videogame play that Shinkle identifies as widespread within the field of 
videogame studies (Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 21), obscures our awareness of the other 
factors involved in the greater whole of the experience of movement within the game-world. 
While, as we have noted, the visual is an important aspect of the experience of play it is not 
the only or even primary aspect,  for as Shinkle notes “Image perception  is  Synaesthetic” 
(Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 25, emphasis in original), in that it incorporates and in turn 
is  also  incorporated  by  other  sensory  modalities,  particularly  the  proprioceptive  sense  of 
bodily  movement  that  affords  the  experience  of  actual  movement  during  the  course  of 
videogame play. Indeed, we have previously noted on several occasions the close connection 
between  visual  perception  and  movement,  drawing  upon  Merleau-Ponty’s  argument  that 
“there is not a perception followed by a movement, for both form a system which varies as a 
whole"  (Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of  Perception 127).  In  regards  to  the  particular 
experience  of  movement  within  the  game-world,  which  we have  been  addressing  in  this 
section, isolating perception, particularly visual perception, from the player’s experience of 
movement prevents us from forming a phenomenological understanding of that experience of 
movement which is  experienced as an experiential  whole,  rather  than as a set  of discrete 
elements or moments.
Conclusion
The experience of movement that arises during the course of videogame play that we have 
described in this chapter is not simply some form of sensory illusion or hallucination that 
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arises out of the flow of images but something inherently derived from our embodiment that 
draws  upon our  everyday  experience  of  movement,  in  particular  the  close  connection  of 
different  sensory  modalities,  particularly  the  affective  engagement  of  the  proprioceptive 
experience of movement, that work together to produce that experience of movement. When I 
experience a sense of actually moving within the game-world, though the movement of my 
own immediate physical body is minute, that movement in the game-world is experienced as 
actual movement for phenomenologically it is, in that it is a bodily experience of movement 
based within my experience of being embodied and moving within space. As the locus of 
interaction becomes incorporated into my body, as a ready-to-hand extension of my own body 
into the game-world, the movement of the locus of manipulation becomes my own. I do not 
direct or instruct the locus of manipulation to move from one point to another but rather carry 
out that movement myself in the same way I would walk across the room – I move. 
This experience of movement in the game-world does not mirror the totality of my experience 
of movement in the actual world, for some aspects such as the experience of momentum are 
not included within the design of the videogame. Some videogames employ visual elements 
to simulate these lacking elements of the experience of movement,  such as in the case of 
‘blacking  out’  in  IL-2  Sturmovik,  or  the  use  of  speed  blurs  employed  by  some  racing 
videogames.  Despite  this,  the  experience  of  movement  within  the  game-world  does  not 
simply arise from visual experience, but rather involves the player’s body affectively, through 
engaging  their  sensory  experience  more  holistically,  particularly  the  proprioceptive 
experience  of  movement,  to  bridge  the  gap  between  the  physical  bodily  experience  of 
movement and the experience of movement in game-worlds. From a standpoint of evaluating 
videogame design, we could propose that the ability of a particular videogame to elicit  such a 
sense of phenomenological engagement is a measure of its success, as affording the player an 
experience of ‘good’ videogame play from a phenomenological point of view would ensure 
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drawing the player wholly into the experience of play. Yet, more deeply, the way in which the 
experience  of  movement  within  the  game-world  demonstrates  the  phenomenological  and 
bodily aspects of the wider experience of videogame play reinforces the argument that has 
been made over the course of this thesis, namely that the experience of videogame play in its 
immediacy, and moment to moment action, draws heavily upon the player’s experience of 
embodiment, which is to say that the experience of videogame play is inherently an embodied 
experience. Addressing this fundamentally embodied nature of videogame play opens up the 
experience of videogame play in its complexity and richness as a particular sort of experience, 
rather than abstracting the nature of this experience into some sort of theory or framework 
based in cognitive processes, ocular centrism, or other reductive approaches, which while no 
doubt  useful  for  certain  other  endeavours  are  unlikely  to  articulate  and  elucidate  the 
experience of videogame play as it is experienced.
253
CONCLUSION:
THE EMBODIED EXPERIENCE
 OF VIDEOGAME PLAY
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This thesis has sought to describe and analyse the experience of videogame play by focusing 
on  the  body’s  role  and  involvement  in  that  experience  through  the  employment  of 
phenomenological concepts. This focus acknowledges the fundamentally embodied nature of 
our  experience,  and  brings  to  our  attention  features  and  aspects  of  the  experience  of 
videogame play often overlooked within the field of videogame studies. These aspects include 
the centrality of the player’s embodied relation to the interface, the complex nature of the 
player’s relation to the interface incorporated as a ready-to-hand extension of their body, that 
the intentional concern of the player flows into the game-world through the player’s embodied 
relation to the physical aspects interface, that the player’s intentional concern comes to dwell 
in the game-world through a process of co-embodiment between the player and their locus of 
manipulation, and the importance of the player’s habitual ways of being-in-the-world to the 
player’s experience of being-in-the-game-world. Taken all together, these aspects demonstrate 
the deep involvement of the body in the player’s experience of videogame play which has 
been our overall focus during the course of this thesis, and thus demonstrates the importance 
of taking into account the bodily dimensions of the experience of videogame play if we are to 
understand that experience as it is experienced. These outcomes, though developed within this 
thesis only to the extent of demonstrating the important role of the player’s body in their 
experience of videogame play,  do suggest a point of departure for the field of videogame 
studies to investigate and understand the experience of videogame play that moves beyond 
trying to capture that experience within abstracted and rationalised structures, derived in some 
cases  from  a  conceptual  separation  between  mind  and  body,  to  instead  opening  up  the 
richness of the experience of videogame play in all its variability and ambiguity.
Videogame Play as it is Experienced
Play can sometimes be an ambiguous concept within the field of videogame studies, yet as 
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Malaby  identifies  it  is  most  often  associated  with  normative  assumptions  of  ‘fun’  and 
‘enjoyment’,  and thus trivial to and outside of the serious concerns of life. While Malaby 
critiques this and calls for the recuperation of play as a concept beyond the simple dichotomy 
of work and play, in his own way he seems to abandon this undertaking in favour of focusing 
on games themselves rather than the experience of playing them, arguing that play is not an 
activity but rather  a mode of experience.  Yet there is no reason why it  cannot  be both a 
particular way of engaging the world, in a playful manner as Malaby argues, and also an 
activity in the sense of an actual individual experience of play, for in common language the 
word is used in both senses – for example when we ‘play’  a musical instrument or when 
someone ‘plays’ the fool. When we apply this dual sense of play to the experience of playing 
a videogame, we can see that Malaby’s wider sense of play as a mode of experience arises 
from the embodied practices of the player engaged in the activity of play – that is to say that 
play is something the player both does and experiences. This brings the actions of the player,  
and by player here we specifically mean an individual engaged in the activity of playing a 
videogame,  into focus,  something that  necessitates  a  re-thinking of the way in which we 
understand and approach the experience of play, as most current approaches are insufficient in 
dealing with, or accounting for, how the experience of videogame play arises from the actions 
of players playing. 
The majority of current approaches that deal with the actual experience of videogame play are 
reductive and abstract in their approaches and outcomes and often in effect produce theories 
of  the  passive  experience  of  videogame  play.  Such  approaches  end  up focusing  on how 
videogames produce experiences for players, instead of the actions of the players themselves 
which constitute the experience of videogame play, and as a result it is not the experience of 
videogame play as it is experienced that is addressed, but rather the focus becomes the various 
formal properties of particular videogames  (Leino "Feeling So Real - a Phenomenological 
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Exploration  into  the  Realities  of  Emotions  in  Play"  1).  Indicative  of  such  reductive  and 
abstracted  approaches  is  the  equating  of  the  interactivity  offered  by  videogames  with 
‘meaningful choices’, where choice becomes a broad notion referring to things that seem to 
have little to do with choice at all, such as “intuitive physical action” or the “random throw of 
a die” (Salen and Zimmerman Rules of Play 61). The complexity of the actions of the player 
are reduced in such work to simply decision trees by the player, to choose either one option or 
another at a particular juncture in what is the often fast-paced and hectic unfolding moment to 
moment  of  videogame  play.  In  addition,  many  approaches  fall  prey  to  the  normative 
assumptions warned of by Malaby by answering the question of what makes videogames fun 
and  enjoyable,  by  simply  equating  enjoyment  to  play.  The  questions  of  why  the  player 
experiences a sense of enjoyment with a particular videogame, whilst another player may not, 
or  what  exactly  is  meant  by  ‘enjoyment’,  when  experiences  such  as  frustration  or 
determination are arguably also present in the experience of videogame play, or of even why 
both players may experience the same videogame in different ways at different times during 
the course of play,  are overlooked in favour of showing that particular ludic structures or 
other elements of videogame design ‘produce’ more or less ‘fun’ for the player. The sense of 
experience of videogame play in itself, as it is experienced by the player, and a description 
and articulation  of  the  experience  as  it  unfolds  in  the  course  of  play is  lacking  in  these 
approaches. A focus on what Lanigan describes as the ‘order of experience’ or experience as 
it  is  experienced  (Lanigan 2),  that  foregrounds the phenomenological  experience  of  play, 
allows us to begin to approach the kinds of questions posited above, and also allows us to 
move beyond the limited notion of ‘fun’ in videogame play to consider the experience of 
videogame play in all its complexity and ambiguity. It is through approaching the experience 
of videogame play in this manner,  and articulating in careful detail  its unfolding, that we 
discover the permeation of the embodied relation the player has with the interface throughout 
their experience of videogame play.
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This approach to the experience of videogame play builds upon the work of Shinkle, who 
argues that within the field of videogame studies “interactivity still tends to be understood as a 
predominately visual and semiotic activity,” leading her to turn to what she describes as the 
affective dimensions of the experience of videogame play, “a way of describing the ‘feel’ or 
intensity of a game”  (Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 22). By affect Shinkle refers to the 
richness and depth of the experience of play, “those phenomenological aspects of interactivity 
that are difficult to describe and to model theoretically, but which nonetheless make a game 
come alive”  (Shinkle "Corporealis Ergo Sum" 22-23).  Notably, Shinkle also introduces the 
importance  of the player’s  body into the experience  of videogame play,  noting  that  their 
perception  of  the images  on screen are not simply seen but  experienced,  and that  this  is 
accomplished through the  involvement  of  the body in  the unfolding of  what  is  generally 
regarded as a purely visual phenomenon  (Shinkle "Corporealis  Ergo Sum" 25). Thus, this 
central role played by the body becomes an important concern in articulating the experience 
of videogame play as it is experienced by the player, and again underlines the need to develop 
a new understanding of that experience that is sensitive to the embodied nature of videogame 
play.
To establish this new understanding of the fundamentally embodied nature of videogame play 
we have adapted Dourish’s notion of embodied interaction, which he describes as not only “a 
form of  interaction  that  is  embodied,  but  rather  that  it  is  an approach to  the  design  and 
analysis of interaction that takes embodiment to be central to, even constitutive of, the whole 
phenomenon”  (Dourish 102).  In  taking up Dourish’s  approach,  the new understanding of 
videogame  play  that  has  been  developed  has  implications  not  only  for  how the  field  of 
videogame studies can investigate videogame play, but also for the design of videogames, an 
implication particularly salient at a time when the mainstream industry is developing ways of 
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playing  videogames  that  foreground  their  embodied  nature  through  interface  modalities 
centred on movement and gesture. More generally, the focus on embodiment developed in 
this  thesis  achieves  several  outcomes  in  relation  to  understanding  the  experience  of 
videogame play through the adaptation of aspects of the work of phenomenologists Merleau-
Ponty and Heidegger in which Dourish’s approach is partially based. Firstly, it recognises the 
central importance of the player’s actions, and implicitly the perceptions with which those 
actions  are  intrinsically  tied,  that  constitute  the experience  of  videogame play and which 
derive  from  the  player’s  direction  of  their  intentional  concern  towards  videogame  play. 
Secondly, by bringing us closer to the experience of videogame play as it is experienced we 
can  move  away from the  abstracted  models  currently  used  to  analyse  those  experiences, 
which render them as deriving from the features of videogame design. And finally, it affords 
us  a  viable  level  of  focus  with  which  to  approach  the  experience  of  videogame  play 
effectively  – the notion  of  an embodied  player  experiencing  videogame play through the 
course of that play. It is at this level of the particular, individual, and embodied player that we 
begin to articulate and understand the unfolding of the experience of videogame play as it is 
experienced.
The implications of understanding videogame play as fundamentally embodied extend beyond 
the player’s  immediate  physical  presence,  for  embodiment  is  a  broad concept.  Following 
Dourish, we can see that embodiment refers not only to “simply physical reality, although that 
is often one way in which it appears. Embodiment, instead, denotes a form of participative 
status. Embodiment is about the fact that things are embedded in the world, and the ways in 
which their reality depends on being embedded”  (Dourish 18). This fundamentally situated 
nature  of  the  embodied  player,  something  that  has  increasingly  attracted  the  attention  of 
videogame scholars as we saw with the ‘situated play’ theme of the 2007 DiGRA conference, 
has implications for how we understand the experience of videogame play.  The embodied 
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player does not exist in some kind of ontological or epistemological vacuum, but enters into 
the activity of play as an individual with a phenomenological history of being-in-the-world, 
upon  which  is  built  an  understanding  of  certain  cultural  conventions  and/or  beliefs,  pre-
existing skills, and expectations – when we refer to an embodied player we are arguing not 
only that that the player’s body plays a role in a simply physical sense, but in the wider sense 
employed  by  Merleau-Ponty  that  their  embodiment  is  their  basis  for  being-in-the-world 
(Merleau-Ponty  Phenomenology  of  Perception 169),  and  thus  permeates  their  entire 
experience of videogame play. The implication of this is that we must take into account the 
circumstances of the player, and be concerned with what bearing that circumstance may have 
on their  experience of videogame play.  Of particular importance is the embodied player’s 
previous experience of play, for someone who has little experience of the videogame they are 
playing, or indeed videogames in general, will have an experience quite different to that of 
someone who already possesses that familiarity. Importantly, this sense of familiarity arises at 
various levels in the experience of videogame play, from the player’s immediate use of the 
physical interface to their experience of the spatiality of videogame worlds.
This is not to overlook the importance of the embodied player’s immediate bodily experience, 
for it is from this immediate sense of embodiment that the player’s experience of the more 
complex aspects of videogames arise. Importantly, the player’s body should not be considered 
as only a fixed entity with easily definable boundaries, as the body is extensible through the 
bodily incorporation of tools or equipment  that  extend the player’s  potential  to act  in the 
world, both in their immediate physical world and the game-space, specifically to take up the 
activity of videogame play. The player’s immediate physical relation to the interface, quite 
simply  holding  it  in  their  hands,  opens  up  the  potential  for  videogame  play  through  a 
movement  of the player’s  intentional  concern from the proximal  physical  interface to the 
distal events shown on-screen. Thus, the interface becomes a central concern in understanding 
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the experience of videogame play as it is experienced. The player’s relation to the interface is 
complex, it is not consciously in the awareness of the player during the course of play as an  
activity, yet remains central to the unfolding of the experience of videogame play as mode of 
experience,  withdrawn yet  ever  present.  In describing  the nature of this  complex relation 
between the player and the interface and its role in the experience of videogame play we can 
begin to articulate and understand the experience of videogame play as it is experienced.
The Interface and the Body: A Complex Relation
The importance of the relation between the player and the interface used to play videogames, 
and its embodied nature, has been demonstrated throughout the course of this thesis and its 
mediating role in the player’s experience of videogame play has been discussed at several 
levels. In Chapter Two the large size of the physical interface of [giantJoystick] demonstrated 
the importance of the physical bodily relation between player and interface, as the increased 
scale changed the nature of that relation and as a result the player’s experience of videogame 
play. The process whereby the interface is taken up and incorporated into the player’s body as 
a ready-to-hand extension of their body was introduced in Chapter Three. This expanded the 
concept of the interface to account for the way that, once it has become ready-to-hand, the 
interface withdraws from the player’s immediate concern. This process of withdrawal, where 
the interface becomes a tool directed by the player towards an intentional in-order-to, was 
shown in Chapters Four and Five to afford the player’s intentional concern to flow into the 
game-space, which thus becomes the focus of their concern. This conception of the interface 
includes the player’s locus of manipulation through which they act within the game-space in 
its  aspect  as  an  avatar,  whilst  concurrently  the  locus  of  manipulation  in  its  aspect  as  a 
character confines the player’s intentional concern within the particular potentials for action 
in the game-space which constitute the character. In negotiating these two aspects of the locus 
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of manipulation the player enters into a process of co-embodiment with it, where over time 
the  player  comes  to  embody  the  limitations  of  the  character  aspect  of  the  locus  of 
manipulation in their conduct through the process of taking up the avatar aspect of the locus 
of  manipulation  as  ready-to-hand  equipment.  We  are  employing  ‘equipment’  here  in 
Heidegger’s sense, where equipment has an intentional assignment towards a particular ‘in-
order-to’, and it is through reconciling their intentional concern with what the character as 
equipment  can be taken up in-order-to  that  the player  is  able  to  incorporate  the locus  of 
manipulation as a ready-to-hand avatar with which to act within the game-space. Finally, in 
Chapter Six we saw how this process of the incorporation of the interface into the player’s  
body, and the resultant flow of their intentionality into the game-space, can afford the player  
an experience of presence in and movement within that game-space as the player moves the 
locus of manipulation directly as if it were their own body. Thus, understanding the nature of 
this  relation  between  the  player  and  the  interface  used  to  play  becomes  important  to 
understanding the experience of videogame play as it is experienced, and from it extends an 
understanding of that  experience which shows that the deeper  levels of the experience of 
videogame  play  arise  out  of  this,  the  immediate  embodied  relation  between  player  and 
interface.
The first implication of dealing with the relation between player and interface explains why 
the interface,  despite  its  importance  to  the player’s  experience  of videogame play,  seems 
strangely absent both from that experience and outside of the player’s immediate concern and 
awareness during the course of play, and in theoretical writing about videogames generally.  
The interface becomes ready-to-hand equipment during the course of play, that is to say that it 
is taken up as an extension of the player’s body and incorporated into the player’s bodily 
schema, much like the experienced typist “incorporates the key-bank space into his bodily 
space” (Merleau-Ponty Phenomenology of Perception 167). The player’s familiarity with the 
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interface is of great importance to their experience of videogame play, for it is through this 
familiarity that the player can take up the interface as equipment ready-to-hand, something in-
order-to do something else rather than being the immediate end of the player’s concern. Thus, 
as Heidegger  argues  in  relation  to  equipment  generally,  for the interface  to  be genuinely 
ready-to-hand it must be withdrawn from the player’s immediate awareness and subordinated 
to that which it is used in-order-to  (Heidegger 360), specifically the activity of playing the 
videogame.
The implication of this withdrawal of the interface from the immediate attention of the player 
produces the ambiguity of the boundary of the interface, the question of what and where it is. 
In being taken up as an extension of the player’s body the interface becomes much more 
complex than what a limited, technically based understanding of the interface accounts for. 
More than simply the physical devices, or on-screen buttons and other elements, with which 
the interface is generally understood as constituting, the incorporation of the interface into the 
player’s  body  schema  instead  suggests  that  the  interface  is  central  to  the  experience  of 
videogame play, and extends into the world of the game itself, and as it is incorporated into 
the player’s body, similarly extends the player’s body into the game world. In the case of 
EyeToy: Play 3 this extension is quite literal, as the player’s body and their movements are 
represented on-screen, and though EyeToy: Play 3 utilises a unique camera based interface it 
demonstrates  aspects  of  the  experience  of  videogame  play  applicable  more  widely.  The 
movement  of  the  player’s  intentional  concern  into  the  world  of  the  videogame  that 
accompanies the withdrawal of the interface from the player’s immediate concern, where the 
player  isn’t  simply  moving  in  front  of  a  camera  but  directing  that  movement  to  achieve 
particular  effects  and  outcomes  within  the  game-space,  underlines  the  importance  of  the 
incorporation of the interface into the player’s body in the experience of videogame play – 
though it may not be present to the player’s awareness in the course of play, it is none-the-less 
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an important basis for that experience. It is through the incorporation of the interface and its 
withdrawal  from  the  player’s  immediate  intentional  concern  that  the  player  is  able  to 
experience a sense of direct engagement with the course of events within the game-space and 
experience that game-space as part of the experience of videogame play.
This movement of the player’s intentionality into the game-space leads to the question of 
where videogame play takes place, the ‘where’ of the effect of the player’s actions and the 
experience of those actions. Even in the case of videogames that foreground the tangibility of 
their interfaces there seems to be a tendency for the player to orientate themselves towards the 
activity on-screen, rather than their immediate physical environment. Given the importance of 
the  withdrawal  of  the  ready-to-hand  interface,  and  the  corresponding  movement  of  the 
player’s intentionality, this is not surprising, for as Susi and Rambusch point out, the players 
are not only “physically situated through their bodies; [. . .] they are simultaneously situated  
within  the game’s  virtual  world;  the activity  of controlling  a  game’s  character  places  the 
player in the virtual game world” (Susi and Rambusch 733-34, emphasis in original). Thus the 
character,  or in-game avatar,  which the player  controls,  is  an extension of the immediate 
physical  interface,  suggesting  new  ways  of  understanding  the  player’s  relation  to  that 
character  based  upon  the  embodied  nature  of  the  experience  of  videogame  play  that  go 
beyond  positing  some  mechanism  of  identification  between  the  player  and  character,  to 
recognise instead that the character  or avatar serves as the location of the player’s bodily 
presence within the game-space.
In the case of EyeToy: Play 3 the game character is a representation of the player’s own body, 
such that the player is presented with a sort of mirror image, their movements in the real-
world  represented  and  re-interpreted  within  the  context  of  the  game  on-screen.  Thus  the 
question of which ‘body’ the player is primarily focused on controlling arises, is it their own 
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immediate physical body, or the represented body that interacts with the on-screen interface? 
Given the phenomenologically natural form of interaction required of the player of EyeToy:  
Play 3, which is simply movement, the answer to this question would seem straight forward, 
but as we saw it was possible to disrupt the player’s sense of connection with their on-screen 
representation through rotation and inversion of the on-screen image, causing the player to 
experience a sense of bodily disorientation, and requiring the player to re-establish a sense of 
familiarity  with  their  on-screen  representation.  The  fragility  of  the  player’s  bodily 
incorporation of the interface, and the effort required to maintain it, underlines the limitations 
of acting through an avatarial stand-in within the game-space, and that embodiment is not 
simply the fundamental state of being of the player but is also an active and fluid process. 
This act of embodying the character entails that the player’s body extends into the game-space 
through an incorporation of the character into the player’s bodily schema, whilst at the same 
time the player embodies in their conduct the limitations of the character that relate to the 
players potential to act within the game-space
Thus the player’s bodily extension into the game-space means that they can experience it as 
an habitable space, not something merely displayed on-screen but as an environment in which 
to act and to be. Yet it is not only simply through the successful incorporation of the avatar 
into the player’s bodily schema that affords the player a sense of presence within the game-
space, but also the way in which videogames make use of the player’s already familiar natural 
and learnt experiences of space. Whilst this is most clear in relation to three dimensional first-
person based games that locate the player within a virtual body, it applies to other types of 
videogames as well, such as the way many strategy games rely on the player’s topological 
understanding  of  space  to  facilitate  the  experience  of  being-in-the-game-world.  This  is  a 
departure from the usual definition of immersion employed by the field of videogame studies, 
as rather than a sense of the player ‘suspending their disbelief’ it suggests an active role for 
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the player of establishing their own sense of being-in-the-game-world through their taking up 
of the interface as an extension of the body through their actions within the game-space. The 
player experiences a sense of bodily presence in the game-space as they are able to project 
their intentional concern into that space through the interface and as such their experience of 
videogame play comes to dwell within the game-space through the direct bodily experience of 
that space. In understanding how the player’s experience of being-in-the-game-world extends 
from their  embodied relation to the interface we can understand why videogame systems, 
such  as  the  Wii,  that  employ  a  more  phenomenologically  natural  interface  enjoys  such 
popularity as they reduce the barriers to entry for inexperienced players into the game-space 
by facilitating the incorporation of the interface into the player’s body, without relying on the 
player having extensive experience of the complex controllers that have long been dominant 
in the videogames industry. Rather, the player can easily take up the interface and get down to 
what they have taken up that interface for – to experience videogame play.
Future Work
This thesis has presented only a starting point in understanding the experience of videogame 
play as experienced, dealing as it does with the most immediate and general implications for 
re-thinking the experience of play as it is experienced. As such several areas of future, more 
detailed  implications  are  suggested.  Firstly,  something  that  has  been  implicit  in  our 
conclusions, but not addressed explicitly, is the social aspect of the experience of videogame 
play. Several suggestions for dealing with the social aspect of videogame play arise out of the 
conclusions reached here, specifically in how the bodies of players are present to each other 
and form the basis of an interpersonal and social relation that constitute them as collaborator  
or competitor. This thesis has shied away from dealing with this social aspect, as it is an area 
of sufficient complexity to warrant a separate research project focusing specifically on that 
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area  alone.  This  would  extend  beyond  the  immediate  physical  sense  of  the  player’s 
embodiment to consider the innumerable practices associated with videogame play that form 
a cultural basis for that inter-personal interaction, a sense of the habitual ways of being-in-the-
world associated with or considered part of a wider culture of playing videogames, and how 
these shared understandings are established and applied, how they change over time, and how 
they might impact upon or influence the experience of videogame play.
There is also further work to do in advancing the articulation of the experience of videogame 
play through expanding the phenomenological framework used here and thus opening up the 
experience  of  videogame  play  through  employing  a  range  of  different  positions  of 
phenomenological  thought.  This  thesis  has  not  sought  to  engage  with  the  philosophical 
discipline of phenomenology in itself,  for it is after  all  a thesis arising out of the field of 
videogame studies which has taken the experience of videogame play as its focus, rather than 
how the experience of videogame play might contribute to phenomenological theory. As such, 
much of the wider richness of phenomenology, including the interpersonal and social aspects 
already mentioned, offer scope for further research. Possible projects that would build upon 
the  outcomes  of  this  thesis  could  include  the  formulation  of  a  sort  of  phenomenological 
typology of videogames based upon the particular kinds of experiences of videogame play 
they tend towards affording, and more in depth engagement with debates concerning some of 
the phenomenological concepts employed such as intentionality and embodiment, particularly 
how these more specific debates may shed further light onto the experience of videogame 
play and thus further open it up to our exploration, articulation, and understanding.
One substantial avenue for further research along these lines would be through close playings 
of  specific  videogames,  employing  the  phenomenological  approach  developed  here,  to 
elucidate  the  phenomenological  experience  of  playing  particular  videogames  and 
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incorporating more phenomenological theory as warranted by the concerns of the analysis. 
Whilst  they are not entirely absent from the field of videogame studies, close playings of 
particular  videogames,  with  no  greater  objective  then  attempting  to  articulate  and  thus 
understand the experience of playing that particular  videogame,  are somewhat  thin on the 
ground, as more  commonly examinations  of particular  videogames  are employed to build 
more general theories about the nature of videogames concerning their formal structures, their 
place amongst wider social practices, or various aspects of videogame design. Close studies of 
individual videogames employing the phenomenological perspective developed in this thesis 
offer the possibility of opening up and identifying points of tension or contradiction within 
this tendency towards generalised theories concerning videogames, suggesting ways in which 
such theories may need to be adapted or indeed highlighting their limitations. The aspect of 
personal experience of a phenomenological approach also offers the possibility of bringing 
into the field of videogame studies a way of answering Flynn’s argument that we “need to 
develop further research into the cultural  specificity of players and the precise patterns of 
embodied  engagement”  (Flynn  59-60).  Videogame studies  is  presently characterised  by a 
significant  proportion of  its  cohort  of researchers  belonging to  that  loose social  grouping 
colloquially  called  ‘gamers’.  Whilst  in  many  ways  this  familiarity  is  undoubtedly  an 
advantage in the study of videogames it can also be disadvantageous if we fail to reflect on 
how this familiarity informs our understanding of, and assumptions about, the experience of 
videogame  play.  When  we  consider  ‘players’  we  need  to  include  a  more  diverse  and 
heterogeneous understanding, not simply taking into account various factors such as genders, 
cultures, ages, and so on but rather considering how the experience of videogame play in all 
its variations might be affected by and implicated in these factors. 
A final potential area for future work is the application of the ideas developed within this 
thesis, and those contained within phenomenological theory more generally, in the design and 
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production  of  videogames  and  other  related  interactive  media.  Through  developing  new 
interface  modalities,  in  reworking  current  genres,  and  using  design  practices  that  are 
phenomenologically informed, there is the potential to further explore the role of the body in 
the experience of videogame play as it is experienced. As was noted in Chapter One, the 
nature of our engagement with videogames is seemingly becoming more performative and 
physically active, and as such the issue of embodiment in the experience of videogame play 
will  likely  continue,  making  ever  more  plain  the  central  contention  of  this  thesis  that 
embodiment is inherent to the experience of videogame play. Thus, the way in which we think 
about and understand the experience of videogame play,  whether we are playing them or 
creating  them,  is  likely  to  change  quite  significantly  in  the  coming  years  –  the  field  of 
videogame studies, if it engages with this change, may find itself well placed to assist and 
consult  with  the  videogames  industry  on  adapting  to  this  change,  not  simply  though 
theoretical concepts, but rather through being able to describe and articulate the experience of 
videogame play as it is experienced.
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